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SOME JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVES ON
EMPLOYMENT SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
COMPARABLE WORTH
Mark Seidenfeld*
INTRODUCTION

Literature on comparable worth abounds but, by and large, it views
the subject from a narrow perspective.' It asks whether employers treat
jobs predominately held by women - "female jobs" - differently from
"male jobs." 2 It takes as given traditional models of equality, which derive
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. B.A. Reed
College, 1975; J.D. Stanford University, 1983. I would like to thank Rob Atkinson, Meg
Baldwin, Linda Griffiths, Tony Herman, Mack Player, Liz Schneider and Don Weidner for
their ideas and comments expressed in numerous discussions and in response to earlier
drafts. I am also grateful for the excellent and dedicated research assistance provided by
Kris Davenport.
1. E.g., H. AARON & C. LOUGY, THE COMPARABLE WORTH CONTROVERSY (1986);
M. GOLD, A DIALOGUE ON COMPARABLE WORTH (1983); E. PAUL, EQUITY AND GENDER:
THE COMPARABLE WORTH DEBATE (1989); Dowd, The Metamorphosis of Comparable
Worth, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 833 (1986); Gertner, Thoughts on Comparable Worth
Litigation and OrganizationalStrategies, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 163 (1986); Nelson,
Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in
Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 233 (1980); Comment, Pay Equity or Pay Up: The
Inevitable Evolution of Comparable Worth Into Employer Liability Under Title VII, 21
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 305 (1987). See generally Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and
Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728 (1986).
2. See Treiman, Hartmann & Roos, Assessing Pay DiscriminationUsing National
Data, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION: TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES
AND POLITICAL REALITIES 137 (H. Remick ed. 1984) [hereinafter TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES]; see, e.g., Clauss, Comparable Worth - The Theory, Its Legal Foundation,and the

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:269

from the similarity of all human beings, and posits that likes be treated
alike. 3
That the commentary focuses on the issue as one of equality and
different treatment is not surprising. Congress debated comparable worth
when it passed the Equal Pay Act of 1963,' and litigants premised initial
comparable worth type claims on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
Thus the debate on comparable worth has been colored by the notions of
what constitutes sexual equality and discrimination under these existing
employment sex discrimination statutes.
This article contends that framing the debate in terms of these
traditional understandings of sexual equality biases its outcome against
comparable worth. It proposes that Congress premised the Equal Pay Act
on a theory of equality that accepts differential treatment of men and
women and requires merely that employers apply the workplace's independently accepted norm that equal work deserves equal pay. It also asserts
that Congress adopted Title VII primarily to address race discrimination.
Therefore, Title VII doctrine reflects the prevailing attitude that race
should be irrelevant to the workings of the labor market.' Since Title VII
FeasibilityofImplementation, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 7, 23-24 (1986); Grune, Pay Equity
Is a Necessary Remedy for Wage Discrimination,in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE
80's 165 (U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights 1984) [hereinafter ISSUE FOR THE 80's]; Livernash,
An Overview, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 1, 3 (E. Livernash 2d
ed. 1984) [hereinafter ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES]. Livernash's portrayal of the "fundamental issue . . . [as] simple," betrays the narrowness of this focus.
3. See, e.g., Westen, The Empty Idea Of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 539-40
(1982).
4. See 108 CONG. REC. 14,767-71 (1962).
5. Title VII cases alleging pay discrimination based on a comparison of men's and
women's jobs, and preceding the academic debate on comparable worth, include: County of
Wash. v.Gunther, 452 U.S. 161(1981) (comparing guards in female prison to those in male
prison); Lemons v. City of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.) (comparing nurses to
nonnursing city employees), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Christensen v. State of
Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977) (comparing clerical employees of state university to
university physical plant workers). Almost immediately after the Court ruled in Gunther
that Title VII proscribed sex-based wage discrimination even where such suits did not
involve equal work claims, proponents of comparable worth published a guide to framing
pay equity suits in terms of Title VII doctrine. See Newman & Vonhof, "Separate But
Equal"-- Job Segregation andPay Equity in the Wake of Gunther, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV.
269, 285-91 (1981).
6. Race and sex discrimination have much in common due to white males' historic
subjugation of blacks and women. See Hacker, Women as a Minority Group, 30 Soc.
FORCES 60 (1951), reprintedin, MASCULINE/FEMININE, READINGS IN SEXUAL MYTHOLOGY AND THE LIBERATION OF WOMEN 130-48 (B. Roszak & T. Roszak eds. 1969)
[hereinafter MASCULINE/FEMININE]. For the purposes of this article, however, there is an
important distinction: in the labor market, "society continue[s] to value sex roles, but not
race roles." Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 39, 45-46 n.43 (1985)
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prohibits race and sex discrimination in almost identical terms, this
doctrine recognizes a formal equivalence of men and women just as it treats
blacks as indistinguishable from whites.7 Most significantly, neither the
Equal Pay Act nor Title VII mean to alter the fundamental character of the
workplace to address the historical exclusion of traditionally female
values. 8
This article sees the debate on comparable worth as part of a broader
question about the appropriate meaning of sexual equality underlying
employment sex discrimination law. Discussion of this question generally
has not been explicit. The more usual analysis of employment sex
discrimination law takes place within a framework that does not question
the underlying preferences reflected in the market. But, throughout the
history of the women's movement in the United States, and especially in
the last decade, feminists have argued that a theory of sexual equality will
have to take into account the differences between men and women as
groups. 9 Applied to the labor market, a model of "equality of difference"
recognizes the existence of sex roles in society - that male and female
workers tend to have different preferences and make different choices.
Because men have historically dominated the labor market, it overwhelmingly reflects values consistent with male roles and rewards "masculine"
choices while ignoring "feminine" concerns and penalizing choices consistent with female roles. To the extent, however, that society considers many
(conclusion based on a study of reverse discrimination cases). See also Wasserstrom,
Racism, Sexism, and PreferentialTreatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L.
REV. 581, 605 (1977). For further discussion, see infra notes 130-146 and accompanying
text.
7. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 85-92, 107-29 and accompanying text.
9. As early as 1853, Antoinette Brown Blackwell argued that if women were to avoid
being regarded as "inferior versions of men, [they must] admit the irreducible difference of
sex" rather than strive for formal egalitarianism. The 1984 James McCormick Mitchell
Lecture: Feminist Discourse,Moral Values, and the Law - A Conversation34 BUFFALO
L. REV. 11, 65 [hereinafter A Conversation] (comments of Professor Ellen C. DuBois).
Recent feminist writings in sociology, philosophy, psychology and law emphasize the need
for society to recognize, and equally value, women's views. See, e.g., C. GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) (reinterpreting psychological gender differences as not indicating developmental inferiority of women); E. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF
WOMEN (1980) (arguing that "equality" should take into account the biological and social
differences between men and women); Rossi, Sex Equality: The Beginning of Ideology, in
MASCULINE/FEMININE, supra note 6, at 173 (proposing a sociological "hybrid" model of

equality that envisions a society whose values reflect male and female input); Scales, The
Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1382 (1986)
(viewing social and legal institutions as a means for male domination over women and
arguing that "a commitment to equality requires that we undertake to investigate the
genderization of the world").
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traditionally female values not only legitimate but salutary, 10 prices set by
the market should incorporate them and, ideally, a theory of labor market
discrimination should rectify their exclusion. Therefore, to assess comparable worth, it is necessary first to understand the influences of theories of
sexual equality underlying existing employment discrimination law, and
second, to extend the analytic panorama beyond that outlined by these
traditional theories' assumption that the marketplace validly reflects the
tastes and preferences of society.
This article analyzes employment sex discrimination law from that
broader perspective. It begins by outlining three models of sexual equality.
It proceeds to show how existing discrimination law - the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII - reflect the two traditional models. It then introduces the
theory of comparable worth and provides some background on that theory.
It describes various means by which the theory might be implemented and
reviews the reasons for the wage gap between men and women, which
provided the most direct impetus for the recent push for comparable worth.
Finally, it demonstrates that comparable worth implements the third
model of equality intended to change the social values in the prevailing
society to reflect "female" tastes and preferences and argues that this is the
precise reason comparable worth might succeed in generating gender
equality in the workplace while existing anti-discrimination law has failed.
I.

THEORIES OF EQUALITY

While debate about discrimination has generated a myriad of models
defining sexual equality, for purposes of discussing employment antidiscrimination laws, these models can be grouped into three classes:
conservative, liberal and feminist. 1 The conservative model emphasizes
innate distinctions between males and females and posits that existing
sociological differences between men and women result naturally from
these innate distinctions. The liberal model rejects the significance of
biological distinctions between males and females and demands that
10. While the labor market may not reward the bearing and raising of children,
society obviously values those functions, at least as long as preservation of the human
species remains one of its important goals.
11. The designation of these models as conservative, liberal, and feminist provides a
simplified description of the political philosophies underlying each model. These labels are
not meant to suggest that all conservatives will agree with the conservative model, all
liberals with the liberal model, and all feminists with the feminist model. Nor are they
meant to suggest that there is a bright line between these various political ideologies. For the
purposes of this article, however, it is not necessary to describe either the diverse
conceptions of justice held by individuals within each of these political denominations, or
the points at which these ideologies overlap.
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institutions defining relations of authority and power - legal, economic
and public-social frameworks - ultimately be gender blind. The feminist
model recognizes that biological distinctions between males and females
historically have led to sociological differences between men and women,
but does not accept that these distinctions manifest any "natural"
sociological order. Rather, society has a choice about how to account for
these innate distinctions, and equality requires restructuring society to
reflect the concerns of both men and women in a nonhierarchical manner.
The Conservative Model Of Sexual Equality

A.

The conservative model of equality posits that males and females
innately differ and therefore should not be treated identically. 2 Rather,
equality is achieved by assigning each to his or her own natural sexappropriate domain and allowing each group to structure its respective
domain. This will result in structures consistent with the innate nature of
the group's members. The conservative idea of equality requires only the
application of gender appropriate norms to each separate sphere, adopting
an ideal of "separate but equal."
This model views the separation of home and market responsibilities,
and the assignment of the former to women and the latter to men, as a
natural consequence of distinctions it sees between males and females."1
The home is a private sphere that operates according to principles of love
and devotion. Primary home responsibilities include creating a supportive
atmosphere, which allows the wage-earning spouse to be more productive,
and bearing and nurturing children to carry on socially productive activity
in the future. 4 The market, unlike the home, is driven by calculation and
12. Philosophers from the time of ancient Greece to the modern era have espoused the
view that women's rationality and psychology differ from men's in a manner that justifies

the different treatment society accords them. See 1ARISTOTLE,
transl. 1943); J.

ROUSSEAU, EMILE, OR EDUCATION

Schopenhauer, On Women, in

POLITICS ch.

12, 13 (Jowett

322-26 (Foxley transl. 1914); A.

ESSAYS OF ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

435 (Saunders transl.

1892); Freud, Femininity, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 184
(Sprott transl. 1933). More recent advocates of this position include: G. GILDER, WEALTH
AND POVERTY

69, 136-37 (1981); G.

GILDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE 144 (1986); S.
139-46 (1973); P. SCHLAFLY, THE

GOLDBERG, THE INEVITABILITY OF PATRIARCITY
POWER OF THE POSITIVE WOMAN 11 (1977).

13. See S. GOLDBERG, supra note 12, at 104. The conservative model is succinctly
summarized in several works critical of the model. See Jaggar, PoliticalPhilosophiesof
Women's Liberation,in

FEMINISM

& PHILOSOPHY 5, 6 (M. Vetterling-Braggin, F. Elliston

& T. English eds. 1977); Rossi, supra note 9, at 5-6 (description of "pluralistic model"); D.
KIRP,

M.

YUDOF &

M.

FRANKS, GENDER JUSTICE 53-55
YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note
"Special Child," 40 PUB. INT. 96,

14. See D. KIRP, M.
Bureaucracy, and the

(1986).

13, at 17-19; Berger, Family,
105-106 (1975).
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competition. The free market capitalist system depends on competition to
ensure efficient production and distribution of goods.15 And, considering
markets in a more dynamic sense, competition also encourages innovation
and increased productivity via an economic "Darwinism" in which the
most fit producers survive and others fall by the wayside. The free market
system, which conservatives see as the ideal, dictates that participants be
analytic rather than emotional, and aggressive rather than sensitive. 16
The relegation of women to the home sphere and men to the market
sphere does not manifest any inequality under the conservative model. The
biological functions of child bearing and breast feeding predispose females
to the care of home responsibilities. Data purporting to show that women
are more emotionally sensitive, caring and nurturing provide further
evidence that women's assumption of this role is natural. 7 Similarly men's
aggressiveness and greater analytic skills, also purportedly demonstrated
by psychological studies,' 8 predispose men to occupy the market sphere. As
stated by one proponent of the conservative view: "The male ethos. . . is
absolutely necessary to the working world. It has made American business
productive and efficient, and the requirements of the workplace simply
demand such 'masculine' behavior from employees."' 9
From the conservative perspective, sex-segregation of jobs and the
home orientation of women reflect the natural "voluntary" choice of the
individual members of society given the distinctions between men and
women. These phenomena do not indicate problems that justify government intervention into the individual choices underlying the structure of
20
either the home or market arenas.
15. See D. KEEZER, MAKING CAPITALISM WORK 288 (1950); A. DAHLBERG, JOBS,
61 (1932); M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133
(1962) (business has no social responsibility other than to compete in order to maximize
profits).
16. For a comprehensive comparison of the family and the market, see Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497
(1983). At various points in her article Olsen depicts the traditional view that the market
and family are based on conflicting ethics. Id. at 1499-500, 1500-22. She also demonstrates
that such a view is, at best, overly simplistic. Id. at 1522-24.
MACHINES AND CAPITALISM

17. See Mischel, Sex Typing and Socialization in 2 CARMICHAEL'S MANUAL OF
CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 3, 6 (P. Mussen 3d ed. 1970) (reporting "greater dependency, social

passivity and conformity in females than in males"); see also L. TIGER & R. Fox, THE
IMPERIAL ANIMAL 102-04 (1971) (comparing the biological and evoluntionary characteristics of male primates and humans in their socio-political relationships).
18. Mischel, supranote 17, at 4-5 (aggressiveness); E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 274 (1974) (analytic skills); F. WESLEY & C. WESLEY,

94 (1977) (analytic skills).
19. Flick, The New Feminism and the World of Work, 71 PUB. INT. 34, 44 (1981).
20. Brigette Berger, a conservative sociologist, considers government intervention

SEX ROLE PSYCHOLOGY
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The Liberal Model Of Sexual Equality
1. The Liberal Critique of the Conservative Model

The liberal model critiques the conservative model on three grounds.
First, it rejects the model's empirical basis that there are material innate
distinctions between males and females. 1 Outside of the clear physiological distinctions between male and female roles in reproduction and
physical strength, data do not show statistically significant sex differences
for most traits.2 Even for those psychological traits where studies have
shown statistically significant differences, such as aggression and spatial
ability, the degree of difference between male and female populations is
small compared to the individual differences within each population. If
these distributions were mirrored in the labor force, jobs would be almost
completely integrated and the workplace would not exhibit the pervasive
sex segregation that presently exists. Thus, liberals reject the conservative
naturalist position that biology dictates the division between home and
market spheres.
Second, the liberal view dismisses the conservatives' blind faith in
market mechanisms that leads to the belief that existing sex-roles reflect
into family matters "a social catastrophe." Berger, supra note 14, at 106. See also Olsen,
supra note 16, at 1501-06 (summarizing the traditional arguments against state intervention into the family and the market as government neutrality).
21. See, e.g., D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 13, at 53-54, 63; Jaggar,
supra note 13, at 7; Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 609-14.
22. See E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, supra note 18, at 349-55. Maccoby and Jacklin
conducted what is still the most comprehensive analysis of studies of sex differences and
concluded that the only well established innate differences are:
1. That girls have greater verbal ability than boys;
2. That boys excel in visual spatial ability;
3. That boys excel in mathematical ability;
4. That males are more aggressive.
Id. at 351-52. More recent analysis using more quantitative analytic techniques (metaanalyses) suggest that even some of these well established differences may be suspect. See,
e.g., Hyde & Linn, Gender Differences in Verbal Ability: A Meta-Analysis, 104 PSYCH.
BULL. 53, 62 (1988) (concluding that there is no statistically significant difference in the
verbal abilities of boys and girls); cf Hare- Mustin & Marecek, The Meaning of Difference:
Gender Theory, Postmodernism and Psychology, 43 AM. PSYCH. 455, 457-58 (1988)
(arguing that whether studies show sex differences often depends on whether the theoretical
framework underlying the studies bias them to exaggerate or minimize the significance of
gender differences).
23. "Gender differences appear to account for no more than I %-5 % of the population
variance." Hyde, How Large Are Cognitive Gender Differences?:A Meta-Analysis Using
w2 and d, 36 AM. PSYCH. 892, 894 (1981). Interestingly, Plato had foreseen and used this
overlap of male and female abilities to justify sex neutral roles even though he accepted
natural differences between the sexes. See THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO: TRANSLATED WITH
NOTES AND AN INTERPRETIVE ESSAY BY ALLAN BLOOM 133-34 (1968).
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the volitional choices of all members of society. Liberals believe instead
that market structures can limit women's opportunities for self development. 4 A history in which women were considered second class citizens,
unable to vote and restricted from pursuing many occupations, supports
this liberal critique.2" It is supported as well by the consistent evidence of
discrimination against women throughout history.2 6 Even today there are
employers who explicitly channel women into a limited class of jobs
without concern for whether individual women can perform the jobs they
27
are restricted from holding.
Finally, liberals criticize the conservative model because it dictates
proper sex roles in the good society, rather than ensuring the fairness of the
process which defines those roles.28 Even if one concedes that women and
men innately differ in ways that at one time justified present sex roles, the
conservative position locks in those roles. It fails to allow for changes in
technology and social values that might require alteration or elimination of
traditional sex roles. It thereby forces its outcome on society rather than
reflecting a choice made by the individuals within society.
Thus, for liberals, the conservative premise that only individuals of
like nature need be treated alike falters because it allows unbridled leeway
to characterize classes of individuals as dissimilar. The conservative model
does not rigorously relate its naturalist and market-operation foundations
to its gender-linked division of home and market. Coupled with the
24. "[L]iberals now expect the state itself to mitigate the worst effects of a market
economy." A. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 34 (1983).

25. See Wildman, The Legitimationof Sex Discrimination:A CriticalResponse to
Supreme Court Jurisprudence,63 OR. L. REV. 265, 273 (1984) (describing pre-1970 sex
discrimination).
26. For a brief description of history and cultural explanation of male domination over
and discrimination against women in the United States, see J. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF
EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY

FRANKS,

293-324 (1978). See also D.

KIRP, M. YUDOF & M.

supra note 13, at 29-45.

27. Roos & Reskin, Institutional Factors Contributing to Sex Segregation in the
Workplace, in SEX
DIES

SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS, EXPLANATIONS, REMESEGREGATION]. See, e.g., Pitre v.

235, 243-44 (B. Reskin ed., 1984) [hereinafter SEX

Western Elec. Co., Inc., 843 F.2d 1262, 1270 (10th Cir. 1988) (men were assigned to
certain technical jobs management believed women could not handle); Van v. Plant & Field
Serv. Corp., 672 F. Supp. 1306, 1311 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (employer refused to hire women for
"dirty" or "dangerous" jobs).
28. Liberal theory instead demands:
[P]olitical decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of any particular
conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life. Since the citizens of a
society differ in their conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it
prefers one conception to another. ...
Dworkin, Liberalism, in

1978).

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY

113, 127 (S. Hampshire ed.
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empirical weaknesses of those foundations, liberals find little reason to
believe that splitting society into distinct women's and men's spheres is
either preordained or a reflection of the personal values of the members of
our society.
2.

The Liberal Model Defined

The liberal model of sexual equality mandates that any difference in
the treatment of individuals be justified by the distinctions between them.
The liberal concept of equality de-emphasizes differences between men
and women, viewing any differences as immaterial to the choices made
within the public domain of society. 9 It advocates formal gender-neutral
decisionmaking and resulting equality of opportunity in the labor market
as its ultimate principles. It envisions a society in which women have been
fully assimilated into the public spheres of society on the same basis as men
now participate.30
The liberal model builds upon individual autonomy as its basis for
defining equality. 31 The model refers to autonomy as capacity of a person to
decide what she values - to choose personal goals. In most cases, no one
else is better able to decide what is in the individual's best interests, for she
most profoundly experiences the effects of her decisions. For this reason
society should allow people the maximum liberty- to fulfill the ends they
deem important.
The liberal's respect for autonomy is not necessarily absolute. The
ability to decide meaningfully what is in one's self interest requires both the
capacity to relate one's conduct to its future effect on one's life and the
experience to comprehend what that the future effect might feel like. For
this reason we restrict the rights of children or the mentally incompetent to
make decisions in long term pursuit of their life goals. But, by all
indications women and men are equally able "to enjoy and suffer, to reason,
29. D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 13, at 20. See also Jaggar, On
Sexual Equality, 84 ETHICS 275, 276 (1974) (describing the traditional (i.e., liberal)
feminist notion of sexually egalitarian society).
30. "Under the assimilationist definition of equality the distinction between men and
women are de-emphasized in favor of the likeness of the sexes. The formerly disadvantaged
or excluded group participates on terms identical to those offered the included group ... "
Note, Sexual Equality Under The Pregnancy DiscriminationAct, 83 COL. L. REV. 690,
704 (1983).
31. See D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supranote 13, at 13-14; A. JAGGAR, supra
note 24, at 33; Richards, The Individual,the Family,and the Constitution:A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,9 (1980). This reliance on autonomy connects the

liberal model to liberal philosophy. Cf I. KANT,
MORALS 58 (Beck transl. 1959).

FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
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to engage in moral deliberation," in short to gauge what is in their own
interests.32 Thus, women are entitled to the same respect for their
autonomous choices as men.
This notion of liberty goes a long way towards delineating the set of
valid decisions under the liberal model. Decisions motivated simply by a
desire to restrict the liberty of women, even if the decision-maker believes
he is acting in their best interests, violate the principle of autonomy.
Similarly this principle requires, at a minimum, that decisions restricting
personal choices be justified as a means of protecting other legitimate
societal interests.
The liberal respect for autonomy and its concomitant right of liberty,
however, do not completely define the bounds of legitimate personal
activity. One person's pursuit of his personal values will often interfere with
another's pursuit of her life plan. For example, a man looking for a
roommate may decide he would not like to share his apartment with a
woman; or a male manager at a retail store may decide he would not like to
work with a female sales clerk. Both of these decisions may reflect the
man's pursuit of his life-style, but they also restrict the choices of particular
women interested in the room or the job.
To resolve the question of when sex based decisions are valid, the
liberal model relies on the distinction between the private and public
domains.33 The private domain encompasses matters pertaining to the
family, home, intimate relationships and friendships - those matters that
by consensus society considers personal. The valid ends of decisions within
this sphere are subjective and the means of achieving those ends are
relatively insulated from governmental or other direct societal
regulations. 4
The public sphere encompasses the production and distribution of
goods and services that are used to fulfill personal aims within the private
domain. The valid ends of the public domain are defined more objectively
by using economic markets and political processes to aggregate the aims of
disconnected individuals that comprise the liberal conception of society.
The means used to achieve these ends are subject to direct regulation to
ensure individuals are treated fairly and to coordinate the activities of the
participants in the public sector, thereby improving productivity and
efficiency.3 5 The means should be instrumentally related to the ends and
society will scrutinize decisions which restrict the options of a historic
32.
33.
34.
35.

Jaggar, supra note 29, at 279.
See D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 13, at 17-20.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
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underclass, such as women, very closely to ensure that the relationship of
means to ends is clearly demonstrated.
Under the liberal model, the distaste for societal interference into the
private domain, coupled with the understanding that personal values and
attitudes govern private matters, permit gender based decisions. In the
public domain, however, the requirements of equal autonomy for men and
women, and of means demonstrably related to the objective ends create a
presumption against the validity of gender based distinctions.
Different factions of liberals disagree about precisely what justifications overcome this presumption of gender neutrality. Some argue that the
history of misogyny and misguided paternalism makes it imperative to
require strict gender neutrality within the public sphere."6 Any other rule
will ultimately reinforce the belief in sex-differences and traditional sex
roles.37 Others contend that, in addition to a fair process, individuals must
be ensured a relatively equal starting point in the competitive public
domain. Historically women have been denied access to this domain and
this historic denial has current ramifications: women are not acculturated
to acquire the skills they need to compete in the labor market; they lack role
models; they are still viewed by many who wield power in the public domain
as "outsiders." To overcome these impediments, these liberals would allow
temporary gender based rules aimed at equalizing the starting point of men
and women in the race of life. 8 But, once equality of the starting point is
achieved, the justification for such affirmative action vanishes.3 9
Despite these important variations among proponents of the liberal
model, there are two key positions to which all liberals subscribe. First, the
ultimate rules governing decisions in the public domain (once equality of
the starting points of all participants is achieved) must not attribute any
significance to gender.4 0 Second, the state may not validly interfere with
social values that have been defined by aggregating the preferences of
36. See, e.g., D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 13, at 31; Jaggar, supra
note 13, at 7; Hoffman & Reed, Sex Discrimination?The XYZ Affair, 62 PuB. INT. 21, 23
(1981). Kirp, Yudof and Franks further justify the demand for gender neutral decisions in
the public domain by arguing that gender policy must not differentially restrict the domain
of choices available to males and females. See D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra
note 13, at 136.
37. Feminists outside the liberal model also share this concern. For example, Joan
Williams thinks that the cultural feminists' celebration of women's values reflects a return
to domesticity that has been used to maintain women as an underclass. Williams,
DeconstructingGender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 821 (1989). See also infra note 65.
38. Jaggar, supra note 13, at 8-9.
39. Id. at 7.
40. Under the liberal/assimilation model, gender should have no more significance
than, for example, eye color. Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 604.
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individuals within society through properly working political and economic
markets."1 The liberal model therefore accepts the "structure of American
society as it now exists. 42
C.

The Feminist Model Of Sexual Equality3

1. The Feminist Critique of the Liberal and Conservation Models

Feminists reject both the emphasis on autonomy and the presumption
against significant sexual differences inherent in the liberal model.
Autonomous choice supposes the existence of atomistic individuals,
separable from the influence of others - of past and present culture. For

feminists, however, personhood cannot exist outside of a social context."
They view culture as historically derived and in turn as strongly influencing
individual values. Thus, social institutions and norms are not the result of
choices of contextually free individuals with which government has no
principled right to interfere. Rather, they are the result of political choice
that reflects historical and current power relationships. 5

Furthermore, feminists view the reliance on autonomy as a means of
41. See Dworkin, supra note 28, at 134; cf E. WOLGAST, supra note 9, at 154.
42. Rossi, supra note 9, at 6.
43. The use of the label "feminist" may be somewhat misleading in light of the
existence of at least five different rapidly developing feminist schools of thought: liberal
feminism, Marxist feminism, socialist feminism, radical feminism, and cultural feminism.
See A. JAGGAR, supra note 24, at 10-13 (including cultural and radical feminists under
different branches of radical feminism); West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, (1988) (drawing distinction between cultural and radical feminism).
The model labelled feminist in this article most closely correlates with what Robin
West calls cultural feminism. West, supra, this note at 1. Both radical and cultural
feminism, however, share a common view of the causes of male domination over women.
Therefore, the feminist critique of the liberal and conservative concepts of equality
corresponds to the views of radical feminists as well as cultural feminists. See infra notes 4453 and accompanying text. The distinctive feature of cultural feminism is their belief that
equality can be "achieved" by incorporating women's values into social institutions of
power. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
44. See E. WOLGAST, supra note 9, at 153-54. See generally West, supra note 43.
Leftist philosophers and critical legal thinkers also reject the liberal celebration of
autonomy, advocating instead the value of community. See, e.g., R. WOLFF, THE POVERTY
OF LIBERALISM 183-84 (1968); Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights - Consciousness
and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1563, 1566-67 (1984). But
feminists not only deny that autonomy is the paramount value, they deny that individuals,
especially women, exist as human beings outside of a social context. For feminists the notion
"that the individual is 'epistemologically and morally prior to the collectivity' ..
is not
true for women." West, supra note 43, at 14.
45. In particular, feminists see gender - sex-based social norms as an all pervasive
institution chosen to maintain males' power and prestige over females. See A. JAGGAR,
supra note 24, at 85.
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justifying men's oppression of women, because historically cultures have
valued male attributes and pursuits and denigrated female ones."'
Women's oppression is further maintained by the liberal skepticism of any
publicly meaningful distinctions between males and females. Given the
historical elevation of male values, the most women have to look forward to
under the liberal model is assimilation into the dominant male culture.
47
Feminists question whether this is truly the achievement of equality.
More significantly, they believe that women differ culturally from men in
ways that make women less comfortable exhibiting these masculine
traits.48 Thus, the "equality of opportunity" promised by the liberal model
appears to be more rhetoric than a real promise. As one feminist legal
commentator put it:
[S]ociety. ..first constructs the social categories "male" and "female"
and then says to those it has defined as female, "all you have to do to be
included is to prove that you 'really' are the same as we are." In other
words, "prove that you really belong in the category that we have
'' 9
constructed in order to exclude you. 4
Feminists also reject the liberal distinction between public and private
spheres.50 Social institutions governing the private sphere - most notably
sexual mores, marriage and the traditional family - dictate the fundamental terms on which men and women participate in the public sphere. In
sexual intercourse, child-bearing, and other intimate interactions, it is the
woman who is penetrated or violated and that profoundly affects how both
46. See Note, Toward A Redefinition Of Sexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 487,
506 (1981) (liberal model of equality is based on the notion that historically valued male
roles are more desirable, while in fact it may be that the roles are more prestigious simply
because they are male); Rossi, supra note 9, at 6 ("assimilation model . . .makes an
assumption that the institutional structure of American society developed over decades by
predominately white Protestant males, constitutes the best of all possible worlds"). See,
e.g., M. O'BRIEN, THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 75 (1981) ("The low social and
philosophical value given to reproduction and to birth is not ontological, not imminent, but
socio-historical, and the sturdiest plank in the platform of male supremacy.").
47. See Note, supra note 46, at 487; Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory,
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1043,1054 (1987); cf Schaar, Equality of Opportunityand Beyond, in
NoMos IX - EQUALITY 228, 231 (1967) ("Before one subscribes to the equality-ofopportunity formula, then, he should be certain that the dominant values, institutions and
goals of his society are the ones he really wants.").
48. See text accompanying infra note 59.
49. Littleton, supra note 47, at 1051 (citations omitted).
50. See A. JAGGAR,supra note 24, at 101. For example, "feminists argue that the so

called private life of the family is political." Z.

EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL

16 (1984); see also id. at 205 (to achieve
egalitarianism, there can be no separation between family and public life); D. KIRP, M.
YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 13, at 17.
EQUALITY: CRISES IN LIBERAL AMERICA
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men and women view women within the public and private spheres. 1 More
generally, all aspects of the oppressive structure of male dominated society
grow out of the hierarchy of power established within personal relationships. For example, an accepted paradigm of sexual relations is seduction,
where the man pursues his goal of "scoring" by overcoming the woman's
resistance. This pattern legitimates and reinforces the use of male
aggression to overcome women's desires, a lesson, which once learned,
pervades all male-female relations, public and private.
Feminists are even less enamored of the conservative model of
equality. While they share a recognition of the significance of gender
differences, the schools reach diametrically opposite conclusions from
those differences. Feminists see social structure as chosen to make those
gender differences important determinants of social status.52 Society has
structured itself to emphasize those differences in a manner that maintains
the domination of men over women.
Having rejected the view that the significance of gender differences is
preordained, feminists find untenable the conservative position that these
differences justify the relegation of women to traditional feminine roles
within a society that clearly and consistently defines these roles as second
class. It may be that men and women differ in ways that mean that
nurturance and child care will ultimately remain predominately female
functions but, for feminists, that implies a need to recognize and celebrate
the importance of these functions within society. 53 It does not justify
treating these functions as having lower status.
2.

The Feminist Model Defined

The feminist model calls for a restructuring of society to reflect the
values of women on par with those of men.54 Equality will exist only when
51. See West, supra note 43, at 29-36 (describing the premise of radical feminism as a
longing for freedom from the invasion and intrusion that is inherently part of being female).
52. One commentator notes that feminine theory
reveals how male power is exercised and reinforced through such "personal"
institutions as childrearing, housework, love, marriage, and all kinds of sexual
practices from rape through prostitution to sexual intercourse itself. The assumption that these institutions and practices are "natural" or of purely individual
concern is shown to be an ideological curtain that conceals the reality of women's
systematic oppression.
A. JAGGAR, supra note 24, at 101.
53. Id. at 141 (describing one conception of radical feminism); West, supra note 43, at
18 (describing "cultural feminism").
54. See Z. EISENSTEIN, supra note 50, at 243-44; Rossi, supra note 9, at 179-85;
Williams, supra note 37, at 807-08.
Both cultural feminists, who assert that males and females innately differ, and liberal
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the uniquely female life-outlook influences the operation and structure of
all social, political and economic institutions. The perspective of both sexes
must be represented "in the very conception of what society is." 55
The feminist model of equality perceives the world as structured

around a sexual class struggle in which women comprise the underclass.56
Women are a class because they share not only different biological
functions in reproduction and child-rearing, but also a different physical
stature, set of experiences, and socialization from men. 7 They also inherit
a common past of oppression. 8 As a result women view their opportunities
for self-development and fulfillment differently from men. In turn society
attributes different abilities, strengths and weaknesses to women. Thus,
women are a sexual class in the sense that being female greatly influences
women's opportunity and choices, and results in a segmentation of society
into gender appropriate roles for males and females.
The theory of sexual class struggle asserts that patriarchal society has
constructed gender specific roles that exclude women from the bastions of
power in order to maintain men's position as the dominant class. Viewed as
a class, women conceptualize their lives as connected to lives of others.59
They do not define themselves by their individual achievements but rather
by their relationships to others and to society generally. But the institutions
of power in society demand independence and individual aggressiveness,
feminists, who see sex differences as reflecting social inculcation of gender appropriate
traits, believe this is the route to sexual equality. The liberals, however, recognize that
women share a distinct outlook because of their socialization as an underclass. They support
celebration of nurturing, caring and other values that the cultural feminists deem innately
female not because these values reflect women's "voice," but because of the inherent
poverty of the prevailing icon of "possessive individualism." See Williams, supranote 37, at
810-13, 845.

55. E.

WOLGAST,

supra note 9, at 158.

56. See A. JAGGAR,supra note 24, at 102. This perspective has labelled the system of
male domination as "patriarchy," and its adherents find "[p]atriarchy ... to be
,everywhere.'" M. Daly, Gyn/Ecology, the Metaethics of Radical Feminism 326 (1978);
see, e.g., Love & Shanklin, The Answer is Matriarchy,in OUR RIGHT TO LOVE 183, 185-86
(G. Vida ed. 1978); MacKinnon, Feminism. Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda
For Theory, 7 SIGNS, J. WOMEN INCULTURE & Soc'Y 515, 528-29 (1982); Estrich, Rape,
95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091 & n.9 (1987).
57. See Z. EisENSTEIN, supra note 50, at 146; Garside, Women and Persons, in
MOTHER WAS NOT A PERSON 192, 196 (M. Anderson ed. 1972); see also E. WOLGAST,
supra note 9, at 133; M. O'BRIEN, supra note 46, at 50.
58. A. JAGGAR, supra note 24, at 102; Garside, supra note 57, at 195-96.
59. West, supra note 43, at 14. For examples of how women view themselves as
connected to others in particular contexts, see C. GILLIGAN, supra note 9, at 25-30; N.
CHODORow, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 167 (1978). For a discussion of how connectedness hypothesis influences

moral theory, see WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY (E. Kittay ed. 1986).
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forcing women to experience a tension between a self-concept that stresses
connectedness and a measure of social success that requires treating others
as competitors.
For example, women in financial careers find that success virtually
precludes retention of traits they have been encouraged to adopt from an
early age.
makes few concessions to those with
[T]he corporate environment.
gentle natures. . . . [To succeed women must put in] brutally long hours
and burdensome amounts of travel, [and act] with political savvy that
advances their careers and a single mindedness that can disrupt families
and friendships. The women who embrace this model are often scorned for
behavior that is applauded in men. 0
Moreover, the traditional measure of success implicitly requires a supportive family structure which enables the individual to avoid thinking about
anything but a career. This notion of success is inherently inconsistent with
a definition of equality that opens success to all: only one representative of
the family can achieve success in the labor market.6 1 The bottom line is that
market structures exclude most females from positions of power within the
market and ensure that the few females who do invade this inner sanctum
have forsaken their sexual class heritage and adopted the dominant male
ethic.6 2 These women thus present little threat to continued male
domination.6 3
The feminist model of equality recognizes the class distinctions
between men and women, but seeks to eliminate the hierarchical relations
stemming from those distinctions. It believes that women as a class have
developed valuable qualities - such as caring, nurturing, and cooperating
- that society should reward. By celebrating these qualities, the model
promotes a positive conception of group difference under which members
of society are not only formally free to pursue atypical behavior but also
60. Gross, Against the Odds:A Woman's Ascent on WallStreet, N.Y. TiMES MAG. 16
(Jan. 6, 1985).
61. See, Rossi, supranote 9, at 183 (under the assimilationist model, men's position in
the top strata of business has been possible "only because their own wives were leading
traditional lives as homemakers").
62. For women to succeed in patriarchal society "they would have to compete without
catching the competitive spirit . . . [which] is a lot to expect." M. MIDGLEY, BEAST AND
MAN 330 (1978).
63. See Littleton, supranote 47, at 1051-52 ("Equality of identity has provided access
for some women into formerly male bastions. . . but has not permitted challenges to the
structure of those bastions."); see, e.g., Project, Law Firmsand Lawyers With Children:An
Empirical Analysis Of Family/Work Conflict, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1263, 1273-77 (1982)
(historically, women are much more likely to make career sacrifices for family responsibilities than their male counterparts).
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under which members of the subgroup (i.e., women) do not have to choose
between atypical behavior and a lower status than the dominant group
(i.e., men). 6"
Many liberals see recognition of class distinctions between men and
women as dangerous because they have been used in the past to justify
stigmatic unequal treatment.6 5 Recognition of difference makes possible
an inference of natural roles, and the resultant limitation of members of
each sex to these roles. It thereby fosters hierarchies by further entrenching
institutions and stereotypes that those in power have used to obtain their
status. It also threatens the liberal respect for autonomy by restricting
individual control over the activities one pursues. But feminists assert that
that difference need not have these implications. "They engage the
meaning of difference itself as a terrain of political struggle," viewing it as
something that adds interest and value to society rather than as justifying
exclusion and subordination.6 6 This suggests that society should pursue
representation of both male and female perspectives in its institutions of
power because such equality of representation promises to eliminate the
stigma of failing to conform to condoned sex roles. It would foster
consensus across groups about social values, which in turn discourages
hierarchical relationships. Additionally, it would allow society to take
advantage of the best of both the male and female outlooks.
Contrary to certain liberal critiques, 67 the feminist model of equality
is not based on an inflexible notion of the good society. It does not
necessarily reject women's existing values as false consciousness resulting
from women's domination under patriarchy. 68 But neither does it accept
these values as necessarily reflecting the desires of liberated women.
64. See Young, Difference and Policy: Some Reflections In The Context Of New
Social Movements, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 535, 544-545, 550 (1987).
65. Cf. D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 13, at 14. Some cultural
feminists also see the dangers of emphasizing difference, and would limit application of the
feminist model to situations directly tied to biological sex distinctions. See, e.g., Krieger &
Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the
Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 513, 537-539 (1983).
66. Young, supra note 64, at 543.
67. See, e.g., D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 13, at 24-26.
68. The positions of the "radical" and "cultural" feminists differ on this point. The
radicals assert that while women differ from men in fundamental ways, there is no way to
know women's true values because of the pervasive influence of patriarchal society.
Cultural feminists, on the other hand, celebrate those feminine attributes that women
appear to value despite the relegation of these attributes to a lower status by patriarchal
society. This difference is captured in an exchange between cultural feminist Carol Gilligan
and radical feminist Catharine MacKinnon, reprintedin A Conversation,supra note 9, at
74-75. Thus, the cultural feminists do not reject a process oriented definition of the good
society. They merely demand that women be an equal part of the process.
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Rather, like the liberal model, it allows the members of society to
determine what is good. It merely demands that the choice reflect the
values of women who have not forsaken their sexual class heritage.
Additionally, given the sexual class distinctions between men and women
and the long history of male domination, the feminists model asserts "that
the perspective of one sex cannot be relied on, in general, to represent the
concerns of the other." 9
II.
A.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MODELS OF EQUALITY AND
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS

The Equal Pay Act

Having developed the conservative, liberal and feminist models of
equality, this article now demonstrates that existing employment sex
discrimination laws implement the two traditional models of equality and
not the feminist ideal. The Equal Pay Act was the first federal antidiscrimination law to address sexual equality in the workplace. The Act
requires employers to provide equal pay for male and female employees
who perform "equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal
skill, effort and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions." 7 Employers may pay different rates to men and
women performing equal work if "such payment is made pursuant to (i) a
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of work; or (iv) a differential based on any
other factor other than sex. '"71
Events preceding adoption of the EPA, along with judicial construction of the Act, demonstrate that the EPA is not premised on gender
neutrality in the workplace. Rather, it reflects the tension between the
conservative view that women's place was in the home and the belief that
wages for a job should reflect the characteristics of the job in some objective
sense. The impetus for the EPA was the prevailing notion in the male
dominated labor market that equal work deserves equal pay, coupled with
a reality that forced an increasing proportion of women into the market to
support themselves and their families on a relatively permanent basis.
1. Labor Market History Prior To Adoption of the EPA
During the first forty years of the twentieth century, female workers
69. E. WOLGAST, supra note 9, at 135.
70. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1978).
71. Id.
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were primarily viewed as a group of younger women working to help
support their parents while awaiting marriage.7 According to mainstream
thought, women's primary place was in the home and only the failure to
marry or exigent circumstances after marriage warranted employment.
Because of the interim nature of such work, women were not expected to
devote themselves to careers. They worked at low paying jobs and were
paid less than men for their skills in anticipation of their leaving the labor
market within a relatively short time.7
During this era, labor and management both adopted the view that
wages should reflect the skill, effort and responsibility objectively required
by jobs.7 4 Under this view, employees performing equal work under equal
working conditions should receive the same wage, except in several limited
situations where personal attributes of workers might justify a pay
differential. Such personal attributes, however, encompassed little more
than seniority, training for future work, and a recognition of different
quantity or quality of work by individual workers.
So long as women worked in jobs distinct from those occupied by men,
the conservative view of sex roles and the principle of an objective pay scale
based on job attributes did not conflict. World War II, however, provided a
great impetus for altering the prevailing conception of women's roles in the
workplace. With many of America's men in the military, and the economy
in the full swing of wartime production, there was a real need for women to
join the labor force. They often took jobs replacing or working alongside
men,7 5 helping to dispel the notion that women were nonessential workers
72. Equal Pay For Equal Work For Women: Hearingson H.R. 1584 and H.R. 2438
Before a Special Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,81 st Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1950) (statement of Joseph Beirne, President of Communication Workers of
America); 108 CONG. REc. 14,760 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Ryan). See also Equal Pay
For Equal Work For Women: Hearings on S. 1178 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Education and Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 207 (1945) (Ella Jean Polinsky's
selections from master's thesis submitted to American University); M. GREENWALD,
WOMEN, WAR AND WORK 5, 155 (1980).
73. Equal Pay For Equal Work For Women: Hearingson H.R. 4273 and H.R, 4408
Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 65
(1948) (Statement by Olive Huston, Executive Secretary of the National Federation of
Business and Professional Women's Clubs). See W. FOGEL, THE EQUAL PAY ACT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPARABLE WORTH

13 (1984).

74. During the period between the World Wars, and after World War II, the
prevalence of this view manifested itself in the increased use of job evaluation systems to set
pay. See S. EVANS & B. NELSON, WAGE JUSTICE 24-25 (1989); R. HENDERSON,
COMPENSATION MANAGEMENT: REWARDING PERFORMANCE 231 (4th ed. 1985); see also
Northrup, Comparable Worth and Realistic Wage Setting, in ISSUE FOR THE 80's, supra
note 2, at 94-96 (War Labor Board's implementation of job evaluations to analyze wage
adjustments increased their use).
75. W. FOGEL, supra note 73, at 13-14.
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in jobs geared toward their temporary status in the workplace. Coupled
with the newly accepted notion that pay should objectively reflect the job
one performs, the War experience demanded that women receive the same
wages as their male predecessors and counterparts-wages inconsistent
with previous levels of women's pay premised on their role as homemakers.
The War's influence was directly reflected in the policies of the
National War Labor Board (NWLB). Executive Order 9250 prohibited
employers from increasing or decreasing wages without prior approval of
the Board.7 6 But the NWLB authorized "[i]ncreases which equalize[d]
the wage or salary rates paid to females with the rates paid to males for
comparable quality and quantity of work on the same or similar operations." 77 Despite the call for equal pay for comparable work, the Board
initially allowed equal pay adjustments only in jobs where women replaced
men or worked side by side with men; the rates for jobs that were performed
only by women were presumed correct in relation to other jobs in a plant. 8
Eventually, however, the NWLB, relying on its more general authority to
eliminate intra-plant wage inequities, ordered management and labor to
79
renegotiate the pay for women's work.
The NWLB thus implemented a comparable worth standard without
disavowing the propriety of the conservative model. The Board permitted
and even expected employers to treat men and women differently. 80 In its
investigation of pay discrepancies, the Board viewed a longstanding
differential, especially one that resulted from collective bargaining, as
evidence that women's pay was not out of line with that for men. 8 The
76. Order No. 9250, 3 C.F.R. 1213-14 (1938-43) (Stabilization of Wages and
Salaries, issued Oct. 3, 1942).
77. General Order No. 16, Wages of Female Employees, 24 WAR LAB. REP. Xii
(adopted Nov. 24, 1942, amended Jan. 3, 1944 and Aug. 20, 1945).
78. See Equal Pay For Women: Effect of Executive Order 9238 on General Order 16,
8 WAR LAB. REP. xxviii (1945) (letter from WLB Chairman to Secretary of Labor, made
public June 4, 1943); Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 3 WAR LAB. REP. 321, 325 (1942).
79. See General Elec. Co., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 666, 669-77 (1945); Aluminum Co. of
America, 14 WAR LAB. REP. 176, 177 (1944). The Board maintained a theoretical
distinction between its "equal pay" and "intra-plant inequity" principles. It generally
allowed broader discretion to employers under the second principle, which may have
reflected the problems created by relying on job evaluations where dissimilar work is
compared. See Smith Wood Prod. Co., 13 WAR LAB. REP. 16, 19 (1943).
80. See, e.g., General Motors Corp., 3 WAR LAB. REP. 348, 356 (1942) ("[I1t is often
impossible or inadvisable for female employees to undertake heavy physical labor .. ");
Brown & Sharpe Mfg., 3 WAR LAB. REP. at 325. Even in cases where the Board compared
dissimilar jobs, it acknowledged that the wages paid for female work might fall below that
for the lowest paid male work requiring no skills. See General Elec.Co., 28 WAR LAB. REP.
at 675. But see Aluminum Co. of America, 14 WAR LAB. REP. at 178 ("irrespective of sex,
qualified workers should receive same rates for each job...").
81. See General Elec. Co., 28 WAR LAB. REP. at 677; Bendix Aviation Corp., 11 WAR

1990]

COMPARABLE WORTH

Board did not premise its "comparable worth" cases on the inherent
equality of women in the workplace; rather the NWLB premised the
standard on the overriding belief that wages should be objectively related
to the job performed and its willingness to rely on job evaluation to identify
wage inequities.
After the War, the NWLB experiment with a comparable worth
standard ended. In the years between World War II and enactment of the
EPA, however, women did not return to their previous work roles.
Although they went back to working primarily in sex-segregated jobs,
women continued to join the workforce in disproportionate numbers, so
that by 1962 one third of all women earned wages.8 2 Many of these women
headed their own households and the wages of many more represented
significant contributions to their families' income.13 Thus, following the
War, women's increased participation in the workforce pressured society
to make comparisons between male and female workers that the conserva-

tive model deemed inappropriate."'
Just as the NWLB did not have to disavow the conservative model of
sexual equality, neither did the circumstances following World War II
mandate a wholesale jettisoning of the model. The post War notions of pay
equity demanded only that men and women be considered "similarly
situated" when they performed equal work. Society could maintain its
traditional view of sex roles and differential treatment of men and women
so long as it did not condone payment of different wages for jobs that
prevailing job analyses classified as the same. Because most women entered
the workforce to perform jobs whose core functions differed from those of
male jobs, the influx of women into the labor market did not force any
radical departure from essentially the conservative model of sexual
equality.
LAB. REP. 669, 670 (1943). By recognizing this justification for wage differentials, the

Board essentially allowed different pay practices for male and female workers where such
practices had been condoned by labor and management prior to the War.
82. Equal Pay Act of 1962: Hearing on S. 2494 and H.R. 11,677 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1962) (prepared statement of Esther Peterson, Assistant Secretary of Labor).
83. See Equal Pay Act of 1963: Hearingson S.882 and S.910 Before the Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1963)
(prepared statement of W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor); 109 CONG. REC. 9199
(1963) (statement of Rep. Green); see also S. EVANS & B. NELSON, supra note 74, at 23
(noting significantly increased participation of older and married women).
84. Some commentators contend that the real impetus for equal pay legislation was
the threat that lower pay for women working the same jobs as men would depress the men's
wages. See Legislation, N. Y. LaborLaw, Section 199-a: "EqualPay ForEqual Work", 46
COLUM. L. REV. 442 (1945); cf. W. FOGEL, supra note 73, at 21.
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Legislative History

By 1963, the conception that women's place was in the home had
eroded. Thus, the EPA's legislative history contained several calls for an
expanded market role for women." At the same time, however, many EPA
proponents appeared to accept the view that differences between men and
women justified explicit sex-based distinctions by employers outside of the
wage-setting context. 6
The extent to which employers should maintain sex-based distinctions
was controversial and the social views were in a state of flux; but Congress
structured the Act to avoid this controversy. Having accepted the notion
that wages should reflect the attributes of a job, Congress could not justify
employers paying men and women in the same job different wages.
Women's role as wife or mother simply became irrelevant when removed
from principles of pay based on employees' needs and demands to pay
based on the benefit to the employer. 7 Thus, while some individual
legislator's statements seemed to conflict with the conservative view of
women as homemaker, proponents of the EPA explicitly noted that the Act
avoided any inconsistency with this conception of separate spheres for
women and men.
For example, in 1962 Representative St. George proposed an amendment to substitute the term "equal work" for "comparable work." The
amendment passed and remained in the Act adopted a year later. In
support of this amendment, Congresswoman St. George remarked:
Now, I agree, and I have always agreed, and it has always been my premise
and that, I think, of most of the people, that what we really want is equality.
We do not want favors. There are certainly many things that men can do
better than women, and before the majority of the House gets too thrilled
by that statement, there are very many things that women can do much
85. For example, Senator Randolph lauded the Corning Glass Company for hiring
women as executives, managers, draftsmen, and scientists, and not just as secretaries. 109
CONG. REC. 8916 (1963).
86. See, e.g., id. at 9212 (remarks of Rep. Cohelan); id. at 9205 (remarks of Rep.
Griffin). But cf. 108 CONG. REC. 14,762 (1962) (remarks of Rep. O'Hara that "[m]ost jobs
today can be done by any worker, whether man or woman").
87. The principle that men's and women's different roles in society were irrelevant to
wage setting provided the foundation for the Act. See S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., I st Sess.
1, reprinted in 1963 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 687. See also 108 CONG. REC. 14,763
(1962) (remarks of Rep. Granahan comparing justification of sex based wage differentials
based on women's lesser need for pay with Communist principle "from each according to his
abilities, to each according to his needs").
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better than men. As a woman, I do not particularly want to be compared to
88
a man, and I am quite sure that that goes for my male colleagues as well.
The following year, the House Report was accompanied by the
statement that employers might refuse to hire women if required to pay
them an equal wage because of the "indisputable fact that women are more
prone to homemaking and motherhood than men." 89 Representative
Green, a sponsor of the equal pay legislation, found that remark "delightful -

most intriguing -

and.

.

. suspect

[ed] it [would] not be challenged

aisle." 9

on either side of the
Her serious response, however, was that
Congress was not debating the question of whether women should work,
but rather addressing the inequity of paying women a different wage when
they performed the same work as men. 9
Furthermore, the legislative history also evidenced congressional
concern that the EPA not undermine employers' use of systematic job
evaluations to set pay. In particular, Congress amended the Bill to
incorporate terms of art from the industrial relations literature on job
evaluation in explaining the concept of "equal work." 92 Congress thereby
structured the Act to preclude judicial scrutiny of employer decisions to
pay jobs at different rates pursuant to accepted job evaluation plans.
The legislative history does not present a picture of a consensus of
understanding about sexual equality. But it clearly depicts that Congress
intended to corral the comparisons of men's and women's work well within
bounds established by job evaluation plans used by employers in 1963.
Further, it shows that Congress tried to avoid the controversy that might
result from a bill which implemented a gender neutral view of women's role
in the workplace. Thus, the view of sexual equality that supported the EPA
scheme appears similar to that underlying the War Labor Board decisions
- the conservative view of sexual equality modified to allow comparison
between men and women performing substantially the same work.
3.

EPA Case Law

Cases implementing the EPA, by and large, remain true to the
jurisprudential underpinnings reflected in the Act's legislative history.
They allow job comparisons in a fairly narrow context, borrowing from
88. 108 CONG. REC. 14,768 (1962).
89. H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1963 U.S.
ADMIN. NEws 687, 692 (additional views of Rep. Findlay).
90. 109 CONG. REC. 9199 (1963).

CODE

&

91. Id.
92. See id. at 9195 (statement of Rep. Frelinghuysen); Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 201-02 (1974) (discussing congressional use of these terms of art).
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traditional job evaluation methodologies to delineate the extent to which
"different" jobs may be considered equal. Moreover, they have relegated
the issue of an employer's explicit use of gender to a relatively unimportant
role in determining liability, thereby implicitly rejecting a model of
equality based on gender neutrality.
To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that an employee
93
of the opposite sex performs equal work and receives a higher wage.
While the statute directs the courts to look at the level of skill, effort and
responsibility a job entails, EPA opinions have required that a plaintiff's
job involve the same core functions as the job with which the plaintiff
claims it is equal. 94 If the jobs do not entail an overlap of core tasks, the
plaintiff loses; if they do entail the same core tasks but are not identical,
then the courts will consider the statutory factors to determine whether the
jobs are substantially equal. 95
Therefore, courts have interpreted equal work more broadly than the
requirement of identical jobs that appears in the legislative history. 96 But it
is still sufficiently narrow to exclude comparisons of jobs when, under the
historical notion of objective job value, the pay for the two jobs is seen as
legitimately reflecting employer discretion. If courts were to compare two
jobs involving distinct core tasks they would have to question the employer's discretionary assignment of compensable factors and the weights
assigned to these factors - decisions that traditional job evaluations
93. Brock v. Georgia Sw. College, 765 F.2d 1026, 1033 (11 th Cir. 1985); Ridgway v.
United Hosp.-Miller Div., 563 F.2d 923, 926 (8th Cir. 1977); see, e.g., Corning Glass, 417
U.S. at 195; Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1048 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied,414 U.S. 822 (1973); Hodgson v. American Bank of Commerce, 447 F.2d 416,420
(5th Cir. 1971).
94. See Brewster v. Barnes, 788 F.2d 985, 991 (4th Cir. 1986); Brobst v. Columbus
Serv. Int'l, 761 F.2d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 777 (1988); Brennan v.
City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 1973); Sullivan, The Equal Pay Act of 1963:
Making and Breaking a Prima Facie Case, 31 ARK. L. REV. 545, 571 (1978).
95. See, e.g., Horner v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706, 714 (8th Cir. 1980); Brennan v.
South Davis Community Hosp., 538 F.2d 859, 861-62 (10th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v.
Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 725 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 470 F.2d 729 (5th Cir.
1972). The Supreme Court noted that these statutory factors should be construed as terms
of art from the science of job evaluation. Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 201. The Court
explicitly recognized that the ambit of equal work under the EPA must respect differentials
justified by prevailing job evaluation methodologies. Id. at 200-01.
96. See 109 CONG. REC. 9197 (1963) (statement of Rep. Goodell noting that to be
equal jobs must be virtually identical). In fact, despite judicial statements to the contrary,
the "substantial equality" standard is essentially the same as the limited comparable work
standard initially applied by the War Labor Board. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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methodologies consider appropriately left to the employer.9 7 If core tasks
are the same, however, the courts have some baseline for comparison which
8
severely limits the need to evaluate the worth of particular job functions.
Significant overlap of job tasks also often allows courts to use the
employer's own implicit weighing of job factors to evaluate whether the
wages assigned to the compared jobs are consistent. 9 Thus, the requirement that a plaintiff compare herself to a male worker performing
substantially equal work ensures that the EPA's provisions do not conflict
with the norms established by traditional job evaluation systems.
EPA doctrine also eschews reliance on the liberal model's precept of
sex-neutrality by minimizing the significance of an employer's use of an
employee's sex in setting wages. An employer may face liability even if he,
in good faith, based pay on factors other than sex, and conceivably could
escape EPA liability even if he used sex as a factor to set pay. The relative
insignificance of the employer's motive is best demonstrated by its
irrelevance to the plaintiff's prima facie case. The plaintiff meets her
burden simply by identifying employees of the opposite sex that get higher
wages for equal work, regardless of how that situation arises. A showing of
unequal pay for equal work may suffice even where the totality of the
employer's pay policy fails to manifest a sex-based disparity. 00 EPA
doctrine treats the incongruity of unequal pay for equal work as presumptively discriminatory even where that incongruity does not logically
support an inference of sex-conscious decisionmaking. I"
97. See infra notes 194-203 and accompanying text for a description of traditional job
evaluation.
98. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 94, at 580-81 (where two jobs entail a large common set of
core tasks, courts can compare the value of additional tasks performed by the favored sex
with those performed by the disfavored sex without engaging in "wholesale judicial job
evaluation"). Courts have been willing to make assessments about the "economic value" of
incidental tasks as part of their determination of equal work. See, e.g., Usery v. Alleghany
County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977);
Hodgson, 436 F.2d at 725.
99. See, e.g., Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 263 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 905 (1970); Sullivan, supra note 94, at 576-80.
100. See M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 164 (1988) ("[EPA]
presupposes that plaintiff will compare herself to a single employee."). A plaintiff may even
meet her burden of establishing a prima facie case by demonstrating that an employer pays
both men and women more than he pays other men and women where all perform equal
work. See Sullivan, supra note 94, at 557.
If courts did not implement this doctrine an employer could consistently hire women at
a lower rate than men but gain protection by paying a few "token women" equally with men.
See Hodgson v. American Bank of Commerce, 447 F.2d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 1971); see also
Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101
(1988).
101. For example, the Tenth Circuit confirmed a trial court finding that the defendant
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Conversely, an employer may have a bona fide pay plan under which a
female employee would earn more than a male employee performing equal
work, for instance due to greater seniority. Under EPA doctrine, if the
employer lowers the woman's salary to equal the man's because he did not
want to pay her more, the women could not establish an equal pay claim.1" 2
The irrelevance of motive to the plaintiffs prima facie case supports the
contention that the Act is premised more on industrial relation's theory
about pay policies than on a jurisprudentially grounded norm of gender
neutrality.
It may be contended that focusing on the prima facie case does not
give a true picture of EPA doctrine, especially since the Act includes a
specific defense for pay decisions based on "any other factor other than
sex." But courts have interpreted this defense narrowly, requiring that the
purported reason for the pay difference legitimately further the employer's
business interest in some generally accepted manner.10 3 The precise
did not appear "to have determined Plaintiffs rate of pay based on her sex," but still violated
the EPA. Sinclair v. Automobile Club of Okla., Inc., 733 F.2d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1984).
Cf. Hein v. Oregon College of Educ., 718 F.2d 910,921 (9th Cir. 1983) (employer can meet
his burden of proof by justifying a lower starting wage for the particular individual in
question, regardless of an overall pattern of male faculty members earning more than
female faculty members).
102. While there is no case presenting such a scenario, this result follows from the
language of the Act - outlawing only unequal pay - and the doctrine that courts have
developed to implement it. Such a pay policy, however, would clearly violate Title VII. See
infra note 131 and accompanying text.
103. See EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988) (adopting the
"legitimate business reason" standard set in Kouba"); Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d
876, 878 (9th Cir. 1982) ("An employer ... cannot use a factor which causes a wage
differential absent an acceptable business reason."); see also Player, Exorcising the
Bugaboo of "Comparable Worth ": Improperly Motivated Pay Distinctions Under Title
VII, 41 ALA. L. REV. 321, 343 (1990) (reason for pay differential must be a "legitimate
business reason" to constitute a "factor other than sex").
Some courts have viewed the first three EPA defenses - pay differentials based on a
seniority, merit, or on quantity/quality of production system - as indicative of the
relationship a pay factor must have to an employer's business interest to constitute a factor
other than sex. In doing so, these courts effectively limit the fourth defense to factors that
employers have traditionally used to determine wages. See, e.g., Glenn v. General Motors
Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11 th Cir.) (" 'factor other than sex' exception applies when the
[wage] disparity results from unique characteristics of the. . . job; (i.e.,) from [individual]
experience, training or ability..."), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 378 (1988); EEOC v. First
Citizens Bank of Billings, 758 F.2d 397, 401 (9th Cir.) ("[E] xperience" qualifies under the
fourth defense, but college education does not where the "main qualitities necessary for the
job are speed and accuracy."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985); Strecker v. Grand Forks
County Soc. Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 104'(8th Cir. 1980) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (education
and experience requirements for the state's personnel classification system must be
reasonably related to job duties).
Other courts have upheld factors that do not directly relate to business efficiency or job

1990]

COMPARABLE WORTH

territory of this fourth EPA defense is as yet uncharted, but an employer
clearly falls outside its bounds if he maintains a wage differential between
males and females based on idiosyncratic factors.""
Furthermore, the "factors other than sex" defense is affirmative and
the employer bears the burden of proving that the legitimate factor
explains the challenged wage disparity. 5 Employers often cannot present
sufficient evidence to convince the trier of fact that a gender-neutral factor
explains the pay differential. 0 6 Coupled with the absence of any requirement that the plaintiff present evidence of use of sex to set pay, the burden
of having to prove absence of discriminatory motive exposes an employer to
a significant likelihood of EPA liability, even where the employer did not
consciously base wages on an employee's sex.
B.

Title VII
1. Legislative History

Only one year after it enacted the EPA, Congress passed Title VII,
prohibiting among other things employment discrimination based on
sex. 10 7 Yet it premised Title VII on an entirely different concept of equality
than that underpinning the EPA. No dramatic shift in the legislators'
understanding of sexual equality explained the different philosophical
groundwork for Title VII. Rather, the different conceptual basis reflected
Congress' desire for Title VII to implement the prevailing liberal model of
performance, but have required that the factor be a reasonable basis for allocating
employee benefits or setting pay. See, e.g., Covington v. Southern I11.
Univ., 816 F.2d 317,
322 (7th Cir.) (salary retention policy which maintains employee's salary upon change of
university position "qualifies as a factor other than sex"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987);
Bence v. Detroit Health Corp., 712 F.2d 1024, 1030-31 (6th Cir. 1983) (company policy
which compensates women at lower commission rate than men for selling identical product
is at least partially based on sex), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984). See also id. at 1032
(Engel, J., dissenting in part) (differences between markets for men's and women's health
spa memberships could justify disparity in commissions to membership salesmen and
saleswomen).
104. Player, supra note 103, at 344.
105. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974).
106. See, e.g., EEOC v. Madison Community Unit School Dist. No. 12,818 F.2d 577,
585 (7th Cir. 1987) (evidence that women were discouraged from coaching male teams
outweighs defendent's rare prior employment of female coaches for male teams); Brock v.
Georgia Sw. College, 765 F.2d 1026, 1037 (11 th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Whitin Mach.
Works, 635 F.2d 1095, 1098 n.6 (4th Cir. 1980); Pearce v. Wichita County, 590 F.2d 128,
134 (5th Cir. 1979); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266-67 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
107. Title VII-Equal Employment Opportunity, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 STAT. 253
(1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to -17 (1982)).
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racial equality, requiring formally equal treatment of blacks and whites in
the public domain.
Title VII's proscription of sex discrimination was the result of an
amendment from the floor of the House of Representatives which added
"sex" to the language outlawing discrimination based on race, color,
religion and national origin. 10 8 Representative Smith of Virginia proposed
the amendment only two days before the House passed its initial version of
the bill. 109 That the House subsequently had to add the term "sex" eight
more places in the Bill to perfect the amendment indicates the level of
thought that went into it." 0
The debate on this amendment did not evidence any new found
consensus about an appropriate model of sexual equality. The amendment
was supported in part by legislators who advocated gender neutrality in the
labor market. 1 But Representative Smith appeared to have proposed the
amendment as a means of adding controversial baggage to the whole bill,
thereby increasing the chances of its defeat." 2 Many Congressmen who
supported the amendment had gone on record a year earlier in opposition to
the more circumscribed Equal Pay Act."' Thus, the amendment passed
not because of a consensus about the propriety of applying Title VII's
provisions to sex discrimination, but because of a coalition of two legislative
factions that represented opposite extremes on the spectrum of views about
sexual equality." 4
Most significantly, the debate did not result in any special considerations posed by the unique nature of sex discrimination. With two limited
108. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964).
109. The amendment was proposed on February 8, 1964. Id. The House approved its
initial version of the bill that became Title VII on February 10, 1964. Id. at 2804-05.
110. See id. at 2718. Representative Smith admitted that these omissions were
mistakes made "in the hurry of preparing [the] amendment." Id.
11. E.g., id. at 2579 (remarks of Rep. Griffiths); id. at 2580-81 (remarks of Rep. St.
George).
112. Proponents of Title VII generally opposed the addition of "sex" to Title VII's
provisions, recognizing Smith's amendment as a strategic ploy to bog down the whole bill.
E.g., id. at 2578 (remarks of Rep. Celler); id. at 2581-82 (remarks of Rep. Green). This led
to the anomalous situation that many Representatives who voted for Title VII opposed the
amendment that became part of the statute.
113. See id. at 2581, 2584 (remarks of Rep. Green).
114. The supporters of Title VII emphasized that differences between men and
women might make the simple addition of sex to Title VII's provisions unwise. E.g., id. at
2577-78 (remarks of Rep. Celler); id. at 2584 (remarks of Rep. Green); see also Letter from
the U.S. Dept. of Labor, Office of the Secretary, reprintedin id. at 2577 ("In view of [the]
policy conclusion reached by representatives from various women's organizations and
private and public agencies to attack discriminations based on sex separately . . . [the
proposed amendment] would not be to the best advantage of women at this time.").
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exceptions subsequently added to the bill as technical amendments, the
same provisions that prohibit race discrimination also apply to sex
discrimination.
One of the two exceptions allows an employer to use an employee's sex
as a criterion of an employment decision when it is a "bona fide
occupational qualification" (BFOQ)." 5 The exception indicates that
Congress recognized some distinction between the appropriate models of
sexual and racial equality. Debate on the BFOQ defense revealed a
congressional expectation that the defense would allow an employer to rely
on strongly held perceptions of sex-appropriate behavior. But the debate
also manifested a congressional understanding that the defense would
apply only in the limited circumstance of universally held beliefs about the
propriety of particular sex-based employment restrictions and that it was
not intended to modify the whole legislative scheme of Title VII as it
applied to nonracial discrimination."'
The second exception, known as the Bennett Amendment, provides
that conduct authorized by the Equal Pay Act shall not constitute a
violation of Title VII." 7 The legislative history surrounding this amendment made it clear that it was not meant to revamp the application of Title
VII to sex discrimination in any significant manner. The Bennett Amendment only affects the proscription of pay discrimination. Senator Bennett
proposed it as a technical amendment to ensure that "in the event of
conflicts, [between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII], the provisions of the
Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified."" ' 8 There was no indication in the
legislative history that the Bennett Amendment addresses concerns raised
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982).
116. In proposing to include a BFOQ for sex-conscious decisions, Representative
Goodell stated:
There are so many instances where the matter of sex is a bona fide occupational
qualification. For instance, I think of an elderly woman who wants a female nurse.
There are many things of this nature which are bona fide occupational qualifications, and it seems to me they would be properly considered here as an exception [to
the general rule against sex-based decisions].
110 CONG. REC. 2718 (1964). The example given by Representative Goodell indicates an
intent to limit the defense to situations where employment decisions extend beyond the
public sphere to directly affect an individual's personal life. Senators Case and Clark,
however, issued an interpretive memorandum describing the BFOQ defense as limited in
nature, covering discrimination like the preference of a French restaurant for a French cook
or a professional baseball team for male players. See id. at 7213. This indicates that the
defense was to apply even in nonprivate contexts involving widely held beliefs that certain
jobs should be staffed by workers of a particular sex.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
118. 110 CONG. REC. 13,647 (1964).
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by potential controversies over the appropriate model of sexual equality.11 9
Thus the model of equality underlying Title VII's provisions barring sex
discrimination is the model Congress thought applicable to race discrimination - the liberal assimilation model of equality. 2 '
At the time Congress enacted Title VII, race-neutral treatment was
already well ensconced as the prevailing paradigm of racial equality.
Dating as far back as the abolitionists, some proponents of racial equality
advocated a race-neutral model. 121 During the New Deal, Congress

prohibited race based decisions in the context of certain federal job and
training programs,1 22 and in 1940, President Roosevelt issued an executive
order barring use of race within the Federal Civil Service system.' 2 3 World
War II acted as a major catalyst destroying the legitimacy of segregation
of blacks 2 4 so that by the War's end some states began adopting legislation prohibiting racial and religious discrimination in private hiring and
promotion.' 2 5 By 1954, the Supreme Court had definitively ruled that the
equal protection clause required government to treat blacks just as it
26
treated whites.
Not surprisingly then, the debate over Title VII did not hinge on any
challenge to the propriety of formally equal treatment for blacks and
whites as the proper model of equality. Instead the debate focused on the
extent to which the government could impose this race-neutral conception
on the decisions of private employers. Opponents argued that Title VII
119. The entire debate in the Bennett Amendment took only two or three minutes. The
amendment was viewed as a "technical correction" that merely recognized the EPA's
exception to the requirement of equal pay for equal work. Id. at 13,647 (remarks of Sen.
Bennett and Sen. Dirksen).
120. See id. at 2599 (remarks of Rep. Goodell). Rep. Goodell noted a problem with the
age discrimination proscriptions of Title VII, since "the whole framework [of Title VII's
antidiscrimination provisions] . . .[were] drawn especially to meet the very peculiar
problems of discrimination on the basis of race, creed, or color."
121. See J.MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY: ABOLITIONISTS AND THE
NEGRO IN THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

147 (1964).

122. One such New Deal federal job program was the Unemployment Relief Act of
1933, ch. 17,48 STAT. 22 (1933-34); but cf.J. POLE, supra note 26, at 255 ("[Tjhere was
more articulate concern to restore conditions of equality during the earlier Progressive era
than during the New Deal.")
123. Exec. Ord. 8587, 5 Fed. Reg. 4445 (1940) (revoked by Exec. Ord. 9830, 12 Fed.
Reg. 1259 (1947).
124. After World War I1American ideals were conceptualized as diametrically
opposed to those of Nazi-Germany. This led to a deeper respect of the American
commitment to individual rights and a rejection of a society premised on racial hierarchy.
At the same time, the manpower needs created by the War gave blacks an opportunity to
show they were deserving of equal status. See J. POLE, supra note 26, at 256-57.
125. See J.POLE, supra note 26, at 260-62.
126. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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would unwisely and impermissibly interfere with employers' liberty to run
their businesses as they saw fit.' 27 Proponents responded by noting that the
ability to earn a living was a prerequisite for minorities to enjoy their other
"civil rights" promised by the fourteenth amendment.1 28 Coupled with the
premise that legitimate bounds of liberty did not encompass freedom to
deny others the opportunity to enjoy their own liberty, proponents
concluded that imposing race neutrality on employer decisions - decisions
made within the public domain - did not unduly restrict liberty. 2 9
With regard to racial equality, the arguments that prevailed thus
closely paralleled the liberal justification for the public-private distinction.
Title VII's proponents accepted individual liberty as the foundation for
civil rights, but believed the nature of the labor market necessitated
restricting employers' liberty to arbitrarily deny minority workers jobs for
which they qualified. Title VII's proscription of race discrimination
followed from a straightforward application of the liberal model of
equality: employer decisions fall within the public sphere; race discrimination in the public sphere denies blacks the opportunity to exercise their
autonomy and is not demonstrably related to legitimate employer goals
such as profit maximization; therefore the government should scrutinize
employers' decisions to ensure they are not race based.
2.

Case Law

Judicial construction of Title VII generally has respected Congress's
inadvertent endorsement of the liberal model of sexual equality. With a
few notable exceptions, courts have treated sex and race as equally
invidious classifications and applied the same doctrinal analysis to discrim1 30
ination based on either classification.
Courts have developed two distinct doctrines under which a plaintiff
may bring a Title VII claim. One is the disparate treatment doctrine, which
prohibits employers from intentionally basing employment decisions on
127. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1963) (House Judiciary
Comm. Minority Rep.); 110 CONG. REC. 13,825 (1964) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
128. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 29 (1964) (additional
views of Reps. McCulloch, Lindsay, Cahill, Schriver, MacGregor, Mathias and Bromwell
in support of the Civil Rights Act) ("The rights of citizenship mean little if an individual is
unable to gain the economic wherewithal to enjoy or properly utilize them.").
129. See 110 CONG. REc. 13,082 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Case); id. at 13,080
(remarks of Sen. Clark); id. at 1512 (remarks of Rep. Madden).
130. The Supreme Court has stated that "under Title VII a distinction based on sex
stands on the same footing as a distinction based on race unless it falls within one of a few
narrow exceptions [i.e., the BFOQ defense or the Bennett Amendment] .
Arizona
Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083-84 (1983).
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sex. The second is the disparate impact doctrine, which prohibits employers from using criteria that are sex neutral on their face but have a
disproportionate adverse impact on women. As this article will show, the
disparate treatment doctrine squarely adopts the liberal model of equality
underlying congressional adoption of Title VII. The disparate impact
doctrine goes beyond merely requiring sex neutrality and upon cursory
view seems premised on a different model. A closer inspection, however,
reveals that it too is based on the liberal model, coupled with a recognition
that employment practices may effectively deny women equal job opportunities without explicitly relying on sex as a decisionmaking criterion.
(a) The disparate treatment doctrine
The disparate treatment doctrine encompasses three different types of
discrimination claims. The first and most straightforward involves an
employer who treats an individual female worker differently from a male
worker because of her sex.'' Since an employer may try to hide use of sex
as an employment criteria, a plaintiff does not need to show directly that
the decision was motivated by sex to make out a prima facie case. She need
only show that the employer treated her differently than a similarly
situated man. 32 For example, a woman who demonstrates that she was
qualified for an available job, that she was not hired, and that a man was
hired, has satisfied her initial burden of presenting a prima facie case. 33
Plaintiff's initial burden in such a case is similar to that under Equal
Pay Act where motive is not crucial. But unlike under EPA doctrine, this
does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Rather the defendant
need only articulate some nondiscriminatory explanation for the different
treatment. 34 Once he does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show that the defendant's explanation is a pretext or to otherwise rebut the
defendant's evidence.' 35 Thus, Title VII's prima facie case reveals little
about the model of equality underlying the statute. Rather it is part of a
series of shifting evidentiary burdens that the court devised "to facilitate
the orderly consideration of relevant evidence,. . . intended progressively
to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional
131. See Price Waterhouse Corp. v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1780-81 (1989).
132. If unrebutted, this difference in treatment implies discriminatory motive. See,
e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
133. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973) (formulating
this test for individual race case); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53 (reemphasizing the burdens
stated in McDonnell Douglas in the context of sex discrimination).
134. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-54.
135. Id. at 256.
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discrimination. '1 36 Most significantly, unlike EPA doctrine, the ultimate
issue is whether the defendant based the decision on the employee's sex; the
defendant will prevail so long as the plaintiff cannot show by a preponder137
ance of the evidence that the decision was sex-conscious.
In the second type of disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff must
allege that an employer engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination.
To make a prima facie pattern-or-practice case, a plaintiff must present
evidence from which one can infer that the employer routinely based
employment decisions on sex. 138 Frequently the plaintiff will base her claim
on statistical evidence showing gross disparities between similarly situated
male and female employees without showing any explicit violation of the
liberal model's sex-neutrality prescription. 1 39 The plaintiff, however, must
account for the effects of factors one would expect to have a substantial
impact on hiring decisions, otherwise the trier of fact cannot conclude that
the disparity reflects an employer's sex-conscious decision. 140 Evidence of
136. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2784 (1988) (citation
omitted).
137. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16
(1983).
138. The plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving "more than the mere occurrence
of isolated or 'accidental' or 'sporadic' discriminatory acts. It ha[s] to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that racial [or sexual] discrimination was the company's
standard operating procedure - the regular rather than the unusual practice." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
139. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-10 (1977);
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339-40 n.20.
140. See Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 822-23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,459 U.S. 1038
(1982); EEOC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 531 (D. Conn.
1983). Plaintiffs' statistical showing might not satisfy the requirements of a prima facie
case if, for other reasons, the statistical comparison does not support a reasonable inference
of discriminatory treatment. See, e.g., Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 704
(9th Cir.) (expert's assumption, inter alia, that all masters degrees are of equal worth
destroyed the probative value of statistics), cert. denied,469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Coble v. Hot
Springs School Dist. No. 6,682 F.2d 721,733 (8th Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs selective choice of
comparison groups undercut the inference of discrimination); Wilkins v. University of
Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 408-10 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs statistics were insufficient
because they failed to include all employees subject to the employer's decision), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 822 (1982).
The court in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. affirmed the trial judge's conclusion that
a statistically significant disparity between the percentage of women in the company's
commissioned sales force and in the underlying labor pool resulted from the women's
voluntarily tendency not to seek sales jobs. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). The trial court
gave credit to testimony that women's natures made them less likely than men to apply for
these jobs and discounted the likelihood that Sears' recruiting techniques discouraged
women. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1305-17 (N.D. I11.1986).
While Sears may be read as a mere application of the rule that the plaintiff must convince

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:269

particular instances of sex-conscious decisionmaking are probative of the
employer's propensity to discriminate and hence help support a pattern-orpractice case.' 4 ' The defendant can rebut a prima facie showing either by
impugning the plaintiff's evidence or by presenting additional statistical
1 42
evidence showing that the disparity results from factors other than sex,
since either showing casts doubts on the plaintiff's allegation that the
employer intentionally discriminated.
Thus, while a plaintiff may prevail without explicitly showing sex
entered into the employer's decision, intentional discrimination is at the
heart of the pattern or practice case.' 4 3 The mere fact that gross disparities
between men and women employees exist is not in itself sufficient reason to
find a violation of Title VII. Such disparities are relevant only to the extent
they imply that the employer considers an employee's sex.'4 As with the
individual disparate treatment case, while the plaintiff may prove her case
by circumstantial evidence, she retains the burden of proving intentional
discrimination.
The third type of disparate treatment claim prohibits an employer
from perpetuating a discriminatory practice the establishment of which
was legal only because it predated the applicability of Title VII.' 45 For
example, where an employer pays a worker in part according to past
the trier of fact that the employer made sex-conscious decisions, the trial court's willingness
to accept differences between men and women is at odds with the liberal model's suspicion of
gender based disparities. Some of the testimony about sex differences came from feminist
scholars. Id. at 1307-08. However, the use of such differences to relegate women to jobs of
inferior status and pay is not consistent with the feminist model of equality since it imports
into Title VII the dictates of the conservative model. The extent to which other courts will
follow Sears' propensity to rely on "natural" sex differences to keep women out of higher
status positions remains to be seen.
141. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 338-39; Catlett v. Missouri Hwy. & Transp.
Comm'n, 828 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1574 (1988);
Coser v. Moore, 739 F.2d 746, 752-53 (2d Cir. 1984); Travenol Labs., 673 F.2d at 817.
142. See, e.g., Penkv. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 816 F.2d 458,464 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 158 (1987); Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
143. See, e.g., Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n. 15 ("Proof of discriminatory motive is
critical, although it can in some situations be'inferred."); AFSCME v. State of Wash., 770
F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985).
144. As the Court explained in Teamsters:
[T]he statistical evidence was not offered or used to support an erroneous theory
that Title VII requires an employer's work force to be racially balanced. Statistics
showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only
because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent
explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices
will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic
composition of the population in the community from which employees are hired.
431 U.S. at 339-40 n.20.
145. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
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salaries initially based on sex, "[e]ach week's paycheck that delivers less to
a [female] than a similarly situated [male] is a wrong actionable under
L 1 6 Use
Title VII."
of such a practice is illegal even if it does not presently
rely on sex based distinctions because it continues the initial discriminatory
scheme. A particular decision made pursuant to the challenged practice
has the same effect as if the employer discriminated anew. The underlying
premise of this third type of claim thus also springs from the impropriety of
treating women differently from men in the labor market. Therefore
individual claims alleging disparate treatment, a pattern-or-practice of
discrimination, or perpetuation of past intentional discrimination all take
aim at use of sex as an employment factor, the precise conduct that the
liberal model of equality deems unjustifiable.
(b) The bona fide occupational qualification defense
While the disparate treatment doctrine generally demands raceneutral and sex-neutral decisionmaking, Title VII allows employers
explicitly to base decisions on workers' sex where sex is a bona fide
occupational qualification."4 7 Since the BFOQ defense does not apply to
146. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395-96 (making statement about blacks and whites). See
also Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309-10 n. 15 (1977) ("proof
that an employer engaged in racial discrimination prior to the effective date of Title VII
might in some circumstances support the inference that such discrimination continued..."); Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988) (where
employment decisionmaking process underwent no substantial changes, a court may
properly utilize past discrimination as evidence of present discriminatory intent); Sobel v.
Yeshiva Univ., 839 F.2d 18, 29 (2d Cir. 1988) (pre-Title VII discriminatory employment
practices in setting initial salaries or increasing them essentially resulted in disproportionate impact on women), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3154 (1989).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). The statute allows a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) defense for religion and national origin as well as sex, but not for race or color. Id.
The Supreme Court has also deviated from requiring employer's decision to be based
on strict sex and race neutrality by allowing affirmative action plans. See Johnson v. Trans.
Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); see also
Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: Its All Over But The Shouting,86
MICH. L. REV. 524 (1987).
With the possible exception of Justice Stevens, however, those justices who have voted
to permit affirmative action plans have clearly articulated that valid plans must aim only to
undo the effects of past discrimination. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637-38 (majority opinion
of Justice Brennan in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens joined) (plan
at issue intended only to attain a balanced workforce in jobs that had been traditionally
segregated, and not to maintain a balanced workforce once attained); id. at 650 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (valid plan must aim at undoing effects of past discrimination by the
employer). But cf id. at 646-47 (Stevens, J., concurring) (contending there are legitimate
reasons for affirmative action other than elimination of past discrimination (citations
omitted)).
Thus, the affirmative action cases merely recognize the position of one faction of the
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race based decisions, it might indicate a deviation from the liberal model of
equality for Title VII's sex discrimination provisions. Cases that permit

sex-based distinctions under the BFOQ defense, however, do not undercut
the conclusion that Title VII adopts the liberal model of sexual equality.
Rather, allowance of sex based distinctions indicates the problem of
universally placing employment decisions within the public domain, rather
than any limitation or rejection of the premises of the liberal model.
An employer may claim the BFOQ defense in a variety of contexts, for
instance in attempts to justify hiring only women as airline stewardesses or
men as guards in male prisons. To prevail under the BFOQ defense, an
employer who refuses to hire women for a particular job must prove that he
had a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all women could
not perform the job in question."" In addition, he must show that the job
duties that women cannot perform are of such a nature that hiring women
for the job would undermine the essence of his business.1 49 Even if an
employer clears these two difficult hurdles, a court might refuse to
recognize the defense if it finds that the defendant could reasonably
rearrange job duties to avoid precluding hiring women for the job.1 50 This
liberal model - that race or sex may be relevant factors in the public domain until the
starting position of blacks and women in the workforce is made equal to that of white men.
148. See, e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir.
1969); Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698, 703 (E.D. Mich. 1982); EEOC v. Mercy
Health Center, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159, 163 (W.D. Okla. 1982); accord
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 331, 333 (1977) (citing Weeks' formulation of the BFOQ
test with approval); see also Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414 (1985)
(applying Weeks formulation to age qualifications); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); P. Cox, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
10.02 (1988).
149. Eg. Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1984) (Delta's
policy of removing pregnant flight attendants would be justified if it could be shown to
increase the safety of air travel, the essence of an airline's function, but not merely because it
satisfies patrons' desire for physically attractive stewardesses); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co.,
653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981); Jatczak, 540 F. Supp. at 704 (no BFOQ for child care
worker whose primary function was teaching and ancillary functions were sex education
and counseling).
150. See United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114, 1118 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 143 (1987); Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1370-71 (11 th Cir. 1982); Gunther
v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
966 (1980); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (D. Del. 1978),
affd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Dothard,433 U.S. at 346 n.5 (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
This third prong of the BFOQ defense requires that the employer alter the structure of
jobs to remove barriers to women's employment. As such it goes beyond the liberal model
requirement of simple gender neutrality in the existing workplace structure. Several courts
have responded to concerns that the employer purposely structured jobs to limit women's
opportunities for hire and promotion in the work place. See, e.g., Hardin,691 F.2d at 1369-

1990]

COMPARABLE WORTH

three part test for a BFOQ is consistent with judicial statements that the
defense is extremely narrow,"' so narrow in fact that for practical purposes
it does not alter Title VII's prescription of gender neutrality.
Beyond reinforcing the narrowness of the BFOQ defense, the test is
not helpful in delineating the model of equality underlying judicial
recognition of the sex-based BFOQ. Courts have applied the same test to
religious and age discrimination claims. 152 Yet notions of religious freedom
and justice for the elderly reflect different conceptions of equality than do
concerns for sexual and racial equality. Thus the BFOQ test merely
provides a judicially malleable framework that courts shape to fit the case
before them, rather than a doctrine that elucidates the concepts of equality
used to decide sex-based BFOQ cases.
Nonetheless, courts' application of the BFOQ test in particular sex
discrimination cases is instructive. The liberal model of equality presumes
that within the public sphere sex should not matter, but within the private
sphere it may. For example, because sexual conduct falls within the private
domain, it is legitimate for individuals to distinguish by sex in choosing
their intimate partners. Similarly, conduct related to excretory functions
or involving display of genitalia are private in nature; the liberal model
therefore permits segregated toilets and locker-rooms.
Virtually no case has found sex to be a BFOQ where the job did not
153
implicate interests that the liberal model places in the private domain.
When an employer uses sex as a proxy for employee abilities that do not
70 & n. 18 (suggesting sheriff's job assignment policy was designed to eliminate almost all
opportunity for women to gain employment as deputies); Gunther,612 F.2d at 1087 (noting
that position plaintiff sought was a necessary step for any women to advance to higher levels
of employment); see also P. Cox, supra note 148, at V 10.02 & n.28. Thus this third prong of
the BFOQ may reflect the need to remedy employers' sex-conscious decisions about job
structures explicitly meant to keep women in low ranking positions.
151. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334; Gregory, 818 F.2d at 1118; Garrett v. Okaloosa
County, 734 F.2d 621, 624 (11 th Cir. 1984).
152. See, e.g., Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (age); Pime v.
Loyola Univ. of Chi., 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1986) (religion); Usery v. Tamiami Trail
Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) (age); Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp.
1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (religion).
153. The term "sex" as used in this article does not include distinctions based on
pregnancy. The appropriate model of just treatment of pregnant women is different than
that for treatment of women generally. Some have argued that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's amendments to Title VII require special treatment that is more consistent with
the feminist model of equality than with the liberal/assimilation ideal. See Kay, supra note
6, at 40-41; Note, supra note 30, at 690.
There is one case which upholds a sex based BFOQ outside the privacy context. See
Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228, 1239-40 (E.D. N.Y. 1986). In Hill, the court found sex
to be a BFOQ for military positions involving combat risk in order to avoid conflicts with
statutory provisions that required the armed forces to discriminate by sex for combat
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involve private or personal concerns, courts have applied the three part
BFOQ test strictly. They define adequate job performance to exclude
satisfying customer preferences to be served by members of a particular
sex.154 They also reject correlations between ability to perform job
functions and employee gender, asserting that Title VII prohibits reliance
on sex stereotypes in evaluating individual applicants or employees.1 55
Courts have even found employers in violation of Title VII when they base
decisions on accurate group statistics related to biological differences
156
between men and women.
When jobs affect interests traditionally viewed as within the private
domain, however, courts apply the three part test more laxly. 57 Some have
positions. But Hill is an anomaly that has little bearing on the BFOQ in usual circumstances
or the consistency of the BFOQ defense with the liberal model of sexual equality.
154. See Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1277
(9th Cir. 1981); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.) cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698, 703-04 (E.D. Mich.
1982); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 1981). See also
Sirota, Sex Discrimination:Title VII and the Bona Fide OccupationalQualification,55
TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1051 (1977) (describing various tests used to determine whether a
BFOQ exists in cases of sex discrimination in the workplace).
155. See Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 468 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984); Berkman, 635 F. Supp. at 1239 (dicta); see also 29 C.F.R. §
1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (1989) (denying application of BFOQ exception where an employer
refuses to hire an individual based on sex characterizations).
156. The Supreme Court invalidated a pension plan requiring greater contributions
from female than male workers due to women's greater expected longevity. City of Los
Angles, Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). While Manhartdid not
directly involve the BFOQ defense, the Court stated: "Even a true generalization about the
class [i.e., women] is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the
generalization does not apply." Id. at 708. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (1989);
Developments in the Law - Employment Discriminationand Title VII ofthe Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1178-79 (1971).
157. For example, the Supreme Court found female guards' "very womanhood" posed
a threat to security at a maximum security male prison in Alabama. The Court asserted,
apparently from its own predilections along with some anecdotal evidence of prison attacks
on women, that there was a substantial "likelihood that inmates would assault a woman
because she was a woman." Dothhard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977). The Court
used this assertion to overturn the trial court's decision that sex was not a BFOQ without
ever even alluding to the "clearly erroneous" standard that normally governs review of such
factual questions. Id. at 336-37.
The Seventh Circuit remanded a determination by the district court that the defendant
had failed to meet its burden of showing that women correctional officers were required to
further the rehabilitative goals at a women's maximum security prison. Torres v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Health & Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1133 (1989). The only objective evidence on the issue showed that having female
correctional officers in the positions in question had not altered the recidivism rate at the
prison. Id. at 1532, n.4. But the court nonetheless held defendants did not have to present
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defined adequate job performance to include respecting the interests of
clientele in being served by members of a particular sex. 158 Others find
functions that workers occasionally perform to be essential to the nature of
the defendant's business.' 59 Therefore, while in the abstract the test for a
sex based BFOQ does not vary with the public or private nature of the
implicated interest, courts are less troubled by upholding employer sex
based distinctions when it truly protects a private domain interest. The
courts have thus applied the BFOQ defense consistently with the liberal
model, allowing sex based decisions only if they are justified by interests
that fall within the personal rather than public domain.
(c) Gender explicit grooming codes
Courts have also recognized an exception to Title VII's sex neutrality
requirement in cases which involve an employer establishing separate
grooming codes for male and female workers. Unlike the BFOQ cases,
however, the doctrine on grooming codes represents a true deviation from
the liberal paradigm.
Grooming code decisions have endorsed an employer's reliance on
societal norms and customer preferences under the guise of recognizing
employers' interests in his "business image" ' - reasoning that is
"objective evidence" that employing women officers furthered the rehabilitative goals of the
facility. Id. at 1531. It was willing to give "substantial weight" to the testimony of the
defendant that in her judgement a female corrections staff was needed. Id. at 1533-34. To
support its holding, the court explicitly noted that "[tihe Supreme Court has never
hesitated to recognize sex-based differences, particularly in cases involving physiology,
marriage, childbirth, or sexuality" - in short, where cases involved the private domain. Id.
at 1527. Without any support on the record, the court simply asserted "that the presence of
unrelated males in living spaces where intimate bodily functions take place is a cause of
stress to females." Id. at 1531.
158. See, e.g., Jones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (sex is
BFOQ for hospital orderlies who perform tasks involving intimate contact with patients);
Norwood v. Dale Maintenance Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. I11.1984) (washroom
attendants); Brooks v. ACF Indus., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (janitors
who clean men's bathhouses); EEOC v. Mercy Health Center, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 159 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (nurses in labor and delivery area); Backus v. Baptist Med.
Center, 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (same), vacatedas moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th
Cir. 1982); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del. Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), affid.
mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979) (nurse's aide at retirement home).
159. See, e.g., Jones, 666 F. Supp. at 935-36; Fesel, 447 F. Supp. at 1352-53.
160. See, e.g., Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (7th Cir. 1987)
(employer's image justified gender explicit grooming code), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1113
(1988); Craft v, Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1215 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (same),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1058 (1986); Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F. Supp. 894, 897 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (contemporary fashions are an appropriate standard for gender explicit dress codes),
ai d, 800 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir. 1986); cf O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse,
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inconsistent with other Title VII cases. One might think that this deviation

from gender neutrality, like that in cases upholding a BFOQ defense,
reflects the liberal model's public/private distinction. But the only privacy
interest on which grooming codes intrude is that of the employees to dress
as he or she see fit - the very interest the courts allow the employer to
restrict. Therefore, cases upholding such restrictions do conflict with the
liberal's respect for autonomy in the private sphere.
The inconsistency between grooming and other Title VII cases
probably reflects an overriding societal consensus regarding sex-appropriate appearance."" Because of the universality of this consensus, conformity is not seen as a great burden to the employee.16 2 Thus the grooming code
cases adopt a conservative view of separate sex-appropriate standards,
rather than the liberal model underlying the rest of Title VII case law.1 63 In
short, courts will not stretch Title VII's liberal model framework to
interfere with societal norms in this limited context. 1 " But these cases
represent a very narrow, almost trivial exception to the disparate treatment
doctrine's insistence on gender neutrality and do not represent a substantial deviation from the precepts of the liberal model.
(d) The disparate impact doctrine
To make out a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must identify some
practice of the employer and show that it disproportionately affects
women." 5 Once the plaintiff identifies such a practice, an employer will be
held to have violated Title VII unless the practice can be justified by the
Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (smock requirement for female sales clerk
violated Title VII because not justified by commonly "accepted social norms").
161. As one judge put it: "until that dreadful day when unisex identity of dress and
appearance arrives," employers are entitled to differentiate between males and females in
dress codes. Devine, 621 F. Supp. at 897.
162. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (if
employee objects to grooming code he can either look elsewhere for employment or
subordinate his preference by accepting the code as part of the job); see also Note,
Employer Dress andAppearance Codes and Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, 46 S.
CAL. L. REV. 965 (1973) (arguing that under Title VII, an employer is not prevented from
imposing reasonable grooming requirements on his employees).
163. But see Kay, supra note 6, at 80 (grooming codes still achieve the goal of equality
of treatment, both sexes being subject to standards of appearance).
164. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 604 F.2d 1028, 1038 (7th Cir.
1979) (Pell, J., dissenting) (applying Title VII to dress codes is an example of "extreme
applications bordering on the ridiculous where no meaningful discrimination exists"), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980).
165. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115,2124 (1989); Connecticut v.
Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982); United States v. Town of Cicero, 786 F.2d 331, 333 (7th
Cir. 1986); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 1986).
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employer's "business necessity."' 16 Unlike the disparate treatment doctrine, the disparate impact doctrine does not focus on the employer's use of
sex in decisionmaking. Rather, the impact doctrine restricts the employer's
use of facially sex-neutral criteria that have a greater adverse impact on
women as a group, than on men. 167 Because the doctrine focuses on the
effects of decisionmaking practices on a protected group of employees,
instead of ensuring equal treatment of individual employees, it appears to
aim at implementing proportional representation of women within employment classifications established by the employer. 6 8 To the extent that the
proof of a disparate impact claim focuses on the overall representation of
women in job or pay classifications, it goes beyond the liberal notion of
individual opportunity independent of gender. 6 9 To the extent the employer can escape liability only by showing that the challenged criteria are
necessary to the viability of his business, the doctrine seems to require
restructuring of the employer's methods of operation to accommodate this
principle of proportional representation. Such a mandate might reflect a
reasonable accommodation between the goal of "equality of result" and a
realization that women employees and the employer both are worse off if
the employer is driven out of business, but it would be inconsistent with the
liberal model's respect for the market values and structure developed by
the dominant (i.e. white male) class.
This superficial analysis of the disparate impact doctrine, however,
ignores some of the essential components that tie it to the liberal ideal.
While a plaintiff's proof under the impact doctrine necessarily considers
the effect of decisionmaking criteria rather than the decisionmaking
process itself, a violation under the doctrine does not hinge simply on a
disparity between women's representation in the employer's workforce and
their representation in the relevant labor market. The plaintiff has the
burden of identifying a specific employer practice and showing that the
practice, and not some other factor beyond the employer's control, caused
166. Teal, 457 U.S. at 446-47; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,331 n.14 (1971);
Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 1987). See also Comment, The Business
Necessity Defense To Disparate-ImpactLiability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911
(1979).
167. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1126 (7th Cir. 1987); Segar v. Smith, 738
F.2d 1249, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, sub. nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115
(1985).
168. See, Cox, The Future of the Disparate Impact Theory of Employment
DiscriminationAfter Watson v. Fort Worth Bank, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV. 753, 760-61.
169. While a goal of proportional representation goes beyond the liberal model, it is
not synonymous with the feminist model, which demands alteration of the very structure of
the workplace.
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the disparity. 7 ' Once such a practice is identified, the employer cannot
escape liability by showing that women are proportionately represented in

his workforce. 17' Thus, in reality the impact doctrine focuses on the
relationship of the employer's challenged practice to the employment
opportunities of members of the protected class and not ultimate disparities in representation. The doctrine does not simply condemn dispropor-

tionate representation. Instead its structure aims to ensure the instrumental relationship between the employer's legitimate ends and his means of
achieving those ends by eliminating the evil of employer reliance on
overbroad or otherwise inexact criteria that unnecessarily restrict a
72
woman's employment opportunities.1
Judicial construction of the business necessity defense further supports the idea that the disparate impact doctrine addresses unnecessary
restrictions on employment opportunities and does not aim to implement
equality of result. Despite its label, this defense does not require that the
employer justify use of employment criteria as necessary to the survival of
his business. Rather, as clarified by the Supreme Court, the employer need
only significantly relate the challenged employment practice to legitimate
employment goals.' 73 Courts have not used this defense to question the
170. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2124 (1989); Eastland v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 619 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066
(1984).
171. Cf., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 450 (1982) (racially proportional
"bottom line" did not provide a defense to Title VII where a written examination used in the
promotion decision had a disparate impact on blacks).
172. The courts have explicitly rejected the view that Title VII demands proportional
representation. See Allen v. Prince George's County, 737 F.2d 1299, 1304 (4th Cir. 1984);
Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 96 (2d Cir. 1984); Eastland, 704 F.2d at 619.
Instead they have repeatedly emphasized that use of proxies for job related skills may
arbitrarily deny individuals equal job opportunities. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 448; Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971); Howard v. International Molders & Allied
Workers Union, 779 F.2d 1546, 1552 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986).
173. See Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26. The term "business necessity" is derived
from the Court's statement in Griggs,that for assessing the validity of criteria shown to have
a disparate impact on a protected class, "[t]he touchstone is business necessity." 401 U.S.
424, 431 (1971). Despite this dicta, the Court itself has relied on Griggs' alternative
formulation that the challenged practice need only bear a manifest relationship to the job in
question. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 588 n.31 (1979); see
also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2790 (1988). Nonetheless,
until Wards Cove, courts had not resolved whether the defense required the employer to
substantiate some sort of necessity or merely to show the practice was employment related.
Compare Davis v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., 803 F.2d 1322, 1328
(4th Cir. 1986) (requiring "a 'compelling' business necessity" for the practice) and
Williams v. Colorado Springs, Colo. School Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir.
1981) (" [t] he practice must be essential, the purpose compelling") with Shidaker v. Tisch,
833 F.2d 627, 633 (7th Cir. 1986) (remanded to allow Postal Service to "show the job-
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employer's definition of job functions, to require that an employer justify
the structure of his jobs, or to mandate that he restructure job classifications to mitigate the disproportionate impact these classifications have on
174
minorities or women.

This does not mean the business necessity defense has provided an
easy escape route for employers. Employers cannot simply assert the
relation of the decisionmaking factor to the job in question; they must

present objective evidence of the relationship between the factor and job
performance under their definition of job responsibilities and successful job
performance. 17 Even if the employer presents such evidence, the plaintiff
may prevail if she demonstrates alternative decisionmaking criteria that
serve the employer's interests and have a lesser impact on women.' 76 In
evaluating the employer's evidence and the plaintiff's proffered alternative, courts impose an external standard that requires a connection

between the decisionmaking criterion and job performance. But the
defense unquestioningly accepts the employer's job structure and the

values inherent in that structure, consistent with the liberal model's
acceptance of the institutional structures and values that have developed
under male domination of the market. 77 The defense does not balance a
relatedness of its promotion standards"), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2900 (1988) and Gillespie
v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health & Soc. Serv., 771 F.2d 1035, 1040 (7th Cir. 1985) (written
employment test should be "job related"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083 (1986).
174. Even cases that purportedly required employers to show business necessity
generally did not question the structure ofjobs in the workplace or the employer's definition
of job responsibilities. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978);
Nash v. City of Houston Civic Center, 800 F.2d 491, 496 (5th Cir. 1986); Zahorik, 729
F.2d at 96.
175. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431; Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp., 841 F.2d 547, 564 (5th
Cir. 1988). But see Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205, 217 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Because of
the professional nature of the job, coupled with the risks and public responsibility inherent
in the position, we conclude that empirical evidence is not required to validate the job
relatedness of the educational requirement."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 872 (1986).
176. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,425 (1975). See, e.g., Zuniga
v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986,992 (5th Cir. 1982); Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611,
617 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 872 (1980). Wards Cove stated that by
demonstrating the employer had such an alternative, the plaintiff essentially proved that the
employer used the challenged practice as a pretext for discrimination. Wards Cove, 109 S.
Ct. at 2126. Wards Cove does not clarify whether the plaintiff has the heavier burden of
actually proving that the practice was illicitly motivated or the traditional showing of an
alternative with lesser impact.
177. Judicial reluctance to question the employer's structure of the workplace went so
far as to allow the Supreme Court to hold that sex was a BFOQ for guards in an Alabama
prison because of the unconstitutional conditions in the prison. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321 (1977). See also, EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1291 (N.D.
Ill. 1986) (trial court did not question employer's classification of sales jobs into commission
and noncommission sales).
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tension between a desire for equality of result and the realization that no
one is better off if the employer's business folds, but rather directly focuses
on the reasonableness of the employer's use of factors that disproportionately restrict the opportunities of women. It therefore reemphasizes that
the impact doctrine's central concern is minimizing unnecessary restrictions on a woman's opportunities, and not guaranteeing proportional
representation.
Viewed as a means of eliminating inexact proxies for job performance
that unnecessarily restrict women's work opportunities, the disparate
impact doctrine comports with the liberal model of sexual equality. Since
the model posits that gender is irrelevant within the labor market,
employment criteria that affect women as a group more harshly than men
are suspect. That criteria do not operate in a gender neutral manner
indicates the likelihood that they rely on traits that should not matter in the
public domain. Thus a presumption that criteria adversely affecting
women are invalid unless shown to be instrumentally related to the
employer's legitimate business interests is consistent with a variation of the
liberal model. The disparate impact doctrine can be seen as implementing
178
precisely this variation.
Recently, the Supreme Court seems to have limited the disparate
impact doctrine, placing on the plaintiff the ultimate burden of "disproving
an employer's assertion that the adverse employment action or practice
was based solely on a legitimate neutral consideration. ' 179 Prior to this
pronouncement, the impact doctrine presumptively forbade adverse actions and the employer had to overcome this by showing that the action
furthered substantial business interests. Now, however, adverse practices
appear presumptively valid and the plaintiff may have to convince the trier
of fact that the employer used them to distinguish employees by sex. Thus
the doctrine may now proscribe not all overbroad or unjustifiable decisions
that tend to harm women, but only those used to hide the employer's
discriminatory motive. 180
178. See P. Cox, supra note 148, at 759 (impact theory can be interpreted as
concerned with the substantive regulation of "merit"); see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431
(impact analysis aims to eliminate "artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers").
179. Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. at 2126; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
108 S. Ct. 2777, 2784 (1988).
180. Even prior to the Wards Cove and Watson decisions, commentators and courts
recognized that the impact doctrine served to screen out hidden intentional discrimination.
Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of the S.E. Judicial Dist., County of L.A., 838 F.2d 1031,
1040 (9th Cir. 1988). See P. Cox, supra note 148, at 757; Rutherglen, Disparate Impact
Under Title VII. An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297 (1987); cf
Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (statistical disparities are a crucial
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While it remains to be seen whether recent Supreme Court decisions
have limited the disparate impact doctrine to address only hidden disparate
treatment,' 81 it is clear that the impact doctrine still comports with the
liberal model. While evidence at trial need not focus on employer intent,
the limited form of the doctrine restricts Title VII liability to those
instances where an employer used facially neutral employment practices to
achieve what would have occurred had he been permitted to base his
decisions explicitly on sex. It thus fits comfortably within the liberal
model's intolerance for outcomes that result from sex differentiated
treatment.
(e) Conclusions regarding Title VII doctrine
In sum, Title VII doctrine implements the liberal model's ultimate
goal that an individual's sex be irrelevant in the labor market. Presently
there is intense controversy in case law about the reach of Title VII's
provisions. But the debate concerns the extent to which the statute allows
interim deviations from the liberal model's prescription of sex neutrality or
prohibits decisionmaking facially consistent with that prescription that
method of proof, since discrimination now works more subtly than in "[tlhe days of Bull
Connor").
181. The majority's language in Wards Cove appeared to adopt this limited role for
the impact doctrine. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126. Both Wards Cove and Watson,
however, involved challenges to subjective employment criteria and employers' entire
hiring systems. Id. at 745; Watson,' 108 S. Ct. at 2782. These challenges did not identify
particular practices that operate objectively and allow the trier of fact confidently to assess
the relation of the practice to the employer's needs. Since by definition a court cannot know
the mechanism by which a subjective practice applies to individual job applicants, it is very
difficult for the courts to assess and monitor the merits of such a system. Essentially, in cases
challenging subjective employment decisions, the courts are forced to choose between
requiring employers to maintain a work force roughly in balance with the underlying labor
pool or limiting liability to cases where the evidence allows the fact finder to infer that the
employer in fact distinguished employees or job candidates by sex. The Court in Wards
Cove implicitly recognized this and, after noting the similarity of proof there and in
Hazelwood, demanded the same outcome that would result under the disparate treatment
doctrine. 109 S. Ct. at 2121.
When a plaintiff challenges a relatively objective employment criterion, like a
minimum height requirement or starting salary based on previous pay, a court can more
easily understand how the criterion operates and whether it is related to the employer's
legitimate business needs. In these cases the impact doctrine can serve the liberal model's
goal of prohibiting overbroad, non-merit based employment criteria. Additionally, the fear
of imposing a bottom line requirement on employers can be ameliorated without adopting a
strict causation requirement. It remains to be seen whether the courts will continue to
employ a relaxed causation requirement to claims challenging particular objective
employment criteria.
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nonetheless adversely affects women, in order to achieve ultimately that
very goal of sex neutrality in the workplace.
The judiciary adheres so strongly to the liberal model as the
foundation of Title VII that courts have restricted the BFOQ defense to
situations directly affecting an individual's private interests despite indications that Congress intended a broader application. Most significantly,
Title VII's legislative history and case law demonstrate that neither
Congress nor the courts see the statute as a means of altering the
competitive work ethic or the workplace institutions established by the
male dominated economy over the years.
III.

THE

Hows AND WHYS OF COMPARABLE WORTH

Unlike Title VII and the EPA, comparable worth does not encompass
particular statutory provisions or legal doctrines. Rather it refers to a
theory by which one can identify and remedy sex-based wage discrimination. The theory proceeds from the belief that an employer should pay an
employee according to the worth of the attributes of the job she performs. It
asserts that an employer engages in sexual discrimination if he pays female
jobs at a lower rate than he pays male jobs relative to this intrinsic measure
of job worth. 182
Antecedents of the theory of comparable worth date back at least as
far as Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, in which he noted five
"principal circumstances," corresponding roughly to skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions, that explain wage differentials. 8 3 The
question of equal pay for women's work was addressed as well by F.Y.
Edgeworth, who noted that in a truly competitive market pay would reflect
the "disutility to the employee," which would equal the "utility to the
employer." 1 84 In 1945, the National War Labor Board first applied a
comparable worth theory to correct gross pay inequities based on sex
182. Comparable worth does not require that the employer pay precisely the

evaluated intrinsic worth of each individual job. It only requires that he not devalue
women's work more than men's work relative to the intrinsic measure of worth. For

example, one formulation of comparable worth would simply require that an organization
pay women "the same percentage of men's pay that the [intrinsic] value of their work bears
to the [intrinsic] value of the men's work." PAY EQUITY AND COMPARABLE WORTH 18
(B.N.A. 1984) (Special Report).
183. See Killingsworth, Economic Analysis of Comparable Worth and Its Consequences, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING 183 (1984) [hereinafter IRRA PROCEEDINGS],

quoting from A.

SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 116-17 (Campbell, Skinner & Todd eds. 1976)).

184. Edgeworth, Equal Pay to Men and Women for Equal Work, 32
433 (1922).

ECON.

J. 431,
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during a period when wages were otherwise frozen. 8 5 Based in large part
on the War Labor Board experience, Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act
in 1963, but limited its scope to substantially equal jobs rather than jobs of

comparable worth.186 The issue of comparable pay for work of comparable
worth then lay moribund until the late 1970's.
The persistence of the wage gap between male and female workers
rekindled the current interest in comparable worth. In simplest terms, on
average a full time working woman earned about sixty three percent of the
pay of a full time working man in 1956 and, despite the enactment of the
Equal Pay Act and Title VII, this ratio has held relatively steady to the
present. 8 7 Comparable worth advocates attribute a substantial portion of
this gap to undervaluation of jobs held by women, rather than to legitimate

business practices or discrimination barring women from obtaining employment in correctly priced higher paying jobs. Despite Title VII
outlawing refusals to hire or promote women because of their gender, the
national labor market remains overwhelmingly sex-segregated. 88 Since
women tend to work in lower paying jobs, it is undisputed that wages vary
185. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
187. According to census data, the ratio of annual earnings was 63.9% in 1955 and
65 % in 1987. See NATIONAL COMM. ON PAY EQUITY, BRIEFING PAPER No. 1: THE WAGE
GAP 3 (1989). This ratio dropped in the 1960's, as women without experience entered the
labor market, but has risen from 58.9% in 1977, apparently in response to increases in
women's average work experience as well as to a greater propensity of women to enter
historically male occupations. See id. at 3, 7; see also Cowan, Poll Finds Women's Gains
Have Taken a Personal Toll, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
188. Based on national data, aggregating employers in different industries and size, as
of 1981, 61 % of all female workers would have to shift occupations for women to be
proportionally distributed across occupations. See Beller, Trends in OccupationalSegregation by Sex and Race, 1960-1981, in SEX SEGREGATION, supra note 27, at 14. This
percentage (the index of segregation), which had been declining slowly until 1970, dropped
more quickly (over 5%) between 1971 and 1981. Id. This drop reflected an increased
probability of younger women entering the job market and taking jobs in predominately
male occupations - especially professional and managerial jobs. Id. at 23. This trend
indicates that women are now more willing and able to avail themselves of the job
opportunities opened by Title VII. But, given the extent of sex-segregation, the effect is not
large. Belier, Occupational Segregation and the Earnings Gap, in ISSUE FOR THE 80's,
supranote 2, at 26 (noting that even at the increased rate ofjob integration, it would take 75
to 100 years to fully integrate the labor market).
In addition, sex segregation occurs vertically within occupations. Women with equal
education and experience tend to occupy lower ranking jobs within an occupation. For
example, while women have entered the ranks of college professors in moderate numbers, a
disproportionately small number occupy tenured positions. See WOMEN, WORK, AND
WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 24, 52 (D. Treiman & H. Hartmann eds.
1981) [hereinafter WOMEN, WORK & WAGES] (report of the Committee on Occupational
Classification and Analysis, Assembly of Behavioral and Social Sciences, National
Research Council); F. BLAU & M. FERBER, THE ECONOMICS OF WOMEN, MEN, AND WORK
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inversely with the percentage of females working in an occupation.189
Thus, comparable worth views employment discrimination as involving
more than barriers to women's entry into high paying jobs, and more than a
lag in women's acquisition of the skills necessary to take advantage of
formally equal job opportunities. It sees the problem as the devaluation of
pay for female jobs because of their gender association and aims to remedy
that directly by increasing the pay for those jobs.
While some governmental entities have implemented comparable
worth for their own workers, neither courts nor legislatures have adopted
comparable worth as the underlying basis for identifying and remedying
pay discrimination. 90 At the same time, some feminists have focused on
comparable worth as one means of achieving equality in the workplace.
The reasons for both phenomena are the same: comparable worth, in at
least some of its guises, holds the potential to go beyond the conservative
and liberal models of equality and to implement aspects of the feminist
ideal.
In order to evaluate comparable worth under the lens of our three
models of equality, we must first understand what implementation of
comparable worth entails. In particular, any comparable worth doctrine
must rely on some process of job evaluation. Additionally, from certain
jurisprudential perspectives, the requirements and limitations of the
evaluation methods will affect the desirability of implementing comparable worth theory. The reasons women receive lower pay for jobs of
comparable intrinsic worth will also affect the efficacy of adopting the
theory since, depending on the model of equality to which one subscribes,
those reasons may reflect legitimate business rather than personal decisions or sex discrimination. Therefore, it is helpful to postpone the
evaluation of comparable worth until after a review of the relationship of
157-61 (1986). This vertical segregation is masked by aggregation of different jobs within
occupations in the national data.
189. See S. WILLBORN, A COMPARABLE WORTH PRIMER 18-19 (1986); WOMEN,
WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 28-30.
190. At least twenty-eight state legislatures have ordered comparable worth studies
for state employment. Twenty of these have authorized implementation of some type of pay
equity plan for state workers. S. EVANS & B. NELSON, supra note 74, at 3. Minnesota also
requires all local jurisdictions (e.g., counties, municipalities, and school boards) to make
comparable worth studies and implement a remedy if needed. Id. The Canadian province of
Ontario recently required employers with more than 10 workers to assess predominately
female jobs based on the "skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions" of the jobs.
Freudenheim, A New Ontario Law Matches Women's Wages With Men's, N.Y. Times,
July 27, 1989, at I, col. 5. No jurisdiction in the United States has yet required private
employers to implement comparable worth. Id.
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the theory to the process of job evaluation and the causes of the gap
between the average wages of working men and women.
A. Implementationof Comparable Worth: The Relationshipof Comparable Worth and Job Evaluation
Comparable worth attempts to use the process of job evaluation to
determine the value of a job in terms of its intrinsic attributes. Job
evaluation is an established practice: steel companies first used it to help set
wages over 100 years ago,' 9 ' and since the mid 1950's, most large
organizations have relied extensively on it in setting wages.' 92 The raisons
d'etre for job evaluation are to attract and retain well qualified workers,
establish a pay scale that employees find equitable,' 93 and rationalize pay
policy to resolve disputes as the jobs in the organization change. But use of
the job evaluation process to alleviate discriminatory low pay for female
jobs stretches the process, perhaps beyond the realm of validity, and such
use at least demands modification from its application by employers today.
1. Job Evaluation as Applied Does Not Provide a Purely Intrinsic
Objective Measure of Job Worth
The goals of efficiency, equity and rationality shape the design and
implementation of any job evaluation plan and thereby constrain employer's pay prerogatives. To maintain a pay scale employees consider fair,
and to attract and retain good workers, a job evaluation explicitly relates
the employer's internal pay policy to the external labor market.1 9' To the
extent workers perceive jobs at the firm as similar to those at other
organizations, the firm will have to provide favorable pay to keep its work
force complacent. For entry level.jobs, for which applicants do not have
firm specific skills, the firm must pay a wage that compares favorably with
191. See R. HENDERSON, supra note 74, at 231.
192. D.

TREIMAN, JoB EVALUATION: AN ANALYTIC REVIEW

SON, supra note 74, at 258. See also E. JOHANSEN, COMPARABLE
THE MOVEMENT

193. See R.

4-5 (1979); R. HENDERTHE MYTH AND

WORTH:

12-13 (1984); Northrup, supra note 74, at 95.
supra note 74, at 231; D. TREIMAN, supra note 192, at 4-5;

HENDERSON,

Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation,and Title VIl ofthe Civil RightsActof
1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REr. 397, 428 (1979); Milkovich, The EmergingDebate, in ISSUES
AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 27; Williams, Discussion, in IRRA PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 183, at 200.
194. See Hildebrand, The Market System, in ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES, supra note

2, at 91; R.

HENDERSON,

supra note 74, at 339-40.
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other jobs that require the same education and experience or the firm will
not attract the most qualified workers.19
Job evaluations tie the wages at the firm to those of the external
market by identifying key jobs which are "common throughout the
industry or in the general locale under study and the content [s] of which
'
The evaluation is designed so that the
[are] commonly understood." 196
wages for these key jobs conform to market rates. 9 A job evaluator will
first choose compensable factors which almost universally fall into four
groups: skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions.1 98 He will next
express the key jobs in terms of levels of each factor (i.e. assign points for
each factor).' 99 These job evaluation points are then compared with the
market wages for the key jobs. The factor weights may be changed, or key
jobs dropped or added, to arrive at an acceptable fit between job ranking
and market wages. 200 Only then does the job evaluator rate the non-key
jobs under the evaluation plan.
Viewed as a means of resolving disputes, job evaluation serves as a
flexible set of rules within which management and employees can work out
195. See Schwab, Job Evaluationand Pay Setting: Concepts and Practices,in ISSUES
AND ALTERNATIVES,

196. R.

supra note 2, at 55.

HENDERSON,

supra note 74, at 262. See also Beatty & Beatty, Some

Problems with Contemporary Job Evaluation Systems, in

TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES,

supra note 2, at 70 (defining "benchmark jobs"); Schwab, supra note 195, at 55 (key jobs
are "characterized by a standardized . . .stable content.")
197. See D. TREIMAN, supra note 192, at 3; Schwab, supra note 195, at 64-67; Beatty
& Beatty, supra note 196, at 70.
198. D. TREIMAN, supra note 192, at 6-7. Studies have shown that many evaluation
systems really rank jobs according to a single, or at most a few, dominant variables.
Organizations, however, continue to employ systems that purportedly rely on as many as
10-15 factors because of their concern that use of a single factor system will not be
acceptable to employees. Id. at 33-34. See also Livernash, supra note 2, at 11 (suggesting
that "market rates" are a dominant factor and level of "responsibility" is often used as a
"fudge factor" to "modify skill ratings to fit the market").
199. The influence of a factor on the final point total in the job evaluation is called its
"weight." See Schwab, supra note 195, at 64. But cf Beatty & Beatty, supranote 196, at 71
(defining the weight as the maximum relative value a factor can have, rather than the actual
contribution to the evaluation plan). An evaluator can explicitly assign specific weights to
each factor, which is known as the a priorimethod of evaluation. D. TREIMAN, supra note
192, at 31. Alternatively, the evaluator can perform a multiple regression analysis of the key
job market rates in terms of the compensable factors, which will automatically assign
weights to each factor in a manner that best fits the relationship of market wages for the key
jobs. This method is known as the policy capturing approach. Id.; see Clauss, supra note 2,
at 50-52; see also Schwab, supra,at 65-66 (describing the regression procedure). The job's
final evaluation is the sum of the points for each factor multiplied by the corresponding
factor weight.
200. See Schwab, supra note 195, at 67.
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differences."' To perform this role, organizations seek a consensus
between management and labor regarding the design and application of
job evaluations. 22 Thus, several steps in the process reflect subjective
judgments, worked out between management and employees, rather than
objective choices based on a "science" of job evaluation. Subjectivity
enters the process in the descriptions of all the evaluated jobs, the choice of
key jobs, the choice of compensable factors, the determination of whether
the system sufficiently comports with the market and, for a priorisystems,
the choice of factor weights. 03
2.

Inconsistencies Exist Between the Theory of Comparable Worth
and Job Evaluation Techniques as Applied

Because job evaluation methodologies, as applied, depend on job
values in existing labor markets and a process of consensus between
management and labor factions that presently wield power, they do not
provide the intrinsic measure of job worth needed to implement comparable worth. In many ways,job evaluation techniques merely cement existing
prejudices about women's work into a bureaucratic bulwark resistent to
any pressures for change in compensation practices. Thus, at the same time
comparable worth relies on job evaluation methods to measure job worth, it
presses for modification of those very methods in order to increase the pay
for female jobs.'
Comparable worth would require a change in the methods by which
compensable factors are chosen. In traditional job evaluations, these
factors tend to reward the types of skill and effort necessary to perform
traditional male jobs and fail to reward skill and effort found in female jobs.
Job evaluators tend to overlook skills associated with historically domestic
responsibilities, especially those of taking care of children, and do not
include them as compensable factors.' 0 Evaluations also describe skill
201. Cf. Schwab, Using Job Evaluations To Obtain Pay Equity, in ISSUE FOR THE
80's, supra note 2, at 89.
202. This consensus is best achieved by involving labor in the job evaluation process.
See D. TREIMAN, supra note 192, at 5; Bellak, Comparable Worth: A Practitioner'sView,
in ISSUE FOR THE 80's, supra note 2, at 78.
203. See R. HENDERSON, supra note 74, at 268; Schwab, supra note 201, at 89.
204. See D. TREIMAN, supra note 192, at 30 (While "job evaluation methods may be
useful tools for assessing job worth . . . under a theory of comparable worth," they have
"troublesome features, .

.

. which

. . .

require that each system be carefully analyzed to

ensure that it is applied fairly and without bias.").
205. For example, the third edition of the United States Department of Labor
DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES overlooked important characteristics of female
jobs because job evaluators did not consider them "job related skills, but rather as qualities
intrinsic to being a woman." Steinberg, Identifying Wage Discriminationand Implement-
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factors in terms that allow greater differentiation, and hence greater
weight, for male jobs.2"' Similarly, effort variables often focus on physical
strength rather than on stamina and fatigue, again permitting greater
differentiation among men's jobs.20 7 To the extent that a job evaluation
uses male oriented factors, it will undervalue female jobs.
Once a job evaluation specifies factors, it weights them to conform to
the market wage distribution for key jobs. Therefore, the evaluation
captures any biases in the relative wages for these jobs and perpetuates
undervaluation of the attributes associated with female jobs.2" 8 Furthermore, positive attributes for female jobs may be neutral or even negative
for male jobs. If so, the selection of key jobs influences the weighting of
factors, and inclusion of too few female key jobs leads to a decrease in the
weight of such attributes.2 09
Even after a job evaluation plan specifies and weights factors, job
descriptions manifest sex-stereotyping in each factor assigned to women's
work. To the extent evaluations rely on supervisors or professional
evaluators to describe jobs, rather than on incumbent workers who have
more knowledge of what their jobs entail,210 the descriptions often omit
important tasks and duties. These omissions occur more often for female
jobs because supervisors of male jobs are more likely to have been promoted
from the jobs they supervise. Therefore, the ultimate effect is likely to be
biased against female jobs.211 Evaluations also often give credit to men's
ing Pay Equity Adjustments, in ISSUE FOR THE 80's, supra note 2, at 104. See generally
Remick, Dilemmasof Implementation: The Case ofNursing, in TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES,
supra note 2, at 90.
206. For example, manual skill factors stress the ability to use tools and not the more
general category of manual dexterity. See D. TREIMAN, supra note 192, at 32.
207. See D. TREIMAN, supra note 192, at 45-46; see also Beatty & Beatty, supra note
196, at 73-74 (physical exertion is often used as a compensable factor while fine motor skill
is not).
208. See Schwab, supra note 201, at 87; Remick, supra note 205, at 100; see also D.
TREIMAN, supra note 192, at 33; Steinberg, supra note 205, at 103.
209. A comparable worth study for Pennsylvania public employees, which used a
regression analysis on male key jobs to derive factor weights, found a negative correlation
between pay and the "people-orientation" of jobs. When the evaluation was implemented,
the rating of the predominately female job of licensed practical nurse, which involves
significant amounts of personal interaction, was significantly depressed. See Pierson,
Koziara & Johannesson, A Policy CapturingApplication in a Union Setting,in TECHNICAL
POSSIBILITIES, supra note 2, at 135.
210. See D. TREIMAN, supra note 192, at 39; see also Beatty & Beatty, supranote 196,
at 73 (also noting the problems of relying on self-interested incumbents to describe jobs).
211. Cf. D. TREIMAN, supra note 192, at 39. Treiman notes experiential differences
between secretaries and the executives who are asked to describe clerical jobs are
particularly significant. Id.

COMPARABLE WORTH

1990]

jobs, but not women's, for skills learned outside of the workplace. 2 In
assessing effort, they tend to stress strength rather than stamina even
where the factors permit recognition of endurance. 13 Finally, although
there is a universal view of female jobs as clean and free from adverse
environmental conditions, 2 14 many of these jobs involve the disposal of
human waste, exposure to suffering and disease, and unpleasant interpersonal interactions. 5
These problems of job evaluation methodology underscore a more
fundamental inconsistency between job evaluation and comparable worth.
Job evaluation is an inherently subjective process.21 6 A job may receive
very different rankings under two job evaluation systems depending on the
compensable factors and the factor weights used, the key jobs selected, the
method of describing jobs and the individuals performing the description
and the evaluation. 7 The success of an evaluation is measured by its
credibility; it works only so long as employees and management accept the
equity of the resulting job ranking. 21 But comparable worth rejects the
priorities dictated by the market, the subjective desires of the employer, or
consensus between labor and management as mechanisms for job evaluations because they have been infected by gender stereotypes and historically biased expectations. Therefore, comparable worth must replace these
mechanisms with some other means of making the subjective choices that
shape its intrinsic measure of job worth.
3. Potential Methods of Implementing Comparable Worth
There are several means of implementing comparable worth which
differ in large part according to whom they give the responsibility of
making the choices necessary to evaluate jobs. One possibility would
simply require an employer to base pay for all jobs on a single quantitative
212. For example, one job evaluation rated "typist" as requiring one month of on-thejob training before a worker could perform the job under normal supervision, while it rated
"truck driver" as requiring twelve months of on-the-job training. See D. TREIMAN, supra
note 192, at 45.
213. Job evaluations rate the physical effort involved in female jobs lower than male
jobs that do not require strength. For example, one evaluation rated "draftsman" and
"truck driver" as requiring similar effort but "typist" as requiring less effort. See D.
TREIMAN,

supra note 192, at 46.

214. E.g., O'Neill & Sider, The Pay Gap and OccupationalSegregation: Implications for Comparable Worth, in IRRA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 183, at 195.
215. See Foged, Discussion, in IRRA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 183, at 206.

216. See R.

HENDERSON,

supra note 74, at 268; D.

TREIMAN,

supra note 192, at 30;

Schwab, supra note 195, at 59.
217. See D. TREIMAN,supranote 192, at 34-35,41; Schwab, supra note 195,at 59-61.
218. See Bellak, supra note 202, at 77-78; Williams, supra note 193, at 200.
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job evaluation.2 19 This would leave the decision of how to structure and
implement the job evaluation to the employer. It would not eliminate
cultural biases and pervasive market undervaluation of women's work
captured by traditional job evaluation. But it would at least force the
employer to review the bases for his pay policies and encourage change of
the most blatant devaluation of female jobs.2 2
A second possible mechanism, similar to that advocated by proponents who see Title VII as including comparable worth, would rely on
private actions to induce employers to provide comparable pay for femaledominated jobs of comparable worth. A plaintiff would present comparable worth studies showing her job is underpaid in relation to male jobs. The
employer could rebut this either by attacking the validity of the plaintiff's
job evaluation or by presenting his own evaluation showing the fe.nale job
is not undervalued. 221 This scheme would vest the responsibility for the
numerous subjective decisions underlying any job evaluation with the
parties and the authority to approve these choices with the arbiters of the
claim - the courts.
This approach has some facial appeal in that it presents comparable
worth as a doctrine of antidiscrimination law to be developed and applied
much as the courts have developed Title VII doctrine. But it requires courts
to make the ultimate subjective decision about the validity of the job
evaluations presented in deciding which of the two parties' evaluations
better measures job worth.22 2 While subjective choices are not foreign to
219. See WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 87-88; Treiman, Hartmann &
Roos, supra note 2, at 149.
220. See WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 87 ("[tlhis ensures that all
jobs in a firm are compensated on the basis of the same criteria"); cf. Treiman, Hartmann,
& Roos, supra note 2, at 151 (table showing that adjusting national average wages to
conform to an unadjusted job evaluation would increase women's wages from 57 % to 70 %
of men's wages).
221. Cf Clauss, supra note 2, at 73 (advocating that a plaintiff should be deemed to
have shown discrimination under Title VII if pay for women's work is less than predicted by
plaintiff'sjob evaluation derived by using a policy capturing approach applied to the firm's
male jobs).
222. See M. RUBINSTEIN, EQUAL PAY FOR WORK OF EQUAL VALUE 96-98 (1984); D.
TREIMAN, supra note 192, at 39 (job evaluation ultimately rests on subjective judgments).
One commentator contends that the use of a policy capturing job evaluation
determines which factors an employer uses to set wages. It thereby relieves the courts of the
obligation of independently deciding which factors are most appropriate. Policy capturing
evaluation is based on the "art" of regression analysis which assumes the functional form
and the independent variables (i.e. compensable factors) used to explain the dependent
variable (i.e. pay). There is no objective way to determine on what variables pay is actually
based or the functional form of the relationship between these variables and pay. Clauss,
supra note 2, at 73-4. See also R. PINDYCK & D. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND
ECONOMIC FORECASTS 128 (2d ed. 1981). See generally Campbell, RegressionAnalysis in
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judges, at present there appears to be no principle to guide such choices. 2 3
Traditional constraints guiding the design and implementation of job
evaluations are not the "stuff' of which most judicial decisions are
made. 24
A third alternative relies on the legislature to define the evaluation
system underlying comparable worth. This scheme would require organizations to set wages for jobs according to an evaluation plan defined by
statute or by an administrative agency established for that purpose. One
major impediment to this mechanism is the difficulty of designing a plan
that satisfies the equitable concerns of proponents of comparable worth
and remains flexible enough to apply to the vast array of jobs and
organizational structures that characterize the workplace. Recent studies
of job evaluation processes and their application of to state public
employees suggest that this hurdle may be surmountable.
The statutory mechanism would first have to define a set of compensable factors broad enough to cover the wide variety of jobs found throughout
the economy. Many private employers already use a "canned" set of
factors. 2 5 Washington, Minnesota and New York have conducted comparable worth studies using a single set of factors to cover most of their job
titles, 2 6 which closely approximate the diversity of jobs in the economy
Title VII Cases: Minimum Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law

and Statistics Meet, 36

STAN.

L.

REV.

1299 (1984).

223. In practice, the validity ofjob evaluations is deterimed solely by their acceptability to both employers and employees. To a large extent, this will depend on how well they
comport with expectations based on existing (and, in all likelihood, historically biased)
wage hierarchies. See also WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 94-96
(comparable worth approach is problematic because "there are no definitive tests of the
'fairness' " in choice of job evaluations, so job worth is "a matter of values"). See supra
notes 191-222 and accompanying text.
224. See American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 720 (7th Cir. 1986);
Weiler, supra note 1, at 1170 & n.161. But see M. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 222, at 101
(despite employers' need for broad discretion in setting wages, courts could review
employers' implementation of job evaluation for reasonableness).
225. Over 4,000 organizations use the Hay Plan, a job evaluation system using
standardized factors and weights. R. HENDERSON, supra note 74, at 311-13.
226. Washington's study used four factors - "knowledge and skills," "mental
demands," "accountability," and "working conditions" to evaluate 121 job classifications.

N.

WILLIS, STATE OF WASHINGTON COMPARABLE WORTH STUDY

4-6 (1974) [hereinafter

Minnesota used the Hay job evaluation system to evaluate
1800 job classifications. Rothschild, Pay Equity - The Minnesota Experience, 20 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 209, 210 (1986). New York considered 35 factors, but ultimately used only
15 factors (plus "proportion female" and "proportion minority" in models aimed at
identifying the explicit effect of these variables on pay) to evaluate 2898 job titles. CENTER
FOR WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT, SUNY, ALBANY, NEW YORK STATE COMPARABLE WORTH
WASHINGTON STATE STUDY].

STUDY

26, 198 (1985) [hereinafter

NEW YORK STATE STUDY].
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generally.22 7 These private and state studies strongly suggest that statutes

or regulations can specify an acceptable universal set of compensable
factors.
Once the law specifies the factors, it would next have to provide the
means to determine factor weights. It could do so using the a priori
approach, setting the weights by legislative fiat.228 In some situations,
however, this might result in job rankings that deviate sufficiently from
employee's notions of relative job worth to cause worker dissatisfaction and
workplace disruptions.2 29 A better solution would be to modify the policy
capturing approach to reduce the devaluation of female jobs. This could be
accomplished by regressing only pay for male key jobs against the
compensable factors to derive factor weights.2 30 An alternative means
would add an independent variable linked to the percentage of job
incumbents who are female and base pay on the regression line derived by
keeping the percent-female variable at a fixed level.2 31
227. For example, New York's study covered managerial/ confidential (nonunion)
positions and those within six bargaining units: (1) security services, (2) administrative
services, (3) operational services, (4) institutional services, (5) professional, scientific and

technical services, and (6) security supervisors.

NEW YORK STATE STUDY,

supra note 226,

at 25. The Minnesota study covered 16 bargaining units based on occupational groups
represented by 11 different unions. Rothschild, supra note 226, at 209.
228. Minnesota and Washington used a priorievaluation systems. See WASHINGTON
STATE STUDY, supra note 226, at 8; Rothschild, supra note 226, at 210 (noting the use of the
Hay system, a standardized a priori system).
229. See Livernash, supra note 2, at 13 (Due to present institutionalized wage
relationships, any legislative prescription of comparable worth will "meet very substantial
resistance and would be highly disruptive.").
230. Viewing male dominated jobs as untainted by discrimination implies that these
jobs reflect a "correct" relation between compensable factors and pay. Therefore,
regressing pay for such jobs against these factors will give unbiased market-based factor
weights. See WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 86. Graphically, this "male pay
policy" approach fits male and female jobs to two separate (and unrelated) regression lines
and then demands that pay for female jobs be set according to the male job regression line.
This approach is not without its disadvantages. This method will not compensate
female jobs for attributes not readily found in male jobs. Even worse, these attribute may be
considered detrimental in male jobs. In that case, basing weights on a regression of pay for
male key jobs would penalize the female jobs. See Treiman, Effect of Choice of Factorsand
FactorWeights in Job Evaluation, in TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES, supra note 2, at 88-89. For
example, the New York Study found that the complexity of mental demands differentiated
female dominated clerical jobs from one another, but did not correlate significantly with
pay for male jobs. Using the male pay policy approach would not reward these job attributes

thereby underpaying clerical jobs. See NEW

YORK STATE STUDY,

supra note 226, at 203-

04; see also supra note 209 (noting Pennsylvania study penalized "people orientation").
231. See WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 88; Treiman, Hartmann &
Roos, supra note 2, at 150. This "overall pay line" adjustment is premised on the notion that
employers should compensate factors identically for all jobs regardless of the percentage of
male or female incumbents. It assumes the same relationship between compensable factors
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The third, and perhaps the most difficult, aspect of a statutorily
mandated evaluation plan concerns the analysis of a job's compensable
factors. Most evaluations rely on a combination of incumbent and
supervisor descriptions and evaluator job studies to generate these analyses.2 32 While all subjectivity probably cannot be eliminated, regulations
could specify procedures to guard against bias in the evaluations. Studies
suggest that job analyses might be done by having supervisors or incumbents answer a specific set of close-ended questions about the jobs they
2 33
perform or supervise.
B.

Causes of Lower Pay For Women's Work

Putting implementation problems aside, the wisdom of adopting
comparable worth depends on the reasons pay for female jobs is less than
for male jobs. The premise of comparable worth is that women's work is
undervalued, and much of the present debate hinges on commentators'
beliefs regarding the economic mechanisms that underlie this premise. The
literature presents two major competing models of wage determination to
explain the pay differential between men's and women's work: a neoclassical microeconomic model and an institutional model.23 4
and wages for every level of the variable "percent female." Graphically, this approach
results in parallel regression lines relating wages to evaluation points for female and male
jobs and moves the (presumably lower) female line up to the male line.
Like the male pay policy approach, this overall pay line adjustment may not be a
panacea. Because pay for female jobs reflects biased evaluations of the jobs' worth, the
regression line used to set the wages for all jobs incorporates those biases into the pay line
adjustment. Moreover, if we believe male and female jobs do not need identical treatment,
but only that neither should be devalued with respect to the other, this method may overly
restrict an employer's discretion to formulate pay policies in a manner that best reflects the
contributions of each job to his firm.
232.. See NEW YORK STATE STUDY, supra note 226, at 17; D. TREIMAN, supra note
192, at 39-40.
233. See WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 119-23 (minority report of
Ernest J. McCormick). Closed-ended questionnaires have been used to evaluate broad
ranges of jobs. See E. MCCORMICK, P. JENNERET & R. MECHAM, POSITION ANALYSIS
QUESTIONNAIRE (1969) ("Position Analysis Questionnaire" (PAQ)); Pierson, Koziera &
Johannesson, supra note 209, at 123-25 (variant on the PAQ used for a pilot pay equity
study in Pennsylvania); NEW YORK STATE STUDY, supra note 226, at 17-24 (questionnaire
developed for the New York comparable worth study).
234. See WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 51-52. This article uses the
term "institutional view" to refer loosely to theories that depend on exogenous market
structures and noneconomic factors that affect human behavior. A thorough review of the
economic debate between neoclassical theory and competing models of the labor market is
provided by Cain, The Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories to Orthodox
Theory: A Survey, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 1215 (1976).
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1. Neoclassical Microeconomic Theory and the Human Capital
Model
Neoclassical economics assumes that wages are set according to
supply and demand. Prices give the labor suppliers (workers) and labor
buyers (employers) signals that allow the market to reach equilibrium.
Except to the extent that there are market imperfections that restrict the
ability of workers and employers to react to prices, employers will set wages
for a job equal to the revenue product of the marginal worker. Unfortunately, employers cannot usually determine the marginal revenue product
of an employee, so instead they rely on proxies for productivity - worker
attributes like education and job experience. 35
The human capital model applies this neoclassical theory to the supply
side of the market as well. It views workers as producers of labor who can
maximize their income by investing in productivity related capital.2 36 This
explains why many individuals forego immediate income to continue their
education or take jobs with lower starting pay but with greater opportunities for on-the-job training. The human capital model in its simplest form
predicts equal returns on education, training and other productivity related
attributes regardless of the type of training or the field of education. For
example, if the return on engineering school exceeded that on nursing
school, then the model predicts that individuals would enter engineering
school in greater numbers until the increased supply of engineers drove
their wages down to a point where the returns on the types of education
2 37
were equal.
Unlike the ideal profit maximizing producer, however, workers do not
necessarily measure the value they derive from a job in purely monetary
terms.2 3 8 Returning to our previous example, if workers generally derive
satisfaction from the task of nursing, this satisfaction is added to the lower
monetary wage and yields an "equal return" in terms of satisfaction but not
235. For an elementary exposition of the neoclassical model of labor markets, see
generally L.

REYNOLDS, S.

MASTERS & C.

MOSER,

LABOR ECONOMICS

AND LABOR

36-224 (9th ed. 1986).
236. See generally G. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 9-11 (2d ed. 1975). For a less
technical description of the human capital model, with an emphasis on its implications for
sex-based wage differentials, see F. BLAU & M. FERBER, supra note 188, at 182-220.
237. Some of the complexities that lead to predictions of unequal rates of return on
human capital are discussed below. In addition, individual differences in innate ability will
cause differentials in returns. For instance, we would expect professional athletes to earn
higher than average returns on their training. An influx of potential athletes will not occur to
lower the return because few individuals have the natural ability to take advantage of this
earning opportunity. See L. THUROW, DANGEROUS CURRENTS 173-80 (1983).
238. See F. BLAU & M. FERBER, supra note 188, at 184.
RELATIONS
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dollars. Similarly, if a job entails psychic costs, such as risks to health or
safety, or entails unpleasant working conditions, the employer must
provide a "wage compensating differential" in order to bring the satisfaction from the job up to the going rate.
Since workers do not behave as profit maximizing producers in a
purely monetary sense, the possibility that individuals will value particular
attributes of jobs differently must also be considered. For example, one
person might find working with sick and dying people day after day very
depressing, while another might find helping such people rewarding. Even
if the distributions of workers' tastes for the attributes of two jobs are
identical, the fact that there is a distribution implies that wages for the jobs
will depend on the demand for them. 3 9 In other words, even if the average
individual would find the two jobs comparable in terms of the required
human capital investment and working conditions, the job with the greater
demand will pay more and therefore yield a higher return.
(a) Gender correlatedpreferences of human capital investment and job
choice
The human capital model tries to explain the relationship between
sex-segregation of jobs and the wage gap by recognizing that men and
women exhibit different extra-market preferences. For example, within
the family, women shoulder more of the burdens of housework and child
bearing and rearing, while men bear greater responsibility for earning
money.24 This differentiation between market-work and home-work, and
specialization of each spouse in one or the other, makes economic sense
239. See Killingsworth, supra note 183, at 184-86.
240. During the first half of the 1970's married working women spent 2.3 to 4.0 hours
per day on housework while husbands spent 0.6 to 1.9 hours a day working around the house.
Married working men spent 6.9 to 7.1 hours per day doing market work, while working
wives spent 5.0 to 6.5 hours per day on the job. F. BLAU & M. FERBER, supra note 188, at
126. Different survey results for 1975-1976 and 1981-1982 do indicate, however, that
among couples where both adults work, men have begun to perform more housework and
women more market work. Id. at 127-28. Data on earnings differences between married
individuals and those who never married support the hypothesis that extra-market sex roles
explain a good portion of the wage gap. In 1970, working women who never married earn
about 98 % of the pay of men who never married. Polachek, Women in the Economy:
Perspectives on Gender Inequality, in ISSUE FOR THE 80's, supra note 2, at 43. Married
women's pay decreased below that of women who never married by three percent for every
decade married, while married men's pay increased above that for men who never married
by four percent for every decade married. Polachek, PotentialBiases in MeasuringMaleFemale Discrimination,10 J. HUM. RESOURCES 205, 215-16 (1975). This, however, may
merely reflect that marriage correlates with potentially discriminatory factors that affect
earnings.
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since it allows a couple to produce more than its members could produce
separately.24 a Given the difference in outlook of men and women, they are
expected to invest in different types of skills and to work in different types of
jobs. Moreover, because the market does not represent women's only
choice for work, it can be expected that they will earn lower wages for their
market work.
For instance, if women expect to take time off from the labor market to
raise children, they should invest in skills that do not depreciate rapidly
during interruptions in labor force participation. This would maximize
their return on human capital given their choice of family role.242 They
might also invest in skills that they can use in both their home and market
roles. They would then derive a monetary return from the labor market and
a non-monetary return from the use of the same skill at home. The skill's
overall return then equals that for skills in which men invest even though its
market return was less than that for the masculine skill.
In addition, a woman who takes on a dual home/market role may have
to choose to act non-optimally in one role to satisfy the other. If women
have to spend appreciable amounts of time doing housework and raising
children, they cannot devote that time to training for work or to work
itself.2 41 Women in this dual role may not work as productively as men. 24 "
241. See F. BLAU & M. FERBER, supra note 188, at 40-45; Polacheck, supra note 240,
at 51; see also G. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 209-11
(1976). Differentiation and specialization may have their costs as well. Housework may be
inherently less satisfying. Monetary earnings may translate into power in the relationship
since they bestow greater flexibility than nonmarket earnings. Specialization may not make
economic sense in the long-run, given life style changes. Additionally, if the marriage
breaks up, specialization may be disastrous especially for the person who specialized in the
less marketable skills associated with home and family. See F. BLAU & M. FERBER, supra
note 188, at 46-52.
242. See generally Polachek, Occupational Self-Selection: A Human Capital Approach to Sex Differences in OccupationalStructure, 63 REv. ECON. & STAT. 60 (1981)
(developing a human capital model that correlates occupation of a worker with withdrawals
from the workforce); Polachek, Occupational Segregation Among Women: Theory,
Evidence, and A Prognosis,in WOMEN IN THE LABOR MARKET 137 (C. Lloyd, E. Andrews
& C. Gilroy eds. 1979) (explaining occupational segregation as reflecting job choices that
maximize lifetime earnings given expected workforce interruptions); cf. Mincer &
Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital:Earnings of Women, 82 J. POL. ECON.
S76, S 103 (1974) (explaining about half of the wage gap as due to differences in returns on
human capital for male and female workers).
243. See O'Neill, An Argument Against Comparable Worth, in ISSUE FOR THE 80'S,
supra note 2, at 181. That full-time working women work 8 %-10 % fewer hours than full
time working men may reflect the constraint of the dual role on women's work time. This
difference in hours worked explains about 5 of the 36 percentage points of the wage gap. See
O'Neill, The Trend in the Male-Female Wage Gap in the United States, 3 J. LAB. ECON.
S91, S93-94 (1985).
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Women may also choose jobs that allow them flexibility to perform both
roles. Data showing that women tend to take jobs requiring less of24a5
-commute and allowing more flexibility to take time off is not surprising.
But, if women restrict their choice of jobs to those with these desirable
attributes, the human capital model hypothesizes that they cannot expect
to earn an equal monetary return on their education, experience and work
efforts.
(b) Sex role socializationas an explanationof sex-segregationand lower
pay for women's work
Sex role socialization is an alternative to the human capital model. It
explains differences between men and women in the workplace as a
response to the pervasive inculcation of gender specific roles by society
rather than as the results of purely voluntary choices aimed at maximizing
utility in light of exogenously determined tastes and preferences. The
socialization process influences the jobs women occupy in several ways: by
instilling gender appropriate personality traits, by reinforcing the home as
the focus of women's role in society, and most directly by defining these jobs
perceived to be women's work. Society teaches girls to depend on others
and to value interpersonal relationships, while it encourages boys to be
independent. 24 6 It reinforces women who develop a "feminine personality"
- subordinate, nurturing, and emotionally sensitive. It discourages
women who strive to dominate, be aggressive, and put personal achievement ahead of concern for others.24 7 By high-school, not surprisingly, men
and women ascribe different values to types of work: men place greater
244. See Becker, Human Capital,Effort, and the Sexual Divisionof Labor, 3 J. LAB.
S33, S43 (1985).
245. See O'Neill & Braun, Women and the Labor Market: A Survey of Issues and
Policies in the United States, reprintedin Pay Equity: Equal Payfor Work ofComparable
Value, PartsI & II, Joint Hearingson the Subcomms. on Human Resources, Civil Service,
Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil
Service, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 1449 (1982) (men commute on the average 3.9 hours per
week and women 2.8 hours per week); Berger, Comparable Worth at Odds with American
Realities, in ISSUE FOR THE 80's, supranote 2, at 69 (women occupy jobs that offer part-time
work and flexible hours). Proponents of the human capital model even suggest that factors
such as the absence of easy access to a telephone in blue collar jobs have kept women out of
ECON.

such jobs. See

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH:

80's, A CONSULTATION, VOLUME 2: PROCEEDINGS 31 (1985) (Statement of
Simon Polachek, Professor of Economics, SUNY at Binghampton).
246. L. WEITZMAN, SEX ROLE SOCIALIZATION: A Focus ON WOMEN 18-19 (1979);
Marini & Brinton, Sex Typing in OccupationalSocialization,in SEX SEGREGATION, supra
note 27, at 210.
247. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 246, at 18; England, Socioeconomic Explanationsof
ISSUE FOR THE

Job Segregation, in

TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES,

supra note 2, at 29.
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value on job status, earnings, freedom from supervision, and leadership,
while women value more highly working with people, helping others and
using their abilities creatively. 4 8 These gender distinctions in "appropriate" personality traits push women into, and keep men from, occupations
that emphasize those traits.24 9 Because the socialization process does not
aim at maximizing women's earning potentials, women tend to develop
skills for which the labor market does not pay a premium.
Sex role socialization also teaches women that the source of personal
satisfaction should be family rather than work. Children learn from
parents, teachers, even picture books and television, that women bear
primary responsibility for housework and raising children. 5 Deviations
from gender appropriate roles elicit negative responses and create discomfort and anxiety, which discourage women from rejecting the traditional
role of homemaker. 51 Society's gender dependant notions of success in
turn encourage women to continue to focus on the family; for a woman to
succeed she must raise and nurture her family, career achievements come
second.2 52 Thus, socialization explains women's orientation toward the
home that leaves them lacking skills or with conflicting obligations that
prevent them from entering high paying male jobs.
Socialization also directly encourages job segregation by identifying
certain jobs, such as nurse or teacher, as feminine and appropriate for
women, and other jobs, such as truck driver or construction worker, as
masculine and therefore inappropriate for women. In a sample of children
in the second, fourth and sixth grades, fifty-four percent of the girls
indicated they planned to be teachers, nurses, housekeepers, secretaries or
waitresses, while one percent of the boys planned to work in these
occupations. Fifty-seven percent of the boys and only four percent of the
girls saw themselves growing up to be firefighters, policemen, car mechan248. Marini & Brinton, supra note 246, at 207, (citing Lueptow, Social Change and
Sex-Role Change in Adolescent OrientationsToward Life, Work and Achievement: 19641975, 43 Soc. PSYCH. Q. 48, 54 (1980)).
249. For example, in 1970 women accounted for 38 % of the national labor force but
comprised 73 % of all workers in nurturant occupations. Thus, a women was about four
times as likely to work in a nurturant occupation than a man. See England, supra note 247,
at 30-31.
250. See L. WEITZMAN, supra note 246, at 8-10.
251. Id. at 14; Berg & Ferber, Men and Women GraduateStudents: Who Succeeds
and Why?, 54 J. HIGHER EDUC. 629,636-37 (1983); Becker, BarriersFacing Women in the
Wage Labor Market, A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 934, 940-41
(1986); Mason, Commentary:Strober's Theory of OccupationalSex Segregation,in SEX
SEGREGATION, supra note 27, at 164-65.
252. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 246, at 61-63; M. GOLD, supra note 1, at 9; Marini &
Brinton, supra note 246, at 210-11.
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ics, construction workers, or in sports related jobs. 53 Socialization about
the gender propriety of jobs may be so effective that most men and women
do not even consider working in an occupation dominated by the opposite
sex.

254

(c) Employment discriminationas a cause of job segregation and lower
pay for women's work
Discrimination against women provides a third explanation or job
segregation and the wage gap that is consistent with the price-auction
model of neoclassical microeconomics. The labor market may set a wage
rate for women below that for men because employers, male workers or
customers have a "taste for discrimination." That is, they will pay for the
privilege of hiring, working with, or buying from men instead of women.
If the employer maintains the discriminatory preference, he will not
hire women for male jobs unless he can pay them sufficiently less than men
so that the wage difference makes.up for his loss of utility that results from
his sex based preference. If the firm's male workers harbor a taste for
discrimination, the firm might refuse to hire women to work with these men
to avoid dissatisfaction among existing employees that will decrease their
productivity 56 or force the firm to pay them a higher wage.2 57 Women will
be hired into jobs presently filled by men only if they accept a wage
sufficiently low to make up for productivity losses and the premium the firm
will have to pay the incumbent male workers.158 Firms that provide services
rather than manufactured goods may also find that their customers
discriminate against women. 259 For example, a retailer may lose customers
253. England, Explanations of Job Segregation and the Sex Gap in Pay, in ISSUE FOR
55; NEMEROWICZ, CHILDREN'S PERCEPTIONS OF GENDER AND
Other studies reveal that high school aged youths aspire to jobs in
a manner that mirrors existing sex segregation of occupations, indicating the strong
influence of socialization prior to entering the job market on occupational desires. Marini &
Brinton, supra note 246, at 201-04.
254. WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 53.
255. See G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971); F. BLAU
& M. FERBER, supra note 188, at 244-51.
256. See Bergmann & Darity, Social Relations in the Workplace and Employer
THE 80's, supra note 2, at
WORK ROLES 130 (1977).

Discrimination, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 155 (1981).
257. See F. BLAU & M. FERBER, supra note 188, at 248-49.

258. If the employer can hire all women, or women and nondiscriminating men,
without having to bear extra costs of searching for these employees, he should be willing to
pay women and men the same rate. Ultimately, employee discrimination would then lead to
job segregation on a firm by firm basis, but without discounting women's wages. See G.
BECKER, supra note 255, at 56.
259. See F. BLAU & M. FERBER, supra note 188, at 251.
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who hold sex based prejudices if he hires female sales clerks. He will hire a

woman only if he can pay her a wage sufficiently below that a man would
command to make up for the revenue from the lost sales. Tastes for
discrimination may also be more complex than mere dislike of working
with or buying from women. They may involve distrust of having women

perform certain traditionally male jobs.260 Therefore, tastes for discrimination can discourage hiring women into particular jobs as well as
decreasing women's wages in relation to those of men.

Even without tastes for discrimination, a profit maximizing employer
may nonetheless engage in discriminatory behavior. An employer may

practice "statistical discrimination" against women by judging individual
job candidates according to the qualifications he attributes to the "average" women candidate.2 61 Most employers perceive women employees as
less committed to their work and having fewer traits associated with
success in male jobs. 62 Thus, statistical discrimination makes an employer

more likely to hire a man than a woman for male jobs, or if he hires a
woman, to pay her less than he would a man.
The effects of discrimination by employers, fellow workers, and
customers, in the aggregate, may depress the wage not only for individual
260. In the context of sex discrimination, it seems strange to assert that men require
some premium to associate with women at work, given that men and women freely associate
outside the workplace. Taste for discrimination makes more sense as a preference for hiring
men and women into gender appropriate jobs. F. BLAU & M. FERBER, supra note 188, at
244.
261. See Phelps, The StatisticalTheory ofRacism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV.
659 (1972). An employer may engage in statistical discrimination to save the costs of having
to determine the traits of individual job candidates. To the extent the savings in information
costs exceeds the costs imposed by (i) errors in the employer's perceptions, (ii) deviations of
individuals' productivity from that predicted by group averages, and (iii) risk costs due to
the greater uncertainty in employee productivity, the use of these perceived group traits is
economically efficient. See Schmid, The PoliticalEconomy of Labor Market Discrimination: A Theoreticaland ComparativeAnalysis of Sex Discrimination,in SEx DISCRIMINATION AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: THE LABOR MARKET AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY

278 (G.

Schmid & R. Weitzel eds. 1984); see also Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination,in
DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS

3, 26, 28-30 (0. Ashenfelter & A. Rees eds. 1973)

(statistical discrimination may result in a stable equilibrum in which wages for blacks [or
women] are lower than for whites). Since the use of accurate perceptions of group averages
generally will not result in the aggregate wage rate for the group exceeding its aggregated
marginal revenue product, some economists do not consider this sex discrimination. See
Aigner & Cain, Statistical Theories of Discriminationin Labor Markets, 30 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 175, 177-78 & n.8. Aigner and Cain, nonetheless, present models in which
the disfavored group, in aggregate, is paid less than favored groups because of greater
uncertainty about how the members of the disfavored group will perform. Id. at 180-83; see
also Schmid, supra, at 279-80.
262. See Rosen & Jardee, Perceived Sex Differences in Managerially Relevant
Behavior, 4 SEx ROLES 837 (1978).
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women, but for female jobs themselves. If discrimination is sufficiently
pervasive, it may crowd women into a limited number of jobs." 3 The supply
of labor for these jobs will thus be greater than it would be if women could
freely choose their occupations, and the supply for male jobs will be less.
Crowding will therefore cause a decrease in the market clearing wage for
women's work below the level that would result absent the barriers to
mobility, and a corresponding increase in the pay for male jobs.
Evidence also indicates that the labor market is not very competitive
and that "monopsony may be widespread in the industries in which many
of the most important female-dominated occupations are found, and may
be a common characteristic of the internal labor markets of large
organizations." 26 4 This allows firms to pay below workers' marginal
revenue products. In that situation, firms benefit from dividing their
workers into groups having supply curves with different elasticities. They
can pay separate wages to each group and, in essence, price discriminate." 5
Women then will receive lower wages than men if the elasticity of supply
for women is lower than that for men.268 Employers may structure their
263. See Bergmann, The Economic Case For Comparable Worth, in COMPARABLE
WORTH: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 71 (H. Hartmann ed. 1985) [hereinafter, NEW
DIRECTIONS]; Bergmann, The Effect on White Incomes ofDiscriminationin Employment,
79 J. POL. ECON. 294, 297-98 (1971). Approaching Bergmann's model from a neoclassical
perspective requires positing an extreme and widespread taste for discrimination that
results in virtual exclusion of women from men's jobs. See Blau & Jusenius, Economists'
Approaches to Sex Segregation in the Labor Market: An Appraisal in WOMEN AND THE
WORKPLACE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION 184

(M.

BLAXALL &

B. REAGAN eds. 1976). Crowding, however, also applies if strong supply side barriers, such
as sex role socialization, exist, or if we abandon neoclassical theory in favor of other models,
such as Lester Thurow's queuing model, under which absolute exclusion of women from
male jobs seems more plausible. See L. THUROW, GENERATING INEQUALITIES 91-97
(1975).
264. Holzhauer, The Economic Possibilitiesof Comparable Worth, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 919, 924 n.10 (1986). See also Devine, Manpower Shortage in Local Government
Employment, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 538, 542 (1969); Hurd, Equilibrium Vacancies in a
Labor Market Dominated By Non-Profit Firms: The "'Shortage"Of Nurses, 55 REV.
ECON. & STATISTICS 234 (1974); Link & Landon, Monopsony and Union Power in the
Market For Nurses, 41 S. ECON. J. 649 (1975); cf. Dunlop, Industrial Relations and
Economics: The Common Frontier Of Wage Determination, in IRRA PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 183, at 12-14 (neoclassical assumption of competitive labor market is
inconsistent with the large existing differentials between the pay of workers performing
similar work for different firms and industries).
265. For a comprehensive treatment of sex based wage discrimination by a monopsonist in the labor market, see J. MADDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 69-85
(1973). See also Bergmann, The Economic Casefor Comparable Worth, supra note 263,
at 71; Madden, Discrimination- A Manifestation of Male Market Power?, in SEX,
DISCRIMINATION, AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR 146, 153 (C. Lloyd ed. 1975).
266. Madden hypothesizes that females may have less ability to move into male jobs
because of extra-market choices such as family commitments. See J. MADDEN, supra note

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:269

jobs to segregate men from women and to decrease the mobility of women
into men's jobs, which decreases the elasticity of the female supply
curve. 26 7 Even absent rigid barriers preventing women from moving from
one employer to another, employers will benefit from price discrimination
so long as no other employer hires women workers away by offering them a
higher wage. Thus, socialization that leads to the belief that women
employees are less valuable also provides a mechanism which prevents
wage competition for women workers. This induces employers to offer
women wages based on shared perceptions of women's value rather than on
marginal revenue product.2" 8 Thus, employers benefit by reinforcing the
perception that female workers are worth less than male workers. Employers receive an economic incentive to maintain job segregation and lower
pay for female jobs which in turn strongly reinforce this perception.
(d) Direct devaluation of women's work
Gender association of female jobs may directly depress the wages for
these jobs below the level that would have prevailed had men historically
performed them. This devaluation cannot be verified directly since it is
impossible to know what the wages for women's work would have been had
265, at 22, 65. But the elasticity of the supply of female labor may be greater "since women
have a socially acceptable occupation (housewife) outside the labor force," so "their
relative immobility within the labor force could be counterbalanced by their greater ability
to move in and out of the labor market altogether." Blau & Jusenius, supra note 269, at 189.
If we relax the usual assumption of exogenous tastes, women may acclimate to a lower wage,
in which case we might reasonably assume that most of the women who can enter the
market would have done so if offered a wage equal to that which would prevail absent
discrimination. If so, then the elasticity of the female supply curve would be less than that of
the male supply curve, at this wage, and occupational wage discrimination will increase the
monopsonist employer's profits.
267. See J. MADDEN, supra note 265, at 77-81.
268. The constraints socialization places on employers act like an agreement between
employers to set separate wages for their male and female workforce. See P. DOERINGER &
M. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS 22 (1971); Bielby &
Baron, A Woman's PlaceIs With Other Women: Sex Segregation Within Organizations,in
SEX SEGREGATION, supra note 27, at 29. Antitrust law has long recognized that even absent
explicit agreement, firms can fix prices by "conscious parallelism." See generally Turner,
The Definition ofAgreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelismand Refusals
To Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962). Socialization provides a means for employers to
benefit by unconscious parallel price discrimination. Moreover, socialization of employees'
and employers' alike to perceive of women workers as less valuable can result in a stable
economic equilibrium in which this perception becomes a self fulfilling prophesy. See Blau,
Occupational Segregation and Labor Market Discrimination, in SEX SEGREGATION,
supra note 27, at 123; Arrow, supra note 261, at 26; Arrow, Economic Dimensions of
OccupationalSegregation:Comment I, 1SIGNS J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y no. 3, pt.
3, at 234 (!976).
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history evolved differently. But circumstantial evidence demonstrates the
likelihood that pay for female jobs is directly deflated.
Anecdotal evidence prior to the passage of the Equal Pay Act
indicates that major companies in the electrical industry explicitly reduced
wages for jobs because they were occupied predominantly by women.2 6
While such wage reductions are now illegal, the method by which firms set
wages tends to perpetuate the effects of such discrimination.2 7 0 In addition,
controlled studies have conclusively demonstrated that evaluators of both
sexes tend to rate work lower when they believe it to be the product of a
woman rather than a man.271 The most relevant studies presented identical
job descriptions to evaluators but manipulated the associated gender of the
jobs by having female incumbents present the description to one group of
evaluators and male incumbents to another group. The first study found no
significant difference in the ratings by the two groups,2 72 although this may
have reflected some weaknesses in the experimental design. A second
study, tailored to reduce these weaknesses, indicated that the sex of the
incumbent describing the job did significantly affect evaluations of relative
273
job worth.
269. In the 1930's, for example, Westinghouse maintained a totally sex segregated
labor force. It performed a job evaluation, and then explicitly set wages for women's jobs
below the wages paid to men's jobs that had received equal evaluations. See Newman &
Vonhof, supra note 5, at 292-94.
270. See Newman & Vanhof, supra note 5, at 291; see also International Union of
Elec. Workers v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1096 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981); cf. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (discussing Title
VII's failure to alleviate historical salary disparities between blacks and whites).
271. See, e.g., Rosen & Jerdee, Effects of Applicant's Sex and Difficulty of Job On
Evaluations Of CandidatesFor ManagerialPositions, 59 J. App. PSYCH. 511 (1974); For
more complete references to and synopses of these and other studies, see D. TREIMAN, supra
note 192, at 44-45; Becker, supra note 251, at 942 & nn. 33-34; O'Leary & Hansen, Trying
Hurts Women, Helps Men: The Meaning Of Effort, in WOMEN IN THE WORK FORCE 100,
102-04 (H. Bernardin ed. 1982); Shepela & Viviano, Some Psychological Factors
Affecting Job Segregationand Wages, in TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES, supra note 2, at 52-55.
272. See Arvey, Passino & Lounsbury, Job Analysis Results as Influenced by Sex of
Incumbent and Sex of Analyst, 62 J. App. PSYCH. 411 (1977).
273. See McArthur & Obrant, Sex Biases in Comparable Worth Analyses, 16 J.
App. Soc. PSYCH. 757 (1986). Other studies have explicitly tested whether the percentage
of incumbents effects the prestige or evaluation of a job. All but one found no such affect.
See id.; see, e.g, Suchner, Sex Ratios and Occupational Prestige: Three Failures to
Replicate A Sexist Bias, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 236 (1979); White, Crino
& DeSanctis, Ratings ofPrestigeand Desirability:Effects of Additional Women Entering
Selected Business Occupations, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 588 (1981 ). But see
Touhey, Effects of Additional Women ProfessionalsOn Ratings of OccupationalPrestige
And Desirability, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 86 (1974) (reporting a
significant effect).
The failure of the indicated percentages of female incumbents to effect job ratings may
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The Institutional Theory of Wage Discrimination and the Dual

Market
Due to pervasive imperfections in the labor market, the institutional
theory of wage determination views the neoclassical model as incomplete in
explaining labor market operation.2 74 From the institutional view, a set of
formal and informal rules governs worker and employer decisions and
these rules respond only weakly to external economic influences.2 75 A firm
fills most of its jobs from within the organization with only limited positions
representing ports of entry into the firm.2 7 Workers may have to compete
to be hired initially by the firm and economic forces do help shape initial
hiring criteria. But once inside the firm, workers do not compete with
outsiders for continued tenure. They advance along preset job ladders with
promotion often dependent on seniority or job tenure.2 7 7 Thus, the
reflect that people tend to ignore abstract figures on base rates in making social judgments.
See McArthur, Social Judgment Biases in Comparable Worth Analysis, in NEW
DIRECTIONS, supra note 263, at 58-59. The McArthur and Obrant study found that the
evaluators could not even recall the information they received about the percentage of
female in the jobs. See McArthur & Obrant, supra, at 768. In other words, the failure to
find an effect due to the stated percentage of females may reflect that the information on
such percentages failed to create an association between "femaleness" and the jobs in the
evaluator's minds. Therefore, the information cannot be used reliably to conclude that the
pay for "real world" female jobs is not depressed due to the gender association.
274. Post-World War II economists developed the theory described below in an
attempt to explain deviations of wages from the results predicted by the neoclassical theory.
Therefore, the theory operates within a background of the neoclassical labor market even as
it rejects many of the assumptions about the workings of that market. It differs from the
purely institutional theory, developed before World War II, which tried to describe labor
markets and the role of unions entirely divorced from microeconomic considerations. See
Kerr, The Neoclassical Revisionists in Labor Economics, in How LABOR MARKETS
WORK 12-13 (B. Kaufman ed. 1988). Some commentators refer to the post war version of
the institutional as "neoinstitutional." See, e.g., Cain, The Challengeof Segmented Labor
Market Theories to Orthodox Theory: A Survey, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 1215, 1227 (1976).
275. See Kaufman, The Postwar View of LaborMarkets and Wage Determination,in
How LABOR MARKETS WORK, supra note 274, at 158; Dunlop, supra note 264, at 15.
276. For this reason, the institutional view characterizes the firm's labor market as an
"internal market." For a comprehensive explanation of the reasons for internal labor
markets, and the processes by which they work, see generally P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE,
supra note 268.
277. That most jobs involve many skills valuable only to workers' present employer
helps to explain the internal job market. The employee learns these skills on the job, either
through trial and error or from more experienced workers. A firm values an incumbent
worker more than a new employee because the new employee has not acquired these firm
specific skills. A firm also learns about its employees as they work: it learns which workers
are responsible, which have particular skills, and a host of other information not easily
obtained without observing employees at work. An employer therefore bears substantial
recruiting, screening and training costs if he must hire a new employee to fill a job vacancy.
Not only does this explain why a firm tends to fill jobs by internal promotion, but also why it
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neoclassical competitive model does not accurately depict the market for
non-entry level jobs.
Unlike under the neoclassical model, employers do not attempt to set
wages at workers' marginal revenue product.2 78 Because many workers
contribute to the final product, firms cannot isolate the contribution of any
one employee. The problem is more than one of practical concern since the
productivity of any employee will depend on the behavior of others and how
well the production team works together. It will also depend on worker
motivation, and the employer's pay policy itself may affect this motivation.
This leads to a complex feedback mechanism in which productivity
determines pay which in turn influences productivity.2 79 Thus, according to
the institutional theory, rather than relying on marginal productivity, an
employer focuses on maintaining a satisfied workforce that operates
smoothly, with minimum turnover and at a reasonable cost. 80 Workers in
turn evaluate wages by looking at the pay of other workers to whom they
bear some occupational relation (e.g. their supervisors, those they supervise, others who perform the same job). To satisfy workers, employers must
set wages to comport with workers' expectations and notions of equity,
which in turn reflect the hierarchical structure of jobs in the workplace.
(a) The relation of the rigid rules of the institutional market to sex
segregation and depression of pay for female jobs
The customs, traditions and structures central to the institutional
view of labor markets prevent rapid change and reinforce existing patterns
and hierarchies. In this way, they exacerbate the occurrence and persistence of wage discrimination.2 8 ' For example, most large employers
maintain rigid job ladders. They staff entry level positions with new
employees, but almost always fill higher level jobs by promoting workers on
the same ladder. Once an employee enters the organization within a ladder,
structures the workplace and wages in order to discourage workers from leaving the firm.
See P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE, supra note 268, at 13-40.
By the same reasoning, a worker's present firm values her more than would another
employer. Thus, the present employer can afford to pay her more than she would earn if she
changed firms. If a worker desires to change jobs, she also bears the costs of obtaining
information regarding job availability and content. These costs are increased for jobs with
other outfits. Moreover, people generally dislike fundamental changes in their routines,
thereby imposing a psychic cost of changing jobs. These too will be greater if a worker moves
to the less familiar setting of another organization. Thus, the worker as well as the employer
reaps substantial benefits from the internal market arrangement. Id.
278. See Dunlop, supra note 264, at 16-17.
279. See L. THUROW, supra note 237, at 201-04.
280. See Milkovich, supra note 193, at 27.
281. WOMEN, WORK, & WAGES, supra note 188, at 62-63.
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she cannot easily move to a different ladder.2 " By hiring women into one
set of entry level jobs and men into another, the firm becomes and remains
segregated. It may even channel women into one set of jobs simply by
gearing its recruitment effort and hiring criteria to populations that have
historically held such positions.2 83
Firms structure job ladders in a manner that not only encourages job
segregation but also limits women's potential advancement and ultimate
pay. Employers provide fewer on-the-job training opportunities for workers in female jobs. Ladders of predominantly female jobs are shorter than
those for male jobs and often start at lower pay.2 84 Top managers of female
jobs usually do not come from the female ladder but are promoted from
male jobs, even though the work experience provided by those male jobs
does not necessarily better prepare them to manage the female jobs.28
(i) The dual market
Institutional economists have also attempted to explain the lower pay
for women's jobs in terms of a "dual market"."' Highly structured internal
markets with established criteria for pay and promotion and extensive
fringe benefits characterize a certain set of jobs. Large firms, in industries
somewhat isolated from competition (e.g. by large capital requirements),
tend to place jobs requiring firm-specific skills within internal markets.
These jobs comprise the primary segment of the job market.
Jobs at less established firms or that require fewer learned on-the-job
skills make up the secondary segment.2 87 The secondary market exhibits
"relative instability of employment,. . . comparative instability and high
unemployment rates of the work force, low wages and poor chances of
advancement, . . . paucity of training opportunities, and . . . arbitrariness in the administration of work rules. '288 Hiring, wages and working
282. See England, supranote 247, 249, at 40; Roos & Reskin, supra note 27, at 236.
283. See England, supra note 253, at 59-60.
284. See R. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 136 (1977); Roos &
Reskin, supra note 27, at 250-51; see also S. PETERSON-HARDT & N. PERLMAN, SEXSEGREGATED CAREER LADDERS IN

NEW YORK STATE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT: A

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF INEQUALITY IN EMPLOYMENT 88, 90 (1979).

285. See Roos & Reskin, supra note 27, at 247-48.
286. For a comprehensive exposition of the dual market model, see P. DOERINGER &
M. PIORE, supra note 268, at 165-69.
287. WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 48. Jobs in the primary segment
and the secondary segment may exist side by side in one firm. For example, janitorial jobs

fall in the secondary segment and exist alongside skilled craft and managerial jobs. Id.
288. P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE, supra note 268, at 170.
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conditions in the secondary market respond more readily to competitive
forces outside the firm than those in the primary segment.28 9
Whereas the primary market exists because of the convergence of
workers' desires for job security and employers' needs for a stable
workforce, the secondary market is structured to accommodate instability
of both work and workers. It appeals to employers with jobs that demand
little on-the-job training and to workers who do not expect a long,
uninterrupted tenure in the workforce. But firms may channel women into
the secondary segment regardless of whether they plan a long term
commitment to the labor force since employers tend to attribute a lack of
commitment to all women. 290 Those who find the dual market to be
discriminatory posit that employers structure female jobs to minimize the
importance of worker loyalty, deny opportunities for advancement and
provide a lower return on worker education and skills.29 1
(ii) Historically lowered expectations
The institutional model of wage determination posits not only a rigidly
structured labor market, but also a "sticky" process of valuing the worth of
a job. Supply and demand alone do not determine wages; psychological
constructs and political power also have their impact.29 2 If demand
decreases, the structure of jobs and levels of output and employment react
allowing the market to clear.29 3 Workers need not necessarily take pay
cuts; rather employers may layoff workers or redefine job responsibilities
and applicant qualifications to increase productivity. If political factors
encourage workers to demand more pay, the wage may go up, even if this
causes the employer to substitute other inputs for labor or to raise the price
289. WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 47-48.
290. The employer's expectation that a group, like women, will exit the workforce, and
the resulting refusal to supply them with training and advancement opportunity, may be a
self-fulfilling prophecy. The lack of long term opportunity lowers a woman's opportunity
cost for withdrawal from the workforce and therefore encourages the very lack of
commitment the employer presupposes. See Arrow, supra note 261, at 26; cf Remick,
Major Issues in a prioriApplications, in TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES, supra note 2, at 117.
291. Consistent with this model of discrimination, "[]obs traditionally held by
women - teaching, nursing, and secretarial work - have . . . features . . . more
characteristic of a secondary than a primary pattern." WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra
note 188, at 48.
292. See Kaufman, supra note 275, at 158, 161-62, 167.
293. The theory presented is a simplification of Lester Thurow's queuing model. See
L. THUROW, supra note 263, at 77. This model of how labor markets clear, while not a
necessary assumption of institutional or segmented labor market models, is consistent with
these models. See P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE, supra note 268, at 165-69.
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of his product and therefore sell less of it. In each case as the wage goes up,
the level of employment in the job goes down until the market clears.
Therefore, the institutional theory sees factors in addition to supply
and demand as strongly influencing wage rates. In particular, wage rates
depend heavily on the relative rates of pay that employees consider
equitable.2 94 But historical wage structures condition the labors perception
of fair wages. Workers', employers' and consumers' attitudes conform to
the realities of past prices for a service or product.29 5 The result is wage
inertia that tends to lock in historical wage relationships.
Because many female jobs entail services perceived as similar to those
women have historically performed outside the labor market, society has
acculturated to paying little for them. Jobs like day-care and nursing
merely provide the kind of care and nurturing women traditionally
provided at home to those who need the services outside the home. Services
like housecleaning are still not sold in any central market. Traditionally,
public entities have provided primary education funded by tax dollars, so
individuals have not had to adjust to paying for education. According to the
expectancy theory of wage determination, the wages for these jobs will be
much lower than for jobs for which we have customarily paid.
The undervaluation does not stop at those jobs which we can identify
as historically excluded from the labor market. Pay differentials between
jobs reflect wage hierarchies individuals perceive as proper. Workers' wage
expectations also depend on the earnings of individuals to whom they
compare themselves. In evaluating the equity of wage differentials,
294. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (citing Milkovich and discussing the
aims of a compensation system); see also Kaufman, supra note 275, at 162. The strong
feelings of discord caused by "unfair" wage differentials reflect the fact that workers view
wages as "measures of status, power, and self worth," as well as instruments to well being.
See Remick, supra note 290, at 113; cf H. PHELPS BROWN, THE INEQUALITY OF PAY 141-

44 (1977) (pay and status tend to agree since they measure economic and social of
attributes that society values).
295. See Dunlop, The Task of Contemporary Wage Theory, in THE THEORY OF
WAGE DETERMINATION 21 (1964) ("historical structure[s] of wages ... condition. . . the
labour supply so that the relative rates among contours are regarded as proper").
Interestingly, psychological theories of how individuals resolve cognitive dissonance
created by pay inequities predict that individuals will change their perceptions of what is
equitable to conform to the existing wage structure. See Adams, Towards An Understanding of Inequity, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 422, 427 (1963). Psychological factors
regarding wages are so strong that prevailing wage rates can override indications that the
rates are too low. For example, the relative pay for nurses in hospitals has remained fairly
constant despite prolonged severe shortages. See Fed Up, FearfulAnd Frazzled, 131 TIME
77 (Mar. 14, 1988). After finding its wages were competitive, a large employer that was
experiencing extremely high turnover in clerical positions refused to increase salaries even
though the other employers in the market were also experiencing recruitment and retention
difficulties. Remick, supra note 290, at 116.
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workers tend to compare themselves to other similar workers: those with
similar jobs (e.g. craftsperson rather than office worker); similar backgrounds and credentials (e.g. high school rather than college graduate);
and similar gender. 96 In other words, when women look at what other
women earn to develop some idea of their own worth in the market, they see
other women working in jobs providing services traditionally done at home
earning relatively low pay. Therefore, they generally learn that their labor
is worth less than that of men.2 9 7
IV.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE MODELS OF EQUALITY TO
COMPARABLE WORTH

Economic theories reveal several potential causes of the wage gap and
illuminate how these might relate to job segregation by sex. Industrial
relations literature indicates the extent to which job evaluation systems
allow comparisons of job values in terms of intrinsic job attributes. It also
reveals how those comparisons might be used to implement the comparable
worth doctrine. The question remains, however, whether adoption of
comparable worth makes sense in light of the limitations of job evaluation
methodologies and the possibility that the wage gap reflects gender
differences in extra-market preferences. The answer depends on the model
of equality to which one adheres.
The feminist model of sexual equality has driven the recent push for
comparable worth. EPA and Title VII doctrine, largely developed
throughout the late sixties and seventies, provided no mechanism to
implement the feminist ideal. At the same time dissatisfaction with the
liberal model rose. Women began to demand more than an opportunity to
achieve success as measured by job status and pay: they also wanted the
296. See Adams, supra note 295, at 424-27; Major, McFarlin & Gagnon, Overworked and Underpaid. On The Nature of Gender Differences in PersonalEntitlement, 47
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 1399, 1411 (1984).
297. Controlled experiments showed that women paid themselves less than men paid

themselves for doing the same work. Additionally, they worked harder than men for a fixed
amount of pay when the subjects had discretion to vary the amount of work performed. This
led the researchers to conclude that "women's sense of personal entitlement with respect to
pay is lower than men's." Major, McFarlin & Gagnon, supra note 296, at 1410.
This "may stem, in part, from application of same-sex referential comparisons in the
absence of other salient comparisons [i.e., information about pay of others for the same
tasks]." Id. at 1411. This is consistent with several courts' recognition that women
historically have been willing to "accept inferior financial rewards for equivalent work."
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978); see also Marshall v. Georgia Sw. College, 489 F. Supp. 1322, 1330
(M.D. Ga. 1980) ("this market force defense [is not a factor] . . . especially when it
appears the females have been willing to accept lower salaries than males.").
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option of having children, raising a family, and, more generally, maintaining aspects of their lives that had previously provided them satisfaction. 9 8
Women's call for a more understanding labor market gained support
from the market's seeming insensitivity to society's human and personal
needs. Shortages of nurses and schools staffed by teachers of questionable
qualification became commonplace; 29 9 while climbing salaries for business
consultants and lawyers attracted the best students away from the very
jobs plagued by a dearth of qualified personnel. 00 Comparable worth's call
for increasing pay for "female" jobs furthered both the interests of women
workers seeking greater status for jobs consistent with their lifestyles and a
significant segment of society disgruntled by its inability to secure
adequate "human" services.
The relationship between the feminist idea of equality and comparable worth explains why comparable worth developed as a means of
implementing sexual and not racial equality. The prevailing paradigm of
racial equality is the liberal model. Its goal is the assimilation of blacks into
the workforce without altering the structure or values of the workplace. 30 1
Some jobs held predominately by blacks and minorities pay little; like
women, on average blacks and other minorities earn significantly less than
white men. 302 But if jobs held disproportionately by blacks pay lower wages
than those held predominately by whites, few doubt that the job is actually
worth less. 30 3 Jobs held disproportionately by blacks are not perceived as
"black" jobs because society does not recognize a black culture that
298. See, e.g., Flick, The New Feminism and the World of Work, 71 PUB. INT. 33, 41
(1983) (quoting testimony of Geraldine Ferraro at the "Pay Equity For Women
Hearings") ("wouldn't it be nice if [a woman worker] could have the freedom of choice to
choose a woman's profession and get equal pay for work at that value?"); Lazarre, IAm The
Mother of Eight, a Housewife, a Feminist- and Happy, 5 Ms. 51 (May 1977); Scanzoni,
How to Live with a Liberated Wife, 20 CHRISTIANITY TODAY 6, 7 (June 4, 1976); Rubin,
Why My Mother Is Liberated - and I'm Not, 81 MADEMOISELLE 24 (July 1975).
299. See An Acute Shortage of Nurses, 96 NEWSWEEK 93 (Sept. 22, 1980);
Musemeche & Adams, The Coming Teacher Shortage, 59 PHI DELTA KAPPA 691 (June
1978).
300. See Bok, A FlawedSystem of Law Practiceand Training,33 J. LEG. EDUC. 570,
573 (1983).
301. Kay, supra note 6, at 47; see Note, Sexual Equality Under The Pregnancy
DiscriminationAct, supra note 30, at 726 (race can be ignored as a salient characteristic
but an adequate model of sexual equality always confronts sexual reproductive differences);
cf. R. WASSERSTROM, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ISSUES 24-29 (1980) (arguing for
"assimilationist ideal" for racial equality but questioning its application to sexual equality).
302. Black males on average earned 60.6% of white male wages from 1955-1959;
their earnings rose to 75.3% of white male earnings for 1975-1978. WOMEN, WORK &
WAGES,

supra note 188, at 16.

303. The New York State Study corroborates this impression. It found that the
minority percentage had no statistically significant effect on wages and accounted for only
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embodies a distinct set of employment related values. This failure to
identify black workers as constituting a separate valuable culture explains
why comparable worth did not arise as a means of alleviating racial pay
disparities.
While the feminist model of equality motivated comparable worth,
the debate about the wisdom of comparable worth has taken place mainly
within the conservative and liberal frameworks. Perhaps this reflects
proponents' strategy of appealing to the judiciary to recognize comparable
worth under the EPA or Title VII. Perhaps it reflects that the feminist
model was not well developed or widely accepted in legal circles when
proponents first developed their theory. Regardless of the reason the
philosophies underlying the debate are limited to the conservative and
liberal models, this article contends that they bias the outcome against the
adoption of comparable worth.
A. Evaluationof Comparable Worth Under the Conservative Model of
Equality
Comparable worth is antithetical to the conservative view of equality.
The conservative model views women's domain as the home, while
comparable worth seeks to force the male domain of the market to accept
and even celebrate women's values and choices. Comparable worth also
measures women workers' worth by the masculine market's measure dollars. This contradicts the conservative premise that women should
assess their worth by how well they care for and nurture their families
rather than by how much money they earn. In other words, the conservative
perspective sees comparable worth as based on "an exaggerated ideology of
work" that tells women it is irrational and misguided- to put so much
emphasis on the family rather than wages. 30 '
From the conservative perspective, extreme job segregation and
underpayment of women's jobs in relation to their intrinsic attributes do
not indicate sex discrimination. Occupational segregation by sex is the
natural result of the differing natures of women and men. Conservatives
are bothered by changes in society that require the market to provide
services formerly provided at home by women in the "traditional"
family. 30 5 But given this development, the propensity of women to
two percent of the difference between earnings of minority and white males.
STATE STUDY,

NEW YORK

supra note 226, at 204.

304. Berger, supra note 245, at 70.
305. See, e.g., Bronfenbrenner, The American Family in Decline, 189 CURRENT 39,
40-41 (Jan. 1977); Carlson, Whatever Happenedtothe "Family Wage"?, 83 PUB. INT. 3,10
(1986).
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congregate in women's jobs supports the conservative hypothesis that
women and men innately differ. Men look at wages as the primary measure
of success and job satisfaction. Women derive satisfaction from other job
attributes such as feeling needed by those they serve. Because women,
more than men, consider more than mere monetary compensation when
evaluating the rewards of a job, human capital theory predicts that women
will develop skills for jobs that provide non-monetary rewards even when
those jobs pay a lower dollar return on their skill investment.
Conservatives buttress their rejection of comparable worth studies by
appealing to the competitive market, which constrains an employer to pay
wages equal to workers' respective marginal revenue products. If an
employer discriminates by paying women's jobs below this amount,
competitors will hire employees away from these underpaid jobs. So long as
there are a sufficient number of nondiscriminating employers to supply the
market demand, the discriminating employer will be driven out of the
market. The competitive process could be thwarted only by employers
colluding to discriminate, a prospect conservatives deem unlikely. 3 6 The
conservatives' trust in the competitive nature of the labor market leads
them to conclude that employers hire women into lesser paying female jobs
because women's natural orientation toward the home makes them less
valuable as workers. Thus, from the conservative perspective job segregation and the wage gap are natural and justified rather than evidence of pay
discrimination for female jobs.
Comparable worth and a conservative model of equality can co-exist
only if some form of job evaluation is accepted as an overriding but limited
means of comparing male and female jobs. This would require conservative's begrudging acceptance of women's move out of the home and into the
labor market and the existence of an overriding job comparison standard
within this traditionally male domain. This position is similar to that
embodied in the EPA, which accepts natural distinctions between the sexes
30 7
but demands equal pay for equal work.
Since job evaluations do not really give an objective or even widely
accepted measure of a job's economic value, the conservative perspective
cannot be extended to allow comparisons of dissimilar work.30 8 Because
306. See O'Neill, An Argument Against Comparable Worth, supra note 243, at 18283; Fischel & Lazear, Comparable Worth: A Rejoinder, 53 U. Cmii. L. REv. 950 (1986); cf.
G. BECKER, supra note 255, at 44-45 (showing how competition decreases the effect of
employer tastes for discrimination on minority wages).
307. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
308. See Beatty & Beatty, supra note 196 at 72; Johnson & Solon, The Attainment of
Pay Equity Between the Sexes By Legal Means: An Economic Analysis, 20 U. MicH. J.L.
REF. 183, 194 (1986); WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 81.
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workers have individual preferences for different jobs, the attributes of a
job theoretically do not determine its nondiscriminatory market clearing
price.3" 9 Industrial relations experts implicitly recognize this and do not
claim that a job evaluation determines the economic worth of a job, but
rather that it provides a system for labor and management to reach a
workable consensus about fair pay practices. 10 For each employer, a
multitude of job evaluation systems may satisfy this "workable consensus"
criterion. While the overall job rankings given by these evaluation systems
tend to correlate to a great extent, this does not guarantee against
significant variations in the relative ranking of any particular job under the
different systems.3 1' Thus, job evaluations do not arrive at a point total for
each job that provides a unique measure of the relative worth of the job to
the employer. Even if an advocate of the conservative model conceded to
the reality that a majority of women today must work, there is no existing
universally accepted intrinsic measure of job worth by which he could
compare pay for dissimilar jobs.
The conservative perspective of sexual equality thus leads to a
rejection of any form of comparable worth as a viable theory of employment sex-based antidiscrimination law. The strongest rebuttal of this
conclusion comes not from arguments consistent with the conservative
model, but from those who attack the fundamental tenets of this
perspective.
The acceptance of market inequality as due to men's and women's
natural occupation of different spheres almost guarantees women's relegation to second class status. There is a built-in hierarchy in the relationship
of the home and market. Happiness in the home, and the private sphere
more generally, depends on a sufficient level of consumption which requires
a sufficient income. Even if women were satisfied to stay at home, economic
developments and the breakdown of the traditional family have forced
309. See Killingsworth, supra note 183, at 184-87; see also Fischel & Lazear,
Comparable Worth and Discriminationin Labor Markets, 53 U. Cui. L. REV. 891, 901
(1986) ("[T]he meaning of'worth' or 'value' is not well specified. The value produced by the
first worker, the average worker and the last worker hired by an employer are all different
and are likely to differ further across occupations.").
310. See Schwab, supra note 195, at 62; cf Bellak, supra note 202, at 78 (commonly
labor and management negotiate agreement on a job evaluation method).
311. See Schwab, supra note 195, at 62 (noting that different job evaluation systems
"share only two-thirds to four-fifths common variance"); see, e.g., Robinson, Wahlstrom &
Mechem, Comparison ofJob Evaluation Methods: A "PolicyCapturing"Approach Using
the Position Analysis Questionnaire,59 J. App. PSYCH. 633, 635 (1974). Despite finding
high correlations between five methods of evaluating jobs, Robinson's results show that the
rank of several jobs, for example head animal keeper, meter maid and secretary, greatly
varied from one evaluation method to another.
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them into the labor market, either as necessary second wage earners or as
primary breadwinners. Society also adheres to a notion of 'just desserts,"
according to which the producer of wealth deserves control over decisions
regarding consumption- a significant subset of the decisions made within
the home sphere. This justification for the wage earner's control over
consumption decisions significantly undercuts a homemaker's claim to
control decisions within the home. Additionally, the market is inherently
"social" and therefore provides visibility and opportunity for greater
influence than the home.
Conservatives' appeal to the competitive labor market is no more
convincing. Empirical evidence indicates that employers' leeway in setting
wages for particular jobs is great enough to account for much of the pay
disparity between men and women. 312 Even if the labor market were
competitive, discrimination by consumers or socialization of employers
and employees to devalue women's work could allow employers to maintain
wages below marginal revenue product. 3 13 Moreover, historically the labor
market did not prevent employers from explicitly maintaining lower wages

for women than for men who performed identical work."1 4 And explanations that job segregation and lower pay for women's work result from
315
women imposing greater costs on employers remain unverifiable.
In short, while some opponents of comparable worth appeal to the
conservative model of equality, most proponents reject this appeal because
they find the assumptions underlying that model normatively unacceptable
or empirically unsound. Few proponents, however, have explicitly adopted
the feminist perspective as the framework for comparable worth.3 16
312. See Clauss, supra note 2, at 67 & n.246 (citing National Research Council
Report showing that entry level pay for the same occupations in a given locale can vary by
200 % to 300 %);see also Dunlop, supra note 264, at 18 (top wage rates for a defined job
classification within a given locality may be two or three times low ones),
313. See BECKER, supra note 255, at 45 (employer with a taste for discrimination may
not be totally pushed out of a competitive market in the long run unless the costs of
production are homogenous of degree one); id. at 76 (the market cannot distinguish
between discrimination by consumers and other distinctions in consumer tastes); see also
supra notes 255-73 and accompanying text.
314. See Newman & Vonhof, supra note 5, at 293-94.
315. See Corcoran & Duncan, Work History, Labor Force Attachment And
EarningsDifferences Between the Races and Sexes, 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES 3, 14 (1979)
("Absenteeism due to the illness of others in the family ... and self imposed limits on job
choice or location had virtually no effect on. . .wages."); cf. Foged, supra note 215, at 206
(rebutting the argument that women work in lower paying female jobs because such jobs
allow them greater flexibility to concentrate on their home duties).
316. There are some notable exceptions, the most noteworthy being Heidi Hartmann,
Ronnie Steinberg and more recently Alice Kessler-Harris. See, e.g., Hartmann, Capitalism, Patriarchyand Job SegregationBy Sex, in CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE
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Rather, most have turned to the liberal model, relying especially on its
suspicion of sex-linked differences, to support their position.
B. Evaluation of Comparable Worth Under the Liberal Model of
Equality
Tension between the liberal model's distrust of sex differences in the
public domain and its acceptance of individual preferences that provide the
foundation for market values creates an ambivalence in its outlook on
comparable worth. Although the extent of underpayment may vary with
methodologies, comparable worth studies almost universally reveal that
female jobs are paid less than male jobs relative to their job evaluation
scores.3 17 Even conceding that job evaluations do not give an objective
measure of job worth, the consistent showing that female jobs are
underpaid indicates a sex-based differential in the labor market, which the

liberal model views as suspect."'
This sex-based difference in the relation of pay to job evaluations,
however, does not necessarily indicate market discrimination. According
to neoclassical microeconomics, market prices ultimately derive from
individual preferences in the private domain and the liberal model accepts
gender differences in this sphere. It also accepts the aggregation of these
values by the market so long as individuals do not make sex-conscious
decisions in their market roles. According to institutional labor economics,
wages derive from employer and employee expectations and needs. The
liberal model of sexual equality takes issue with existing wages only to the
extent market institutions are structured in a sex conscious manner. Under
either theory of labor markets, gender distinctions in the private sphere can
result in women preferring jobs with relatively low value in the market
FOR SOCIAL FEMINISM

(Z. Eisenstein ed. 1979); Hartmann & O'Neill, The Comparable

Worth Controversy, in NEW PERSPECTIVES (U.S. Comm. On Civil Rights, Spring 1985);
Steinberg, "A Want Of Harmony".-Perspectives On Wage Discriminationand Comparable Worth, in TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES, supra note 2, at 3, 24-25; Kessler-Harris, The Just
Price, The Free Market and the Value of Women, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 235 (1988).
317. For example, almost all voluntary studies done by various states have concluded
that increased female incumbency results in lower rates of pay to job evaluation scores. See
Stimpson, Foreword,in S.EVANS & B. NELSON, supra note 74 (noting that 20 of the states
that have begun comparable worth studies have already determined that their studies
justified comparable worth adjustments).
318. See Voos, Discussion, in IRRA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 183, at 202. This is
bolstered by the historical evidence that, prior to Title VIl's proscription of explicit sexsegregation of jobs, employers decreased the pay for female jobs simply because they were
female. Historical evidence also shows that evaluations unconsciously discount the worth of
work solely because they believe a woman produced it. See supra notes 269-73 and
accompanying text.
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place. Simply put, the liberal model expects market values to be sex neutral
while it recognizes the legitimacy of non-neutral public values that register
individual private choices.
Those who adopt the liberal perspective attempt to resolve this tension
by isolating the discriminatory causes of the wage gap from those that stem
from legitimate sex-conscious private choices and then evaluating whether
comparable worth provides a sagacious remedy for the identified discrimination. 319 In evaluating the efficacy of comparable worth, they focus on
several basic questions: To what extent does the wage gap result from
discriminatory depression of wages for female jobs (i.e. from sex-based
occupational wage discrimination)? Do comparable worth analyses of
individual employer's pay practices reliably identify instances of such
discrimination? Is comparable worth the appropriate means of remedying
such discrimination?
1. The Influence of Sex-based Occupational Wage Discrimination
on the Wage Gap
Under the liberal model, comparable worth is not justified unless the
wage gap reflects market discrimination rather than the impact of
legitimate private choices. Private choices can effect women's wages when
women voluntarily assume different family roles than men which interfere
with their productivity in the labor market. 2 0 Comparable worth advocates, however, point to regression analyses that indicate that productivity
related variables, such as experience, education, hours worked, seniority,
and employment continuity, explain at most half of the observed wage
gap.32 1 Opponents respond that women's choice of familial responsibility
affects their productivity in subtle ways that do not necessarily show up in
the productivity related variables used in regression analyses: variables like
intensity of work, concentration on one's job, or dedication to quality are
319. For a thorough example of this approach, see Weiler, supra note 1, at 1779-93.
See, e.g., Corcoran & Duncan, supra note 315; England, supra note 253, at 55; O'Neill,
supra note 243, at 179; Polachek, supra note 242, at 68.
320. See supra notes 240-45 and accompanying text.
321. See WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 19-24; Corcoran & Duncan,
supra note 315, at 18-19; Blinder, Wage Discrimination:Reduced Form and Structural
Estimates, 8 J. HUM. RESOURCES 436,449 (1973); Oaxaca, Theory and Measurement in
the Economics of Discrimination,in EQUAL RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 1, 25
(1977); see also Belier, OccupationalSegregationby Sex: Determinantsand Changes, 17
J. HUM. RESOURCES 371, (1982) (human capital model does not explain who enters male
occupations); England, The Failure of Human Capital Theory To Explain Occupational
Sex Segregation, 17 J. HUM. RESOURCES 358 (1982) (human capital theory does not
explain occupational segregation).
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difficult if not impossible to measure. 32 Even variables included in
regression analyses may not accurately indicate workers' true contributions to production.323 For example, a worker's experience in a particular
job or department at a particular plant may be a more meaningful
predictor of a worker's contribution than overall work experience. These
subtle missing or misspecified variables may explain some of the otherwise
unexplained residual wage gap. Opponents of comparable worth find
strong support for this argument in the fact that the wage gap between
never married male and female workers is much smaller than that for
married workers because they expect marriage to alter men's and women's
32
commitment to the market in opposite ways.
But in order for omitted variables or biases in the measurement of
included variables to account for the residual gap, they must correlate with
workers' sex and not correlate strongly with the variables included in the
regressions. 315 The lack of a more complete regression that demonstrates
the effect of these subtle variables on the wage gap seriously undercuts
opponent's contentions that such variables exist. The omitted variable
argument essentially asserts that different private choices of men and
women result in legitimate sex-based differences in workers' positions in
the labor market which cannot be verified. It thus becomes indistinguishable from the conservative position that innate differences explain job
segregation and contradicts the liberal suspicion of unexplained sex
differences in the labor market. Not surprisingly, proponents of comparable worth do not find the argument convincing.32
322. See Becker, supra note 244, at S52-53 (division of labor within the family affects
relative intensity of wives dedication to work); Fuchs, Differences in Hourly Earnings
Between Men and Women, 94 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 9, 14 (May 1971); O'Neill & Sider,
supra note 214, at 194-95; see also Blau, supra note 268, at 127 (possibility of missing
variables in regressions results in overstatement of discrimination).
323. WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 19; Milkovich, supra note 193, at
42.
324. See Malkiel & Malkiel, Male-FemalePay Differentials in Professional Employment, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 693, 701-02 (1973); see also Gwartney & Stroup,
Measurementof Employment DiscriminationAccording to Sex, 39 S. EcON. J.575, 57980 (1973); Polachek, supra note 240, at 215. Weiler concludes from the marriage penalty
for women's wages that "one cannot thereby infer that the jobs predominately filled by
women are inherently undervalued and underpaid." Weiler, supra note 1,at 1787. This
conclusion, however, simply ignores the possibility that marriage might not be the causal
factor but might simply correlate with other factors that cause the wage gap, such as
differences in productivity, related variables or occupational wage discrimination. Id.
325. WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 19 & n.5; Treiman, Hartmann &
Roos, supra note 2, at 149.
326. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 251, at 937; Clauss, supra note 2, at 55-56
(concluding that the existence of a legitimate factor explaining the residual wage gap "is
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Sex linked choices in the private sphere, such as the choice of
accepting day-to-day household responsibilities, may also affect wages in
the market because they alter women's career expectations, independent
of their effect on women's actual work experience. For example, economically rational women who expect to leave the labor force mid-career will
seek jobs that maximize their earnings over their entire working lives.
Therefore, they will invest in skills that do not depreciate with absence
from employment. Even if these women end up not interrupting their
careers, they will have invested in slowly depreciating skills and will work
in jobs requiring such skills. Those jobs will forgive employment discontinuities but may not yield the same return on education and experience as do
jobs that demand employment continuity. Thus, women's early expectations of different home roles can lead them to choose jobs that yield less
overall pay than jobs chosen by men or women who plan continuous
careers. 27 Attributing the gap to sex differentiated expectations is also
consistent with the dual labor market hypothesis that women gear their
career plans to the secondary market so they can have greater flexibility to
enter and leave the workforce. It also explains the "marriage gap," since
one would surmise that women who plan for discontinuous careers tend to
place greater emphasis on marriage and family.
Proponents of comparable worth, however, cite empirical analyses
that call into question the expectation version of the human capital model.
Studies show that actual continuity of work experience does not explain
any significant portion of the wage gap. 28 More pointedly, other studies
highly unlikely and certainly too speculative to rebut the prima facie showing of disparate
treatment established by the regression analysis.").
327. See Polachek, Differences in Expected Post-School Investment as a Determinant of Market Wage Differentials, 16 INT'L ECON. REV. 451, 466 (1975); Polachek, Sex
Differences in College Major, 31 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 498, 505 (1978); Mincer &
Polachek, supra note 242, at 583; Polachek, supra note 240, at 42-43; O'Neill, supra note
243, at 182.
328. See Corcoran, Duncan & Ponza, A Longitudinal Analysis of White Women's
Wages, 18 J. HuM. RESOURCES 497, 510 (1983). Analyses reveal a short term depreciation
effect due to withdrawal from the workforce, but a rebound in human capital appreciation
that virtually eliminates the effect of this depreciation in the long run. Id. at 498. Mincer &
Ofek, Interrupted Work Careers:Depreciation and Restoration of Human Capital,17 J.
HuM. RESOURCES 3, 17 (1982). Corcoran, Duncan and Ponza also found no significant
affect on wages due to known prospective withdrawals from the labor force. This directly
contradicts the explanation that the wage gap is due to gender differences in expectations of
labor force withdrawal. Corcoran, Duncan & Ponza, supra this note, at 513-14. But cf
Sandell & Shapiro, Work Expectations, Human CapitalAccumulation and the Wages of
Young Women, 15 J. HuM. RESOURCES 335, 350-51 (1980) (young women's future career
expectations correlate with their attainment of human capital, making it likely that the
wage gap is attributable in part to sex differences in career expectations). Failure to find a
statistically significant deviation from the null hypothesis does not permit the conclusion
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demonstrate that the depreciation rate of human capital in female
occupations does not significantly differ from that in male occupations.3 29
Therefore, expected depreciation in skills should not influence economically rational women who plan for career interruptions to seek different
jobs than men. Nor does the marriage gap necessarily indicate that
different home roles explain job segregation and the wage gap. 330 Perhaps
most disturbing, the persistence of the wage gap despite changes in
women's outlook about their participation in the market also undercuts the
expected career-cycle explanation of the gap. 3 '
Thus, from the liberal perspective, empirical studies do not dispel the
possibility that discrimination may substantially contribute to the wage
gap. But this does not end the inquiry. The liberal model accepts that there
is a "correct" wage which would prevail in the absence of market
discrimination against women. If discrimination merely channels women
into lower paying but correctly priced jobs, there would be no justification
for comparable worth's mandate that employers increase pay for female
jobs. Therefore, numerous studies have attempted to discern the extent to
which occupational segregation explains the wage gap.
Almost all of these studies have concluded that the percentage of
female incumbents in an occupation has a statistically significant inverse
that the effect does not exist. In fact, Corcoran, Duncan and Ponza did find a nonsignificant
negative correlation between prospective labor force withdrawals and wages, and noted that
the issue deserves further study. Corcoran, Duncan & Ponza, supra this note, at 314-315.
Also, the Corcoran study focused on the prospective withdrawal of women workers and
therefore did not test whether the work expectations of young women not yet in the
workforce affects women's investment in human capital relative to men.
329. See England, supra note 321, at 366; see also Corcoran, Duncan & Ponza, supra
note 328, at 510.
330. Studies have failed to demonstrate how differing "home roles" lead to lower pay
for women. For example, one study hypothesized that women's family obligations might
lead them to be absent from work, or to restrict their potential job locations and hours more
than men, possibly causing the wage gap. While the study found the expected sex
differences in absenteeism, and work hours and location restrictions, it found that these
factors did not significantly affect wages. Corcoran & Duncan, supra note 315, at 14-15.
Other analyses reveal that single women and women without children were no less likely to
work in female occupations than married women and women with children, thereby
refuting the belief that home roles explain sex-segregation of occupations. See England,
supra note 321, at 367; Zellner, The Determinantsof OccupationalSegregation,in SEX,
DISCRIMINATION AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR 125, 139 (C. Lloyd ed. 1975). This
conclusion is consistent with the realization that many female jobs such as "[niurses,
telephone operators, and waitresses have long hours, shift work, overtime, little vacation
and lack of control over work schedules." Foged, supra note 215, at 206.
331. See Blau, supra note 268, at 126; Blau & Beller, Trends in EarningsDifferentials By Gender, 1971-1981, 41 INDUS. & LAB. REV. REV. 513, 528 (1988).
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correlation with wages for the occupation.11 2 From the liberal perspective,
this supports an inference that the wages for female jobs fall below the
nondiscriminatory rate that would ordinarily prevail. But these studies
have disagreed sharply on the magnitude of wage depression for women's
jobs. They find that occupational segregation accounts for anywhere from
five percent to forty percent of the gap. 3 Therefore, they raise questions
about the efficacy of comparable worth as a means of eradicating the wage
gap.
Most studies of the relationship of pay to the "femaleness" of jobs
regress national wage data against the percentage of females in occupations as well as against other variables that might affect wages. Their
conflicting conclusions result in part from their use of different levels of
detail in defining occupations. Broadly defined occupational categories
tend to aggregate highly sex-segregated jobs into integrated occupations,
masking the effect of women's congregation in the more detailed job
categories.83 ' Use of too detailed a breakdown of occupations, however,
may result in a study construing sex-linked success on the job as
discrimination due to occupational segregation. 3 5
332. See, e.g., Blau & Belier, supra note 331, at 528; Johnson & Solon, supra note
308, at 196 & n.15; cf Fuchs, supra note 322, at 13 (finding "percent-female" to be a
statistically significant contributor to the wage gap using one regression equation, but to
depress wages only to a nonsignificant degree using a second regression equation). But see
Buchele & Aldrich, How Much Difference Would Comparable Worth Make, 24 INDUS.
REL. 222, 231 (1985) (finding no difference between women's returns on job characteristics
in women's and men's jobs, which "raises some questions about the importance of
occupational segregation as a cause of the male-female earnings gap"). Interestingly,
Buchele & Aldrich did find men's returns on job characteristics exceeded those of women in
all jobs, indicating substantial discrimination. Id. Thus, their results imply either: (i)
employers pervasively violate the Equal Pay Act; (ii) the wage gap is attributable to interfirm sex segregation, with women working for lower paying firms or (iii) the studies job
categorization was too broad, so it masked the effects of job segregation. See infra note 338
and accompanying text for a discussion on interfirm sex segregation and notes 334-35 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the over-breadth of study categorization.
333. Thus, Polachek concludes "at best, occupationalsegregationexplains only 4.6
percent of the gender gap in wages." Polachek, supra note 240, at 40, while Treiman and
Hartmann conclude that 35% to 40% of the gap is attributable to occupational
segregation. WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 33. See also WOMEN'S WORK,
MEN'S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB 11 (B. Reskin & H. Hartmann eds. 1986)
(attributing 18 %-24 % of the wage gap to occupational segregation); Johnson & Solon,
supra note 308, at 206 (estimating 8%-24% of the wage gap is due to occupational
segregation).
334. WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 31; see also WOMEN'S WORK,
MEN'S WORK,

supra note 333, at I.

335. See Polachek, supranote 240, at 38. This misinterpretation will occur only if: (1)
men tend to be more successful at work; (2) employers reward this success with promotions
and corresponding pay increases; and (3) these promotions cause men to move into jobs that
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Studies' conclusions also vary with the other independent variables
included in their regressions. Analyses that omit detailed job related
variables, such as experience or education required for each job, cannot
distinguish assignment of women to lower valued jobs from depression of
wages for jobs staffed predominately by women. But if a study distinguishes by narrowly defined job-related factors, such as by the educational
major or type of experience required by the job (e.g. clerical verses
mechanical experience), it will attribute sex-linked pay differentials to
differences in these variables rather than to devaluation of "female" t ype of
work. s3 6 Analyses also should include some personal variables, such as
workers' education and experience, to avoid misinterpreting the hiring of
workers with fewer productivity related attributes into lower paying jobs as
pay discrimination. But inclusion of personal variables ignores the interaction between these variables and discriminatory depression of wages for
33 7
female jobs.
The extent of wage discrimination attributable to devaluation of
femalejobs identified by a regression analysis also depends substantially on
the degree to which the analysis includes employer related variables, most
importantly the identity of the industry or the firm for which employees
work. The more detailed the employer description used by a study, the
smaller the effect it attributes to sex-based occupational wage discrimination.3 3 8 But employer variables, like job and personal variables, can raise
the regression analysis characterizes as within different occupations. If instead employers
grant such promotions on the basis of personal productivity variables, such as seniority,
experience, or on the job training, and the regression includes these as independent
variables, then it will not misinterpret success as occupational pay discrimination.
Therefore, we should be concerned by a greatly detailed occupational breakdown only if we
believe that private lifestyle choices allow men to achieve success in ways not measured by
personal productivity related variables.
336. See Milkovich, supra note 193, at 41.
337. See Blau, supra note 268, at 127. As an illustration of how discrimination may
affect productivity related variables, suppose a woman can work only in female jobs that pay
half of what her husband can earn in male jobs. Since one spouse must devote less time to
earning wages in order to take care of the family, logically the family would choose to have
the wife take the time away from her lesser-paying work. This results in a correlation
between pay and personal variables like experience, employment continuity and marital
status, rather than as a result of occupational wage discrimination.
338. See Johnson & Solon, supra note 308, at 197. This corroborates the well
documented phenomena that within occupations there is sex-segregation by firms, with
women tending to work for firms that pay less. See WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note
188, at 39; WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK, supra note 333, at 12 (citing numerous studies
demonstrating this phenomenon within various industries, including white collar occupations, clerical jobs, retail clerks, beauty salon operators, college faculty); Weiler, supra note
1, at 1792 & nn. 226-29; cf Bielby & Baron, supra note 268, at 27, 35 (detailed study of
California employers showing pervasive sex-segregation by firm, as well as within firms).
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questions about what constitutes discrimination. For example, if pay for
electronics salespeople exceeds that for retail clothing salespeople, and
women are more likely to sell clothes, the resulting pay differential can be
attributed to a discriminatory devaluation of the more typically female
pursuit. Alternatively, the pay differential can be justified by the conclusion that salespeople of electronic goods provide a kind of expertise for
which consumers are willing to pay more.
Thus data on the cause of the wage gap do not resolve the question of
the extent to which the wage gap reflects sex-based occupational wage
discrimination. The number and complexity of the arguably legitimate
influences on wages render the empirical analyses necessary to definitively
answer the question impractical. 3 More fundamentally, the analyses
depend on the liberal model's public/private and personal/market distinctions to define the set of legitimate factors. Yet even within the liberal
model there is no consensus on the dividing lines between these spheres.
For example, from the liberal perspective sex-role socialization that
influences women to acquire "female" skills, assume home-care responsibilities, and work at sex-appropriate jobs may be viewed as discriminatory.
Social institutions reinforce women's conformity with accepted female
roles both in the private (e.g. family) and public (e.g. market) domains.
The liberal model condemns these institutions' sex-conscious distinctions
in public roles. On the other hand, attributing women's choices to the subtle
psychological influences of these institutions contradicts the liberal tenent
that human beings are above all else autonomous. Therefore, sex role
socialization may be viewed as part of women's voluntary choice of their
own lifestyles. The legitimacy of including personal variables, such as
number of children or marital status, in regression analyses hinges on
which view one takes under the liberal model.
The liberal model also views a consumer's decision about the value she
places on goods ambiguously. On the one hand, such decisions represent
personal preferences for which the liberal model guarantees respect. If a
consumer values tips from her stockbroker more than childcare, government has no business interfering. In order to implement this personal
valuation, however, the consumer usually must buy the product on the
market and thereby becomes a participant in the public arena. If, however,
consumers pay less for childcare simply because it is women's work, the
liberal model deems the lesser pay discriminatory. Because of this
339. See Milkovich, supra note 193, at 46; cf Johnson & Solon, supra note 308, at 186
(noting that "no one has ever estimated a [comprehensive] model [of the wage gap] . . .
because, no r-al world data set contains all thc variables that can be considered to inflluence
wages.").
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ambiguity, the liberal model provides insufficient guidance about the
inclusion of job and employer related variables, such as the type of skills
required for the job, or the type of product provided by the employer.
In short, the liberal model's reliance on the public/private and
personal/market distinctions to separate allowable sex-conscious decisions
from discrimination focuses the comparable worth debate on empirical
questions about the causes of the wage gap. But the model does not provide
sufficient clarity about the bounds of the dichotomous categories it creates
to dictate a resolution of the debate. From the liberal perspective, whether
discriminatory devaluation of women's work is sufficiently egregious to
justify government intervention remains a controversy.
2.

Comparable Worth Studies as Indications of Employer Wage
Discrimination Against Female Jobs

Even if national wage data indicate that depression of wages for
female jobs causes a significant portion of the wage gap, the instances of
such discrimination must be identified. Comparable worth would rely on
studies of a particular employer's pay practices to demonstrate that the
employer engages in occupational wage discrimination. If, after accounting for legitimate job attributes and personal variables, a study showed
workers in female jobs were underpaid, that would indicate the employer
discriminated against such jobs.
The liberal model, unlike the conservative model, does not permit
opponents merely to argue that job attributes do not determine the
nondiscriminatory level of pay for particular jobs. Whether one believes
the neoclassical or the institutional model of labor economics, he must
concede the important part intrinsic job attributes play in determining pay
for jobs, as evidenced by their common use in employer's job evaluations.'" 0
Even if job evaluations do not uniquely determine the worth of particular
jobs in a comparable worth study, if a relationship between pay and job
attributes for female jobs that differs from the relationship for male jobs is
reliably demonstrated, then liberals perceive it as evidence of suspect
behavior and demand an explanation of this sex difference.34 1
Some opponents, however, challenge the reliability of comparable
worth studies. These opponents question whether even existing job evaluation methodologies yield job ratings that are sufficiently consistent to
340. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
341. Cf Voos, supra note 318, at 202 (different tastes of male and female workers
"would not explain why wages are consistently found to be higher for heavily male
occupations, other things equal .....
).
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reliably demonstrate differential treatment of male and female jobs.3 "
Consistency requires that a given job evaluation system yield repeatable
outcomes when applied by different evaluators to the same set of jobs.

Studies show significant variation in individual analyses of jobs in
terms of tasks or compensable factors. 34 3 Since such job analyses are an
integral part of virtually every quantitative job evaluation, this undercuts
the repeatability of comparable worth studies. Job evaluations, however,
can mitigate the effects of such individual differences by having committees, composed for instance of incumbent employees, supervisors and
independent job analysts, perform the requisite job analyses.34 4 Careful
definition of the intrinsic job attributes by which the system ranks jobs also

can eliminate much of the individual variation in job analyses. Advocates
of comparable worth point to several studies that have used these
techniques to overcome problems with repeatability of outcomes. 4 5
Even if a system yields a repeatable outcome, the choice of the system
itself might influence the job evaluations it produces. Since different
342. See Schwab, supra note 195, at 59-60.
343. See Hackman & Oldham, Development of Job DiagnosticSurvey, 60 J. App.
PSYCH. 159, 165 (1975); Jenkins, Nadler, Lawler & Cammann, StandardizingObservations: An Approach to Measuring the Nature of Jobs, 60 J. APP. PSYCH. 171, 175 (1975).
These two studies, however, focused on job description methods meant to identify problems
of worker motivation and worker attitudes and behavior respectively, rather than providing
descriptions for setting wages.
Job analyses similar to those used in common job evaluation systems generally exhibit

average inter-analyst correlations of 0.50 and higher. NEW
note 226, at 93, (quoting 0. BuRos, THE EIGHTH MENTAL

YORK STATE STUDY, supra
MEASUREMENTS YEARBOOK

(1978)); see, e.g., Lawshe & Wilson, Studies in Job Evaluation: The Reliability of Two
Point Rating Systems, 31 J. App. PSYCH. 355, 360 (1947) (average correlation between
individual evaluators ranged from 0.51 for ratings of "job hazards" to 0.86 for "learning
period"; average correlation for total points was 0.89). Moreover, these inter-analyst
correlation for specific job factors may paint an overly pessimistic picture of the reliability
of the job analysis process because reliability of total points assigned to jobs generally
exceeds that for specific compensable factors. See, e.g., Lawshe & Farbro, Studies in Job
Evaluation: The Reliability of an Abbreviated Job Evaluation System, 33 J. APP. PSYCH.
158, 160 (1949) (reporting total point inter-analyst correlation of 0.89); Chesler,
Reliability and Comparability of Different Job Evaluation Systems, 32 J. App. PSYCH.
(465,471 (1948) (reporting reliability rates for total job evaluation systems of 0.93 to 0.99);
McCormick, Jeanneret & Mecham, A Study of Job Characteristics and Dimensions as
Based on the Position Analysis Questionnaire (PAQ), 56 J. App. PSYCH. 347, 365 (1972)
(multiple correlations between PAQ and existing wage rates ranged between 0.83-0.90).
344. See Lawshe & Wilson, supra note 343, at 361.
345. See, e.g., Clauss, supra note 2, at 53 & n. 195 (reporting how the Wisconsin Task
Force on Comparable Worth achieved very reliable job analyses by using committees to
evaluate jobs and by carefully defining compensable factors); see also NEW YORK STATE
STUDY, supra note 226, at 50-56, 93-95 (describing field studies used to eliminate
ambiguities and simplify the job description instrument used in the comparable worth
study, and reporting satisfactory reliability of the final questionnaire).
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systems depend on different subjective choices, objective consistency also
requires that the results from different accepted job evaluation systems
"converge."34" Results from the most prevalent job evaluation systems
correlate sufficiently to justify their use in implementing a particular
company's pay policy or for comparison of that policy with the pay
practices of similar companies. 34 71 No studies to date, however, have
ascertained whether different accepted job evaluation systems yield
sufficiently convergent conclusions regarding the relationship of job
"worth" and gender of job incumbents to justify the inference of occupational wage discrimination that proponents draw from comparable worth
studies. Data on convergence at present indicate only that job evaluation
methodologies appear to be promising candidates for a means of identify348
ing such discrimination.
Despite the promising outlook regarding consistency of traditional job
evaluations, extending application of job evaluation techniques to separate
occupational wage discrimination from legitimate pay decisions may
exacerbate reliability problems. Opponents claim that job evaluation
methodologies avoid being arbitrary only because they accept and interpolate from existing market values. 349 By abandoning the labor market as
potentially discriminatory, comparable worth inherently imposes nonobjective judgments about the appropriate value the market should place
on particular job attributes. 350 For example, a regression of nurturing
required by a job against pay might demonstrate that the labor market
places a negative value on this job attribute. This negative valuation,
however, might reflect the association of nurturing with women, the very
type of discrimination comparable worth means to eliminate. While
traditional application of job evaluation would merely accept this as a job
factor with negative weight, a decision as to whether and how to include
nurturing would have to be made if this job evaluation system were to be
used to generate a comparable worth study.
Choices of different compensable factors or factor weights can result
in different conclusions regarding whether an employer's pay practices
reflect discrimination against female jobs. If such choices are uncon346. See Schwab, supra note 195, at 61-62.
347. Robinson, Wahistran & Mecham, supra note 311, at 636. But cf Schwab, supra
note 195, at 62 (implying opposite conclusion from similar data).
348. Cf WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 81-82 (concluding that further
study of job evaluation techniques, aimed at enabling them to better address sex-based pay
discrimination, "would be very valuable").
349. Livernash, supra note 2, at 19-20; Schwab, supra note 195, at 76-77.
350. See D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 13, at 169-70; Hildebrand,
supra note 194, at 87.
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strained, comparable worth studies cannot reliably be expected to indicate
discrimination. But constraints on these choices essentially dictate the
"values" the studies place on particular job attributes. The liberal model
sees the imposition of these values as illegitimate because it contravenes the
market's aggregation of legitimate personal preferences and choices in the
private domain. Thus, the consistency requirement applied to comparable
worth studies leads back to the liberal debates about the proper boundary
between public and private spheres and about what constitutes market
discrimination rather than legitimate private choice.
3. The Propriety of Comparable Worth as a Remedy for
Occupational Wage Discrimination
The final question from the liberal perspective addresses the wisdom
of adopting a comparable worth doctrine as a remedy for pay discrimination against women's work. For those who accept the neoclassical description of the labor market, the goal of any remedy for discrimination should
be efficiency. The best outcome will be that which maximizes social wealth
subject to the postulate that tastes for discrimination, which the liberal
model deems illegitimate, are accorded no value. If one further assumes
that the labor market is, for the most part, competitive, then the "perfect
remedy" would alter the market only to the extent of eliminating the
influences of these illegitimate tastes for discrimination; any other remedial effects would inefficiently distort the economy."6 1
In the concrete context of occupational wage discrimination, illegitimate sex-conscious decisionmaking can alter economic outcomes via two
distinct mechanisms: crowding and direct devaluation of female jobs.
Under the crowding hypotheses, discriminatory hiring inflates the labor
supply for female jobs above the level that would prevail absent discrimination and lowers the market clearing wage. The same phenomena causes a
shortage of the supply for male jobs and inflates the wage for these jobs.
The ideal remedy would increase the wage for female jobs and decrease
that for male jobs to the level that would prevail absent discriminatory
barriers that prevent women from entering other jobs. Under the liberal
model, however, comparable worth would set women's wages at the
prevailing rate for comparable male jobs, accepting those as an indication
of the correct bases for compensation. This would set wages for all jobs,
male and female, higher than the "correct" wage, resulting in some
351. See. e.g., Fischel & Lazear, supranote 309, at 901-04 (analyzing the efficiency of
the crowding hypothesis assuming an otherwise competitive market).
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inefficiency.3 5 The wisdom of comparable worth then is reduced to an
empirical question of whether the efficiency loss due to discriminatory
overcrowding exceeds that which would result from comparable worth.3 5
Resolution of this question, like those focusing on the extent. to which the
wage gap and particular employers' pay practices reflect occupational
wage discrimination, requires the ability to establish the "correct" wage
for female jobs. The issue again thrusts us into the labyrinth of the debate
about what factors legitimately affect wages.
Under the devaluation hypothesis, depression of wages for female jobs
results from employers' perception of such jobs as less valuable than the
jobs' contributions to productivity and profits. Thus the demand curve for
such jobs falls below the nondiscriminatory demand curve and results in a
lower wage and under-utilization of female jobs. Comparable worth would
force the employer to increase the wage to the nondiscriminatory level.
Wage for female jobs will increase but, according to neoclassical economics, employers will respond by decreasing the number of female jobs.35"
Comparable worth will then result in an economic output that is farther
from the nondiscriminatory ideal than that without comparable worth.3"5
Accepting the liberal goal of achievement of the nondiscriminatory level of
production and distribution of wealth, society would be better off by not
adopting comparable worth and having the government distribute a lump
sum payment to women working in predominately female jobs.3 56
This analysis, however, treats the "correct" wages as determined by
productivity alone. It ignores that wages also provide workers a measure of
self worth. "[A]n employee . . . may regard his own relative pay as his
'score', with which he is credited; a group of employees may regard the
relative pay of their occupation as the measure of the value that society sets
352. See id. at 902-04 (explaining more thoroughly the potential inefficiency that
would result from a comparable worth remedy).
353. See Holzhauer, supra note 264, at 922-24.
354. Neoclassical microeconomics assumes that individual preferences are exogenous
to the economic system - in other words, that consumer tastes do not depend on prices. See
E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICs, THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 78 (6th ed. 1988). Under
this assumption, "taste" for discrimination that causes the depressed demand curve will not
change as a result of the increase in pay for female jobs, and employers will continue to
operate along this discriminatory curve. The assumption of exogenous tastes parallels the
liberal model's assumption of autonomous beings whose preferences and values drive
economic and political outcomes rather than being a result of the economic and political
systems historically in place.
355. See J. Jacobsen, The Economics of ComparableWorth: Theoretical Considerations, in COMPARABLE WORTH: ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE 36, 43 (M. Hill & M.
Killingsworth eds. 1989).
356. See Fischel & Lazear, supra note 309, at 909-10.
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upon their qualifications." '5 7 Simply giving women as much money as they
would earn under a comparable worth scheme will not allow women to
achieve the same status or level of self esteem as they would obtain by
receiving a greater salary for the work they perform.
Defenders of comparable worth also do not accept this analysis'
underlying premise of a highly competitive labor market.3 58 If employers
act as monopsonistic purchasers of labor, comparable worth will not only
result in a fairer wage to workers in female jobs, but it will also increase the
quantity of such jobs toward the optimal nondiscriminatory level.3 59
For those who believe that enough imperfections plague the labor
market to make the institutional model more accurate than the neoclassical model, the entire notion of evaluating comparable worth relative to an
economically ideal outcome makes little sense. The institutional model
rejects the notion that supply and demand determine an efficient market
clearing price and quantity. Using this model, the best one can do is
compare the potential costs and benefits comparable worth would impose
on the existing economy without regard to an efficient ideal."'
The costs of comparable worth differ from those imposed by Title VII
because, rather than dictate only that employers hire women instead of
men, comparable worth requires employers to increase pay to their
workforces. Unlike Title VII, comparable worth's prospective remedy
imposes a direct cost independent of administrative costs and retroactive
relief. And, unlike the EPA, comparable worth would impose this cost on a
substantial proportion of employers. It would not be limited to the rare
instances of unequal pay for equal work. Estimates of the costs vary from
about $2 billion to $400 billion.3"' But many of these estimates unrealistically assume that all occupational wage differentials, discriminatory or
357. H. PHELPS BROWN, supra note 294, at 129; see also Becker, supra note 251, at
943 n.40.
358. See, e.g., Holzhauer, supra note 264, at 924 (noting that employers may act as
monopsonists); WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supranote 188, at 45 (rejecting the competitive
market theory of wage determination because employees often do not know of job
opportunities, and face economic and psychological barriers to job mobility); Marshall &
Paulin, The Employment and Earnings of Women: The Comparable Worth Debate, in
ISSUE FOR THE 80's, supranote 2, at 208-09 (recognizing that" 'inefficient behavior' may be
penalized in a competitive labor market, but the fact remains that the labor market is not
perfectly competitive in the neoclassical sense.").
359. See Holzhauer, supra note 264, at 926.
360. Much of the literature therefore simply identifies and balances these costs and
benefits. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note I, at 1793-94; Clauss, supra note 2, at 92-93;
Marshall & Paulin, supra note 8, at 210-11.
361. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: AN ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 38 (1985); Ncwmnan & Vonhof, supra note 5, at 309; Marshall
Paulin, supra note 358, at 210.
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otherwise, will be universally and immediately eliminated." 2 These costs
can be decreased by limiting the applicability of comparable worth, for
example to large employers or governmental entities, 363 and phasing it in
over time. Even without such limitations, the realistic costs are not so great
that they would cripple the economy.
The primary potential benefit of comparable worth, from the liberal
perspective, is its ability to decrease the wage gap between men and women
workers. But the ability of comparable worth to reduce the gap is
uncertain. Comparable worth addresses only discriminatory depression of
pay for female jobs and the extent to which this discrimination contributes
to the wage gap is controversial. Discrimination remediable by comparable
worth is additionally circumscribed because, as presently envisioned, it will
not rectify inter-firm pay differentials. Therefore, it will not remedy that
portion of the gap attributable to men working for high paying firms and
women for low paying firms, even if this phenomenon results from
occupational sex segregation and devaluation of female jobs. Thus, at least
one commentator has concluded comparable worth is not justified because
it will not appreciably increase women's relative earnings.36 4
This argument, however, has not convinced others who have considered it.36 5 While much sex-segregation occurs by particular firms hiring
mostly men or mostly women, intra-firm segregation of women into lower
362. See Blumrosen, Remedies For Wage Discrimination,20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 99,
153 (1986); Remick & Steinberg, Technical PossibilitiesandPoliticalRealities, Concluding Remarks, in TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES, supra note 2, at 290. The actual costs imposed
by a comparable worth remedy depend on the specifics of how the doctrine is implemented.
The assumption that it will require employers to totally eliminate the entire wage gap is
unrealistic. See id. at 290-92. More realistic estimates can be gained from jurisdictions
which have adopted some form of comparable worth. For example, Minnesota's adoption of
comparable worth for its state workers cost 3.7 % of its payroll budget. See S. EVANS & B.
NELSON, supra note 74, at 3. Moreover, one can interpret the direct costs of a comparable
worth remedy as an indication of the extent of occupational wage discrimination.
Therefore, the greater the "cost," the greater the need for the remedy. See Marshall &
Paulin, supra note 358, at 210; Blumrosen supra, at 154.
363. Government entities and larger employers in a particular locale often dominate
the market for female jobs and establish the going rate of pay for such jobs. See Holzhauer,
supra note 264, at 924 & n. 10. Thus, restricting comparable worth to large employers in a
locale may yield the same remedial results as a broader application but entail lower costs.
364. See Weiler, supra note 1, at 1792-93.
365. See Sorenson, The Wage Effects of OccupationalWage Composition:A Review

and New Findings, in ANALYSIS AND

EVIDENCE,

supranote 355, at 57 (critiquing previous

studies finding minimal effect of intra-firm occupational segregation on wage gap and
concluding that such segregation explains 20%-30% of the gap). See, e.g., Johnson &
Solon, supra note 308, at 206; WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 92-93;
WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK,

supra note 333, at 12-13.
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paying jobs is also pervasive. 368 Comparable worth studies of particular
organizations' pay practices have revealed significant pay disparities that,
if rectified, would provide a sizeable benefit to employees working for these

organizations in predominately female jobs.

67

More fundamentally, from the liberal perspective, opponents' focus
on comparable worth's effect on the wage gap, rather than on its effect on
pay for women's work, is questionable. Even abandoning the notion of an
economically efficient ideal, the liberal model aims to implement the
outcome that would result from elimination of discriminatory market
processes. The wage gap, however, focuses on results rather than processes;
it is a "bottom line" measure that does not comport with the sex-neutral
treatment mandated by the liberal model. 36 8 The liberal goal is not
necessarily a zero wage gap, but rather female jobs priced independent of
the effects of crowding, discriminatory devaluation of women's work, or
monopsonist sex-segregation and price discrimination.
By focusing on the wage gap as the indication of comparable worth's
efficacy, the debate understates the beneficial effect of comparable worth.
Both men and women who work in female jobs would receive greater pay
under a comparable worth doctrine. In fact, studies have shown that the
average man who works in a female job suffers a greater discriminatory
decrease in earnings than the average woman in such a job.36 9 Because
comparable worth will benefit some men as well as disadvantage some
women, its effect on the wage gap will be smaller than its effect on wages of
366. See Bridges & Berk, Sex, Earnings, and the Nature of Work: A Job-Level
Analysis of Male-Female Income Differences, 58 Soc. Sci. Q. 553, 555-60 (1978) (whitecollar predominately female jobs in Chicago financial firms paid less primarily because they
compensated incumbents' job characteristics at a lower rate than those of predominately
male jobs); Halaby, Sexual Inequality in the Work Place: An Employer-Specific Analysis
of Pay Differences, 8 Soc. Sci. RESEARCH 79, 94-95 (1979) (female managers in a public
utility earned less than male managers primarily because women were in the lower ranks of
management to an extent not explained by human capital differences); Malkiel & Malkiel,
supra note 324, at 702 (one-quarter of the male-female wage differential for professional
employees of a single corporation could not be explained by differences in human capital
and appears attributable to assignment of women to lower level jobs).
367. See, e.g., S. EVANS & B. NELSON, supra note 74, at 98 (reporting a $2200
average pay equity raise implemented by the comparable worth plan for state workers in
Minnesota); WASHINGTON STATE STUDY, supra note 226, at 20 (reporting a 20 % disparity
in pay between female jobs and male jobs); see also Blumrosen, supra note 362, at 155 &
n. 169 (comparable worth studies "have demonstrated a pervasive 20 % difference between
the evaluated scores for predominately women's jobs and the market rates for comparable
jobs.").
368. Cf supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text (noting how the Supreme Court's
rejection of a "bottom-line" test under the disparate impact doctrine comports with the
liberal model of sexual equality).
369. See Johnson & Solon, supra note 308, at 198.
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workers, male and female, who work in predominately female jobs.37 0
Under the liberal model, however, comparable worth's benefit is the extent
to which it increases the wages of all employees, male and female, suffering
from wage discrimination of female jobs.
Opponents also argue that the disemployment effect of raising pay for
female jobs will decrease benefits from comparable worth. An increase in
pay will cause employers to reduce the number of jobs, which might result
in women as a group receiving less pay than without comparable worth.3 7 1
Proponents have responded, however, that the disemployment effect
depends on the elasticity of demand for the jobs in question. Many women's
jobs involve provision of services and therefore are not capital intensive;
their elasticity of demand is likely to be low. 372 Moreover, if the institutional view of the labor market is accurate, employers might respond by
restructuring job tasks to make female jobs more important rather than
reducing their number. Empirical data from organizations that have
adopted comparable worth policies seem to indicate that disemployment
3 73
effects are small.
370. See Weiler, supra note 1, at 1790-91 n.224, citing Johnson & Solon, PAY
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WOMEN'S AND MEN'S JOBS: THE EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARABLE WORTH LEGISLATION 9 (1984) (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 1472) (concluding that the percentage of females in an occupation
depressed the wage of the average worker 9%, but explains only 7% of the wage gap).
371. See D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 13, at 171; Killingsworth,
supra note 183, at 187-88; Weiler, supra note 1, at 1776-77 (but noting that the Australian
experience with comparable worth resulted in "a sharp net improvement... [for] women
on the whole").
372. See Remick & Steinberg, supra note 362, at 293. "The few econometric studies
that have estimated [disemployment] effects indicate [these] . . . effect[s] would be fairly
small, at least in the U.S. public sector." See Voos, supra note 318, at 202, (citing R.
Ehrenberg & R. Smith, COMPARABLE WORTH IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, NationalBureauof
EconomicResearch (1984), G. JOHNSON & G. SOLON, PAY DIFFERS BETWEEN MEN'S AND
WOMEN'S JOBS: THE EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARABLE WORTH LEGISLATION

(National Bureau of Economic Resources) (1984); but cf. Johnson & Solon, supra note
308, at 203 (reporting an econometric model that predicts the major effect of comparable
worth would be to transfer income from holders of uncovered women's jobs to those in
covered women's jobs).
373. The major empirical evidence comes from Australia's experience after it
implemented a comprehensive comparable worth law in the early 1970's. Following this
implementation, women's wages increased 30% more than men's wages and women
continued to increase their share of the labor market. Gregory & Duncan, Segmented
Labor Market Theories and the Australian Experience of Equal Pay For Women, 3 J.
POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 403, 422 (1981). Opponents, however, challenge this conclusion
asserting that without comparable worth women's employment would have grown at a
faster pace. See Killingsworth, supra note 183, at 188 (reporting that women's employment
growth relative to that of men fell from 4.3 % to 3.0 % and women's unemployment rate was
0.5% higher than it would have been without comparable worth). Limited data from
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Proponents contend that comparable worth will indirectly result in a
second benefit - a reduction of sex segregation of jobs. Increased wages
for female jobs will attract men who demand greater pay than do many
women. 74 Comparable worth also reduces monopsonistic employers'
incentive to maintain occupational sex segregation by limiting their ability
to price discriminate between male and female workers. But, to the extent
sex-segregation of jobs results from employer discrimination in job
assignment, Title VII's proscription of discriminatory hiring and promotion provides a more direct remedy and avoids the costs and economic
distortions that result from comparable worth's direct effect on market
prices for labor. And, to the extent that sex-segregation results from sexrole socialization, the liberal model views segregation ambivalently since it
may reflect legitimate private choices. The liberal model prefers to address
the problem of sex-role socialization by private persuasion of individuals to
change their life outlooks and personal preferences rather than by the
government mandating conduct that may be inconsistent with those
preferences.37 5
4.

The Liberal Model's Conclusion Regarding Comparable Worth

The liberal perspective thus entertains comparable worth as a
potentially legitimate means of identifying and remedying discrimination
that depresses pay for women's work, but remains ambivalent toward
comparable worth because no one has yet devised a particular mechanism
that adequately distinguishes between the effects of legitimate private
choice and sex-based market decisions. The liberal model fails to recognize
that the lack of guidance in its definition of discrimination prevents
empirical analyses from making these distinctions. In fact, the liberal
model attempts to hide its definition's lack of guidance by characterizing it
as insufficiency of empirical technique.
The liberal model's respect for private individual choice also leads to
its disapproval of interference with social institutions in ways that might
frustrate that choice. The regulation of wages and prices, however, directly
threatens disruption of market signals that reflect such choices. Therefore,
the liberal perspective frowns upon wage regulation except when market
imperfections are unavoidable or that regulation is necessary to achieve a
public policy of overriding importance. This general disapproval of
Minnesota's recent implementation for its state workers shows that fears of large
disemployment effects appear unfounded. See Rothschild, supra note 226, at 214.
374. See Holzhauer, supra note 264, at 931; Clauss, supra note 2, at 69 & n.259.
375. See D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 13, at 172.
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governmental interference with wage rates, along with the ambiguity
about the causes of the wage gap, leads many liberals to dismiss

comparable worth as unnecessary or too costly given its potential
benefits.37
C.

The Feminist Response to Liberal Critiquesof Comparable Worth

The feminist model of equality rejects the public/private distinction
and the reverence for individual preferences that result in the liberal
model's hesitancy to support comparable worth. Because feminists believe
that patriarchal institutions have pervasively colored personal values, they
generally reject the neoclassical model of labor markets, which builds upon
acceptance and respect for consumer and worker tastes. They subscribe
instead to the institutional model, which sees the market as composed of
institutions that reflect psychological and political influences.3 7 From the
feminist perspective women and men alike have been acculturated to
devalue work done by women. Therefore, the goal of sex-based employment anti-discrimination law should be to alter existing labor market
institutions that maintain this devaluation and undo the existing
patriarchal impact on the workplace.
1. The Wage Gap as Evidence of Occupational Wage

Discrimination
From the feminist perspective, women's tendency to work in jobs that
pay less than male jobs indicates discrimination even if it is due to sexdifferentiated personal choices made in the private sphere. Extra-market
376. Judicial treatment of comparable worth under Title VII mirrors the ambivalence
of the liberal model underlying the statute. Courts generally have refused to endorse
comparable worth as an independent theory of liability. See American Nurses Ass'n v.
Illinois, 783 F.2d 716,723 (7th Cir. 1986); AFSCMEv. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1407
(1985); Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 888 (1980). But some courts have treated an employer's pay policy as suspect
where plaintiffs show that the difference between pay for two jobs greatly deviates from the
expected wage based on the intrinsic attributes of the jobs. See, e.g, California State
Employees' Ass'n v. California, 682 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (plaintiff
established prima facie case by comparing female jobs such as stenographer, nurse and
librarian with male jobs such as groundskeeper, photographer, and highway equipment
cleaner); Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435, 445 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (plaintiff
established prima facie case by comparing nurses to sanitarians since jobs were "of
comparable value to an employer").
377. See, e.g., S. EVANS & B. NELSON, supra note 74, at 46-53 (describing both
neoclassical and institutional approaches as having some advantages, but questioning the
neoclassical approach on several grounds); Hartmann, Research Needs in Comparable
Worth, in IRRA PROCEEDINGS supra note 183, at 177; Steinberg, supra note 205, at 100.
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choices that explain the wage gap merely indicate that the workplace is
structured to penalize women for their sex-distinct set of personal
choices.37 That patriarchal society defines these extra-market choices,
such as the homemaker and child-rearing roles, as appropriately female
only exacerbates the problem for it results in women paying a psychological penalty if they attempt to deviate from these roles.
The feminist perspective also views humans as fundamentally connected rather than as isolated autonomous beings whose preferences can be
aggregated into a value-neutral set of prices. Thus, the feminist model
rejects the liberal focus on objectively calculable benefits as a measure of
social "well-being." Instead, its view of society as competing gender classes
implies that the definition of social welfare is itself political. It sees societal
institutions as chosen to satisfy historically patriarchal political and social
goals rather than as evolving to best satisfy individual freedom or to
maximize aggregate utility.
The feminist model's rejection of the public/private distinction,
combined with its insistence that social welfare is politically defined,
implies that society makes political choices about the worth of job
attributes. These choices directly influence pay for particular jobs. From
the feminist perspective, whether the wage gap evidences discrimination
depends on the attributes society chooses to deem as valuable.3 79 "At issue
in the comparable worth debate are fundamental questions . . . of social
priorities. Do we want a social order in which parking attendants earn more
than child care attendants, and state liquor clerks more than school
teachers ....,,380 The feminist model of sexual equality, of course, also
requires gender parity. Accordingly, the attributes society chooses to value
should respect the lifestyle and preferences (both personal and public) of
women. To the extent the wage gap cannot be explained in terms of chosen
values that meet the feminist definition of equality, it evidences wage
discrimination.
Many of the liberal perspective's legitimate explanations of the wage
gap thus become discriminatory from the feminist outlook. The feminist
outlook does not tolerate gender distinctions that patriarchal society
condones, but which operate to exclude women from equal representation
378. See Littleton, supra note 47, at 1054.
379. Accord id. at 1057-58 (feminist model of equality would "support challenge to
the overvaluation of'male' skills (and corresponding undervaluation of female ones) in the
job evaluation systems used by employers, .. rather than limiting challenges to unequal
application.").
380. Rhode, Gender and Jurisprudence:An Agenda For Research, 56 U. CIN. L.
REV. 521, 528 (i987).
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in the workplace. For example, marital status, number of children and type
of job (where the classifications distinguish between male and female
occupations) are themselves discriminatory causes of gender-pay disparities. Therefore, they should be excluded from the set of "legitimate"
factors used to explain the gap. Without these factors to explain the wage
gap, data clearly support the correlation between women's lower pay and
sex-segregation of jobs. 8 1 Thus, sex discrimination, as the feminist model
defines it, plays a significant role in causing pay inequity.
2.

Consistency of Comparable Worth Studies

The feminist model's answer to the liberal critique that much of the
wage gap does not reflect discrimination also responds to the liberal
perspective's demand for objectivity of comparable worth studies. Respect
for personal values led the liberal model to demand consistency between
comparable worth studies premised on different subjective value judgments such as what factors should be included in job descriptions. The
feminist model critiques the liberal's requirement of value-neutral measures of discrimination as a political choice, one which by default
legitimizes historically developed preferences that feminists perceive as
patriarchal and, therefore, discriminatory. The feminist perspective instead views any measure of discrimination as political and hence value
laden. It thus is not necessarily bothered by an outcome dependent on value
judgments.
The feminist model still requires that the job evaluation system chosen
to compare male and female jobs be self-consistent. This means that
conclusions drawn by one set of unbiased individuals applying the system
must be replicable by others using the same system. Recent comparable
worth studies, however, have demonstrated that a system can be designed
to give repeatable results even when applied across a wide range of jobs
staffed by workers characteristically viewed as participating in distinct
labor markets.38 2
From the feminist perspective, a more vexing problem is how to choose
between systems that embody different value choices. 3 One answer is to
381. See WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 34-35 (1970 Census data
expanded occupational classifications (479 occupations) indicated that 35-41 % of the
wage gap resulted from occupational segregation); WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK, supra
note 333, at 10-11 (current population survey data using a broad occupational classification
(24 occupations) indicated that, in 1970 and 1979 respectively, 22 %, and 18 % of the wage
gap was attributable to occupational segregation).
382. See supra note 226-27 and accompanying text.
383. The liberal model's reverence for value neutrality, and its resulting requirement
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rely on the feminist recognition that this choice is political and leave the
choice to the political process - that is to the legislature.38 4 The
legislature, however, is itself an institution influenced by patriarchy.
Therefore, allowing the legislature to make the value choices is unlikely to
eliminate patriarchy's impact. An even greater fear is that legislation
promoted as beneficial to women will in fact fortify the system society has
designed to maintain male dominance.3 8 5 This fear is supported by
historical instances of paternalistic legislatures which imposed restrictions
3 86
on women's opportunities to work in male occupations.
Nonetheless, regardless of the value choices the legislature actually
makes, the simple requirement of evaluation of jobs under a specific system
brings to light the criterion used to set pay and requires that those criteria
be applied consistently. This alone probably would reduce "pay differentials resulting from traditional stereotypes regarding the value of 'women's
work.' ",387 Moreover, comparable worth applies to male and female job
incumbents alike and does not restrict any individual worker's job
opportunities based on sex. Given these characteristics and recognition
that wages reflect an employee's status and significance in the workforce, it
is difficult to imagine how a legislature could structure explicit efforts to
increase pay for female jobs to limit rather than expand women's influence
in the workplace. A more convincing reason, however, to allow legislatures
to make the value judgments underlying comparable worth is that it is
worse to ignore occupational wage discrimination. There appears to be no
less biased institution than the legislature to which we can entrust these
38
decisions.
that the conclusions of different comparable worth studies be consistent, make this issue
irrelevant from the liberal perspective.
384. The legislature need not decide on the details of a comparable worth system. It
may instead delegate the decisions detailing the implementation and execution of
comparable worth studies to agencies or even to courts. For example, in 1981, the
Minnesota state legislature established a task force composed of "members of the State
House and Senate, representatives of the Department of Employee Relations, union
representatives and members of the public" to study pay practices for state employees.
Rothschild, supra note 226, at 210. This task force completed the comparable worth study
for state employees using the Hay job evaluation system. Id. The legislature appropriated
funds and left detailed implementation to the collective bargaining process between
employee unions and the state. Id. at 211.
385. Cf Williams, supra note 37, at 822 (arguing more generally that relational (i.e.,
cultural) feminism's recognition of gender differences threatens the continued oppression
of women).
386. See D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 13, at 36-41; J.POLE, supra
note 26, at 314.
387. WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 188, at 95.
388. Some commentators have suggested that comparable worth be implemented
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3. The Benefits of Comparable Worth Revisited
From the feminist outlook, the liberal model's lack of historical
context and its respect for individual preferences also prejudices its
calculation of costs and benefits. The neoclassical notion of efficiency
derives from consumers' willingness and ability to pay. It therefore "is a
product of existing distributions of wealth, entitlements and preferences,
all of which have been affected by discrimination based on gender."38 As
soon as we entertain altering consumer tastes, we no longer have a welldefined concept of efficiency by which to compare outcomes. It may be that
an outcome which is Pareto superior to a second outcome given one set of
consumer indifference curves is Pareto inferior as measured in accordance
with a second set of such curves. Since the feminist perspective looks at
comparable worth as a means of changing individuals' valuation of
women's preferences and choices, it expands the horizon under consideration beyond that envisioned by neoclassical microeconomics into a realm
where efficiency has little meaning.
Thus, we cannot accept the costs cited by opponents to comparable
worth as a meaningful indication of the ultimate burden this doctrine may
place on society. Such costs may be offset by productivity gains due to
comparable worth's effect on the structure of the workplace. 9 More
fundamentally, these costs may be reduced by society members' reevaluation of the importance of what they give up for comparable worth. For
example, today's opportunity cost of a man working shorter hours so he can
take care of his children while his wife works might be seen tomorrow as a
benefit for which the man would gladly pay his lost income.
Rather than focus on measurable dollar benefits, the feminist model's
goal of alteration of personal tastes also leads it to focus on comparable
worth's ability to change societal norms that devalue the worth of women
and their work. Because patriarchy is so universal, and at the same time so
well ensconced that it hides its influence on many of the day-to-day choices
through the activities of labor unions without government intervention. See, e.g., Weiler,
supra note 1,at 1798-1801. Where possible, union involvement in implementing comparable worth is desirable, since it will provide for employee participation and consensus most
likely to result in a workable plan. But unions do not represent most women workers and
those that do are frequently sex-segregated. Id. at 1799. Implementation by unions will at
best be piecemeal, and their impact limited by the lack of moral force inherent in the
collective bargaining process. Thus, legislative mandating of comparable worth that allows
for union participation seems preferable to relying on voluntary union action.
389. Becker, supra note 251, at 937.
390. See Bergmann & Gray, Economic Models As A Means of Calculating Legal
Compensation Claims, in TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES supra note 2, at 170; see also text
accompanying infra note 397.
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of mainstream society, its subtle effects cannot easily be eliminated.
Moreover, matters of taste do not readily lend themselves to reasoned
criticism; argument can address only the implications of maintaining such
tastes. Value preferences firmly embedded in society cannot easily be
changed without a mechanism to allow individuals to experience the
39 1
changed tastes.
Consistent with the hypothesis that experiential learning is necessary
for alteration of personal preferences, "social psychologists have determined that an effective way of changing a person's attitude is not
necessarily to present a persuasive communication, but instead to commit
'392
the person to behavior that goes against his or her current beliefs.
Comparable worth implements such a program to change individual
beliefs about the value of women's work by committing employers to pay
female jobs at a rate above that consistent with employers' present beliefs.
Since consumers ultimately will have to pay relatively more for services
provided predominately by women, comparable worth commits society as a
whole to behavior inconsistent with most individuals' unconscious evaluation of the worth of women's work. Thus comparable worth holds the
radical potential to alleviate the undervaluation of women that patriarchal
393
societies have instilled from time immemorial.
Comparable worth's radical potential should not be surprising since,
in the past, workers have used similar commitments of employers to behave
at odds with market values to alter societal values. For example, minimum
wage legislation has effectively altered societal conceptions of the worth of
even the least valuable day's work. Union negotiation for a "living wage"
has acculturated workers and employers alike to the notion that no man
should work full-time for less money than he needs to provide an adequate
lifestyle for himself and his family. This has led to pay "considerably above
minimum wage even for such entry level jobs as laborer or custodian.1 394
And, of particular note for attempts to alter social norms of equality,
perhaps the "greatest effect [of Title VII] has been to change cultural
norms; no longer is explicit discrimination on the basis of sex widely
regarded as natural and unobjectionable. ' ' 39 5 It is this radical potential of
comparable worth that lies at the heart of the liberal model's ambivalence
391. Cf.F. BLAU & M. FERBER, supra note 188, at 71.
392. Zanna & Sande, The Effects Of Collective Actions on the Attitudes of
Individual Group Members: A Dissonance Analysis, in 5 SOCIAL INFLUENCE: THE
ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 151 (M. Zanna, J. Olson & C. Herman eds. 1987); see also L.
FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 31 (1957).
393. See Steinberg, supra note 316, at 24-25.
394. Remick, supra note 290, at 114.
395. Becker, supra note 251, at 939.
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toward the theory. It is this radical potential that makes comparable worth
so important from the feminist perspective.
In addition to altering societal norms to comport with the feminist
model of equality of representation, comparable worth would directly
encourage changes in workplace structures to give women greater influence. Increasing wages for female jobs would encourage more women to
make a greater commitment to the workplace. According to human capital
theory, this in turn would cause a greater commitment by men to
nonmarket (i.e., family) responsibilities. 396 According to institutional
labor economics, wages do not merely mirror technology and tastes by
responding to supply and demand; they also affect employers' decisions
about how to structure the workplace. Rather than setting wages equal to
the marginal worth of the job, employers often define job tasks so that the
marginal worth of the job equals the largely psychologically determined
wage. Under this thesis, increases in pay for female jobs will result in a
redefinition of job tasks making the jobs more important to the employer.3 97 Thus, comparable worth may change the labor market to
encourage greater overall participation by women as well as greater
involvement of women in fundamental workplace tasks and decisions.
Finally, the feminist perspective sees comparable worth as an important means of increasing women's self esteem. As previously noted,
workers view pay as a measure of their worth to society. Increasing
women's pay thus should also increase their feeling of self worth. This
alone, however, does not distinguish comparable worth from the liberal
perspective's preferred remedy of hiring women into better paying male
jobs since that too increases women worker's pay and self esteem. But for
many women, the increase in self regard that results from the liberal ideal
demands that they forfeit aspects of their personal lives that they have
chosen and society encourages as gender appropriate. Thus, for many
women the self esteem they derive from successful careers is offset by
insecurities about their "failings" as wives and mothers.3 9 8 Comparable
worth avoids placing women on the horns of this dilemma.
The psychological impact on workers of reevaluating the worth of jobs
also differs greatly from the effect of the Title VII remedy of promoting
particular women. This is so because pay is both influenced by and
influences one's social position.
BLAU & M. FERBER, supra note 188, at 40-45.
397. See Bergman & Gray, supra note 390, at 170.
398. See Powers, Sex Segregationand the Ambivalent Directionsof Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 55, 96; cf Littleton, supra note 47, at 1051 (describing tension
between success and roles of child-rearing).

396. See F.
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. rank ordering of occupations by status will be much the

same as that by pay. The similarity in this respect of societies that differ
widely in respect of culture and of political and economic organization,
indicates a general agreement about which qualities are worth paying more
for and which attract the attribution of higher status. .

.

. [P]ay is

regarded as the natural complement to or outcome of status. This is
supported by a feedback: the members of an occupation that attains
relatively high pay by the working of the market will be enabled by that pay
to maintain the kind of lifestyle to which high status is attributed. The
association also tends to maintain itself as it becomes hallowed by
custom. 9"

The feminist model recognizes this psychological relationship between
status and pay. It sees comparable worth as an important mechanism for
altering the hallowed customs that relegate women to second class
citizenry.
CONCLUSION

Society today has yet to reach any consensus about the ideology
underlying the phrase "sexual equality." Existing employment discrimination law mirrors this societal discord. The Equal Pay Act implements a
conservative model of equality that recognizes the significance of sex
differences in the workplace. But the Act adheres to a limited but
overriding principle that workers performing the same work should receive
equal pay irrespective of their needs for income or differing social roles
outside the workplace. Title VII adopts the liberal principle that ultimately
labor market participants should make decisions in a sex-neutral manner.
The call for comparable worth, however, stems in large part from a
dissatisfaction with these two traditional views of sexual equality. It
reflects the feminist demand that employers accommodate women's
choices and preferences in structuring the workplace.
Unfortunately, the debate about whether and how to implement
comparable worth has not explicitly invoked the feminist model of
equality. As a result, much of the debate appears to focus on empirical
questions, such as whether the wage gap results from employer discrimination or from many women voluntarily choosing to emphasize satisfaction of
interpersonal relationships at the expense of devotion to the competitive,
impersonal workplace. From the conservative or liberal perspectives, this
focus almost guarantees the conclusion that comparable worth is not
justified. The conservative model presupposes that women make different
399. H.

PHELPS BROWN,

supra note 294, at 142 (emphasis added).

1990]

COMPARABLE WORTH

373

choices that affect their productivity; the liberal model distrusts government interference with wages and prices unless the existence of illegitimate
sex-conscious pay practices are clearly demonstrated. From the feminist
perspective, however, equality requires that the workplace accord women's
outlook equal respect. Women must participate in and influence the
structure of the labor market on an equal footing with men. Feminist
ideology supports revaluation of women's work in order to encourage
women's participation in the workplace without penalizing them for their
choice of lifestyles. Comparable worth provides the method for that
revaluation and thus its adoption is a crucial step on the road to sexual
equality both in the workplace and beyond.

